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Abstract 
Stuar t D a v i d Lander 
Policing Partnerships: A n Investigation into the Police Response to 
Partnership Working in the Wake of the 1998 Crime and Disorder 
Act 
This thesis is based u p o n empir ica l research, w h i c h explores how the 
police service i n one Cons tabula ry area has accommodated the 
mandate to work i n cr ime prevention par tnerships w i t h other agencies, 
following the implementa t ion of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act . The 
focus is specifically u p o n crime a n d disorder reduct ion partnerships 
(CDRPs). The research is based u p o n a mul t i -method research design. 
It draws mos t heavily u p o n data obtained from semi-structured 
interviews w i t h police officers ho ld ing vary ing experiences of crime 
prevention par tnership work ing across one Cons tabu la ry area. It also 
analyses official documents , a n d draws u p o n the results of a short 
survey combined w i t h the author 's own relevant experiences as a 
serving police officer engaged wi th in the par tnership arena. 
The research is informed by a li terature review, w h i c h examines the 
police service role i n cr ime prevention alongside wider aspects of police 
reform a n d par tnership working . The l i terature review suggests the 
police service has been d rawn reluctant ly into greater engagement wi th 
crime prevention, a n d that cr ime prevention competes, often 
unsuccessful ly , against other aspects of pol ic ing, w h i c h have been 
promoted w i t h i n the wider police reform agenda. It also suggests that 
par tnership work ing i n crime prevention has h a d a difficult and 
chequered history. Despite official efforts to encourage the adoption of 
'cr i t ical success factors' i n par tnership work ing , s u c h work ing has more 
usua l ly encountered a range of obstacles, re la t ing par t icular ly to 
difficulties i n inter-organisat ional relations, a n d the ambiguit ies 
contradict ions a n d tensions, w h i c h have been a n inherent feature of 
pol icy m a k i n g i n this area. 
The research u p o n w h i c h this thesis is based supports m u c h of what is 
found i n the literature, however, i t also expands considerably u p o n the 
problems posed to par tnership work ing by a range of ' intra'-
organisat ional issues . In par t icular , cer tain features of the police 
organisat ional a n d occupat ional cul ture , w h i c h serve to Undermine 
par tnership work ing by treating i t more as a symbol ic , legitimacy-
bu i ld ing funct ion a n d by regarding i t as out-of-place w i t h i n a largely 
'detectionist', 'here a n d now', dominan t cons t ruc t ion of pol ic ing. In 
addit ion, by in t roduc ing alternative l i n e s of accountabi l i ty ' th rough to 
government offices, as wel l as to other agencies, par tnership working , i n 
the wake of the 1998 Cr ime and Disorder Ac t , provokes a n in ternal 
organisat ional poli t ics , w h i c h threatens to unde rmine the authori ty of 
police headquarters a n d has prompted a defensive in te rna l response, 
w h i c h cont inues w i t h the advent of Loca l A r e a Agreements (LAAs). 
Despite or even because of these problems, the police have tended to 
dominate loca l C D R P s i n the areas examined by the research. However, 
they have used s u c h dominance largely to conta in the threat to the 
cul ture a n d authori ty of the police, rather t h a n to exploit the potential 
for genuine, proactive, problem-oriented par tnership work ing . 
List of Contents 
Introduction 1-10 
1. A n Overview of the Development of Crime 
Prevention and Community Safety from a 
Police Service Perspective 
1.1 Introduct ion 11-12 
1.2 The E a r l y Beginnings 12-16 
1.3 Conservative Cr ime Prevention Pol icy 17-21 
1.4 Cr ime Prevention Pol icy under New Labou r 22-28 
1.5 Chapter S u m m a r y 28-31 
2. Police Reform 
2.1 Introduct ion 32 
2.2 The Emergence of Permanent , Professional 32-43 
Pol ic ing 
2.3 Police Reform unde r New Labou r 43-50 
2.4 Chapter S u m m a i y 50-52 
3. Success of the Partnership Approach 
3.1 Introduct ion 53-55 
3.2 Trac ing the Development of the 55-65 
Par tnership Approach to Cr ime Prevent ion 
3.3 Cr i t i ca l Success Factors i n Par tnership 65-68 
W o r k i n g 
3.4 Cr i t i ca l Perspectives o n Par tnership 68-75 
W o r k i n g 
3.5 Chapter S u m m a r y 76 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Int roduct ion 77 
4.2 The Research Quest ions 77-79 
4.3 Developing the Research Strategy 79 
4.4 Prac t ica l Considerat ions 79-82 
4.5 E t h i c a l Considerat ions 82-83 
4.6 Integrity 83 
4.7 Confidential i ty a n d Anonymi ty 83-84 
4.8 Informed Consent 84-85 
4.9 Selecting the Research Methods 85-88 
4.10 Rel iabi l i ty 88-91 
4.11 Va l id i ty 91-94 
4.12 General isabi l i ty 94-95 
4.13 Chapter S u m m a i y 95-96 
5. The Research Findings 
5.1 Introduct ion 97 
5.2 Es tab l i sh ing the F o r m a l Posi t ion o n 97-100 
Par tnership W o r k i n g 
5.3 A Structure for Par tnership W o r k i n g 101-109 
5.4 C D R P s : The Ques t ion of Police Dominance 109-121 
a n d the Imposi t ion of a Nat iona l Agenda 
5.5 Organisa t ional Suppor t for Par tnership 121-125 
W o r k i n g 
5.6 Par tnership a n d Police Cu l tu re 125-138 
5.7 A New Structure a n d a New C y n i c i s m ? 138-142 
6 Summary and Concluding Discussions 
6.1 Introduct ion 144 
6.2 S u m m a r i s i n g the Research F ind ings 144-156 
6.3 Reflecting u p o n the Relevance of the 152-156 
Research 




Establishing the Aims and Scope of the Research 
The author of this thesis i s a serving police officer. He has been a 
serving officer throughout the dura t ion of the research, w h i c h began 
w i t h registrat ion i n September 2000, a year after the implementat ion 
of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act . The rad ica l par tnership work ing 
requirements of this impor tan t piece of legislat ion form the focus of 
this study. 
Pr ior to registering for doctoral studies,, the author h a d conducted a 
research project under the Home Office's Police Research A w a r d 
Scheme, managed th rough the then Pol ic ing a n d Reduc ing Cr ime U n i t 
(Lander a n d Booty, 2002). Th i s earlier project h a d been conceived 
w i t h the very prac t ica l a i m of identifying the const i tuent elements of 
effective par tnership work ing , a n d the subsequent d isseminat ion of 
this knowledge to others i n the form of good practice guidance. The 
need for s u c h research a n d guidance h a d been identified by the author 
o n the basis of h is own work-related experiences, where par tnership 
work ing h a d come to take on a n increasingly significant role i n 
operat ional pol ic ing. Par tnership work ing was something the police 
service was being cal led u p o n to engage i n , yet i n the author 's 
experience i t was something the police, a n d other agencies, d id not 
necessari ly 'do' par t icu lar ly wel l . The author subscr ibed to the view 
that par tnership work ing was l ikely to play a n essential par t i n the 
future development of the police service, a n d l ike ly to be a n essential 
ingredient i n their future effectiveness. Consequent ly, the earlier 
project was conceived as a piece of appl ied research, w h i c h cou ld 
contribute to improvements i n practice a n d delivery. 
The empir ica l research conducted for that project i nc luded the 
purposive sampl ing of practi t ioners from a range of different agencies 
who h a d been involved i n par tnerships of different k inds , a n d i n 
different pol icy areas. These practi t ioners were interviewed i n order to 
ascertain, from their experiences, wha t they considered to be the m a i n 
ingredients of effective par tnership work ing . These ingredients were 
separated out i n an anal3rtic framework w i t h i n the f inal report (Lander 
a n d Booty, 2002), a n d used to construct a recipe for effective 
par tnership working , w h i c h was nat ional ly disseminated th rough that 
report on the Home Office website. 
The research for this earlier project was being wri t ten u p as the 
present s tudy began, a n d par t icular ly as the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder 
A c t was being pu t into effect. The focus of the legislat ion centred on 
par tnership work ing i n the specific field of cr ime prevention, a n d its 
great significance was to make s u c h par tnership w o r k i n g mandatory, 
rather t han voluntary, or at least non-mandatory, as h a d hitherto been 
the case. Th i s was a momentous change, w h i c h the author 
ant icipated w o u l d significantly raise the profile of par tnership working, 
p lac ing i t centre stage w i t h i n loca l operat ional pol ic ing. It also 
increased the importance of generating credible guidance w i t h regard 
to effective practice. The police needed to k n o w how best to respond to 
the legislat ion and , notwithstanding, the var ious pieces of guidance 
w h i c h began to appear as the legislat ion was pu t into practice, the 
author recognised a need to update h i s earlier research into Volunta ry ' 
par tnership work ing . In essence, the 1998 A c t h a d changed the rules 
of the game. Cer ta in agencies now l i a d to be' involved i n loca l cr ime 
prevention par tnerships , a n d the work of these par tnerships Tiad to 
be' integrated into loca l pol ic ing strategies. There were difficult and 
outs tanding questions regarding w h i c h other agencies, beyond the 
responsible authorit ies, shou ld be involved. It also ra ised issues i n 
connect ion w i t h capacity, and s imi lar ly , there were difficult 
outs tanding questions centred on how the par tnerships might meet 
their statutory obligations, par t icular ly i n terms of the product ion of 
audi ts a n d strategies. Notwi ths tanding the official guidance w h i c h 
was produced, the legislat ion quite deliberately left a lot of the detail to 
be determined at the loca l level, a n d thus , the author su rmised that 
there was a case, as before, for identifying examples of effective 
par tnership work ing , a n d for d is t i l l ing these into some form of 
prac t ica l guidance. 
A t its very outset, therefore, th is doctoral research project was 
premised u p o n s imi la r pract ica l motives to those, w h i c h informed the 
earlier research supported by the Police Research A w a r d Scheme. The 
doctoral research was to be another piece of appl ied research, oriented 
towards the improvement of practice i n the area of par tnership 
work ing , specifically as related to cr ime prevention. However, as the 
author began h is studies, so h i s unders tand ing of the purpose of h is 
intended research began to change. There were two m a i n reasons for 
this changed unders tanding. Fi rs t ly , the au thor enrolled for h i s 
doctoral research on a part-t ime basis , w h i c h meant the background 
reading filled a wider per iod of t ime than i t might otherwise have done 
h a d the research been conducted o n a full-t ime basis . In the course of 
this background reading, w h i c h took u p the first two years of 
registration, information came to l ight from a variety of sources, w h i c h 
indicated that the new cr ime a n d disorder reduct ion par tnerships 
(CDRPs) were not m a k i n g quite the ' sp lash ' the au thor h a d expected, 
a n d there were signs that m a n y were not work ing par t icu lar ly wel l 
(The literature review section below provides a comprehensive review of 
this literature). Secondly, as a serving officer progressing h i s career 
w i t h i n the police service, the author witnessed firsthand the l ack of 
impac t C D R P s were hav ing on loca l operat ional po l ic ing a n d also, 
important ly, the 'poli t ics ' that their es tabl ishment h a d in t roduced both 
into, a n d beyond, the police service. 
Literature the author consul ted du r ing this per iod of t ime, a n d 
subsequent to i t (as despite the way research reports tend to be 
wri t ten u p , the l i terature review does not stop w h e n the empir ica l 
research starts), suggested that the author 's earlier focus regarding 
the purpose of h i s intended research was perhaps a little misdirected. 
Th i s l i terature, reviewed over the pages to follow, suggested 
par tnership work ing i n cr ime prevention was being constra ined by 
factors, w h i c h were more significant and more endur ing t han h a d 
previously been recognised. The earlier research identified certain 
TDarriers' to par tnership work ing , however, impl ic i t w i t h i n the not ion of 
a barr ier is the idea that i t c an be overcome, for example through the 
deployment of the correct sk i l l s and quali t ies. The literature 
suggested, however, that the constraints facing C D R P s were not s imple 
barriers, w h i c h cou ld be stepped over or otherwise evaded, rather they 
were ingra ined i n the very fabric of the C D R P s a n d the domain they 
inhabi ted. Consequently, the idea that m a k i n g par tnership work ing 
mandatory w o u l d somehow open u p the floodgates a n d create an 
environment w h i c h w o u l d be deeply receptive to guidance regarding 
effective par tnership work ing was perhaps a little naifve. It appeared 
the whole concept was, i n effect, t ry ing to r u n before learn ing to walk . 
A s a result , rather t han engaging i n appl ied research seeking to 
identify a n d disseminate the pr inciples of good practice i n par tnership 
work ing , i t was apparent the author needed to a t ta in a deeper 
unders tand ing of the context su r round ing par tnership work ing , thus , 
i n the context of the author 's background reading a n d of unfolding 
developments i n both policy a n d practice, the overarching a i m or 
purpose of the research, w h i c h informs this thesis was reconceived as 
being the need to 'unders tand ' the way that the par tnership 
requirements of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t were being 
translated into organisat ional practice. 
Fo r a pract ical ly minded serving police officer, this revised a i m is less 
precise a n d more vague t han i t ideally cou ld be, however, this is 
necessari ly so. It is s t i l l 'applied' research i n the sense that s u c h an 
unders tanding can lead to pract ica l improvements , w h i c h might make 
par tnership work ing more effective, bu t important ly , i t recognises that 
par tnership work ing is a complex phenomenon w h i c h cannot be as 
easily conceptual ised a n d measured as the or ig inal purpose a n d focus 
h a d assumed. The or iginal purpose 'assumed' par tnership work ing 
required the appl ica t ion of a cer ta in knowledge of 'what works ' i n order 
to be effective. The revised a i m acknowledges the whole idea and 
concept of par tnership work ing as being 'problematic' . 
Th i s revis ion i n relat ion to the purpose for this doctoral research can 
be conceived i n epistemological terms. The or ig ina l purpose was 
premised u p o n a posit ivist unders tanding: par tnership work ing was a 
' thing out there' w h i c h cou ld be categorised, a n d the causes of 'good' 
par tnership work ing cou ld be isolated, identified, measured, and 
disseminated as good practice. The revised purpose, however, 
represents more of a n interpretivistic posi t ion. Par tnership work ing . 
according to s u c h a posi t ion, is a constructed reali ty w h i c h can be 
constructed by different people i n different ways at different times. 
T h u s , rather t h a n having a n objective and timeless quality, 
'partnership work ing ' or 'the par tnership approach ' has , l ike other 
social phenomena, a n essential ambigui ty w h i c h provides space for i t 
to be constructed differently, dependent u p o n a context that 
comprises, amongst other things, government pol icy making , 
prescr ipt ion a n d advice,, organisat ional routines a n d practices, 
i nd iv idua l interests or motives a n d s i tua t ional exigencies. 
Th is acceptance of a n interpretivist epistemology does not necessari ly 
mean the complete abandonment of a n alternative posit ivist 
perspective. A s m a n y social research methodology textbooks point out 
(Denscombe, 2002), the debate between pos i t iv ism a n d interpret ivism 
has not been resolved and i t i s not necessary for a researcher, s u c h as 
this author, to attempt a resolut ion every t ime they conduct research. 
Th is i s more a task for phi losophers of socia l science, who w i l l be 
m u c h better equipped for this task. A s Denscombe (2002: 23) 
observes, "In practice, empir ica l socia l researchers have not been 
obsessed w i t h the pur i ty of their ontological or epistemological 
posi t ion." Rather, he suggests, researchers tend to be more pragmatic, 
f inding prac t ica l ways to meet their research a ims a n d to answer their 
research questions, wi thout getting bogged down i n these bigger, and 
h ighly complex, ph i losophica l questions. 
In the course of the background reading, the author encountered a 
number of other studies of par tnership w o r k i n g (see Chapter 3). The 
presence of s u c h studies, m a n y of w h i c h attested to the complexity of 
par tnership w o r k i n g and supported a n interpretivist view of it, ra ised a 
danger that this s tudy w o u l d merely 're-invent the wheel ' , reproducing 
what was already k n o w n about par tnership work ing i n crime 
prevention. Th i s is a problem faced by m a n y researchers, however, 
par t icular ly perhaps by those researching policy areas, w h i c h are 
contemporary, a n d fast-moving. Seeking to reproduce exist ing 
knowledge is not a sufficient premise for doctoral research w h i c h is 
required to demonstrate a cont r ibut ion to knowledge, a n d thus the 
author justifies the relevance and originali ty of h i s research on the 
following grounds. 
Initially, the research examines par tnership work ing i n relat ion to 
crime prevention i n the wake of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act , 
thereby d is t inguish ing itself from the volume of studies on par tnership 
working , w h i c h examined the phenomenon pr ior to 1998. A s noted 
earlier, i n m a k i n g par tnership work ing mandatory for responsible 
authorit ies the Cr ime and Disorder A c t changed the 'rules of the 
game', a n d this justifies a re-appraisal of exist ing knowledge. 
Secondly, whi le the author has a personal work-related interest i n , 
a n d commitment to, par tnership work ing the research is not merely a 
self-serving or indulgent exercise, disconnected from theoretical a n d 
academic developments elsevi^here. Thus , while on one level, the 
research i s about the in t r ins ic difficulties a n d ambiguit ies of 
par tnership w o r k i n g i n cr ime prevention, on another level i t is also 
about the problems ra ised for those imagin ing new ways of governing 
cr ime, w h i c h have been characterised by some as a shift from the 
'government' of cr ime, to the 'governance' of cr ime or as a shift from 
pol ic ing to securi ty governance (Johnston a n d Shear ing, 2003). The 
research, therefore, engages w i t h some of these 'bigger questions ' 
regarding governing crime i n condit ions of late-modernity. 
Thi rd ly , i n contrast to other studies, w h i c h tend to adopt what m i g h t 
be cal led a mult i -agency perspective on par tnership work ing , this 
research focuses quite deliberately, a n d specifically, u p o n how the 
par tnership w o r k i n g requirements of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t 
have been interpreted and accommodated by the police service. The 
author has been made aware of one other study, w h i c h has adopted a 
specific focus u p o n the police service role i n par tnership work ing 
(Fletcher, 2006), however, the specific police focus does endow this 
research w i t h a degree of originality. The rationale for focusing 
exclusively u p o n the police service i s not only that other research has 
adopted a more mult i -agency focus, bu t also that the intra-agency 
d imens ion is a relatively neglected, yet important , contextual variable 
for unders tand ing par tnership work ing (Crawford, 1997). 
Fur thermore, the author finds h imse l f i n a par t icu lar ly good posi t ion, 
as a serving police officer, to explore the intra-agency d imens ion , from 
the police service's perspective. 
F r o m a posit ivist point of view, the author 's pos i t ion m a y be regarded 
as a problem as i t lacks objectivity. F r o m a n interpretivist posi t ion, 
however, one might argue that this is less a problem a n d more of a n 
opportunity. In par t icular , the author 's immers ion w i t h i n the police 
organisat ion, a n d culture, affords a better opportuni ty to obtain a n 
appreciative unders tand ing of the par tnership approach from a police 
perspective. Th i s is not to suggest a monol i th ic view of police cul ture, 
bu t rather to acknowledge that a serving police officer i s wel l p laced to 
unders tand the variety i n police responses regarding the mandate to 
work i n par tnership wi th other agencies, a n d to account for the 
reasons for th is . Wi thout a s suming that a l l other police officers 
shared h is en thus ia sm for the par tnership approach, the author 
nevertheless he ld that h i s posi t ion afforded a n opportuni ty for a 
relatively dis t inct piece of research. Th i s i s not to deny that s u c h a 
posi t ion d id not raise other methodological concerns, a n d these are 
explored i n more detail i n the methodology chapter of th is thesis. 
Chapter 4. 
It is generally accepted that the broad a ims of a research s tudy need to 
be translated into a set of more specific research questions. In 
grounded theory (Glaser a n d Strauss , 1967) there is a n argument that 
s u c h research questions are difficult to specify i n advance of the 
research, as the purpose of the research is to b u i l d theory from the 
data, rather t h a n test the theory (that is u sua l l y explici t or impl ic i t i n 
research questions) against the data. The author has some S3anpathy 
w i t h this grounded approach, w h i c h is par t icu lar ly suitable for 
research topics where the focus is p r imar i ly descriptive, as i t is i n this 
case, given that the police service's response to the partnership 
requirements of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t is relatively under-
explored, a n d therefore i n need of documentat ion. However, the 
author is scept ical regarding the feasibility, or even necessari ly the 
desirabil i ty, of a pure ly grounded approach mindfu l that research is 
generally prompted by concerns, w h i c h lead the researcher i n one 
direct ion rather t han another. Layder 's (1998) no t ion of a n adaptive 
approach, w h i c h sits somewhere between the hypothesis-test ing of 
pos i t iv i sm a n d the openness a n d 'unst ructuredness ' of pure 
interpret ivism, appears altogether more credible, w i t h the li terature 
a n d other research being used to guide the researcher i n one direct ion 
or another. Consequently, the author recognises the ut i l i ty of 
identifying research questions or issues th rough a l i terature review, 
w h i c h occupies the following three chapters. 
In the case of this par t icu lar project there m a y be par t icu lar ly good 
reasons for the u t i l i sa t ion of a n adaptive approach. A s stated above, 
the research was conducted on a part-t ime basis , effectively over a 
number of years as the author dipped i n a n d out of the field. Over this 
period of t ime studies, w h i c h identified the problematic nature of 
par tnership w o r k i n g were pub l i shed a n d there were also a number of 
important pol icy changes affecting the work of C D R P s , to a greater or 
lesser extent. A l t h o u g h the focus u p o n the police service remained a 
constant throughout the research, the p r inc ipa l subject of the 
research, namely par tnership work ing , became something of a moving 
target as new requirements, s tructures a n d so o n were imposed u p o n 
C D R P s . A n adaptive approach al lowed the author to reflect u p o n a n d 
modify h i s research i n the l ight of s u c h changes a n d addit ions to 
knowledge. A n excessively r ig id set of research questions, or 
hypotheses, m a y qu ick ly have become out of date, whereas a n 
adaptive approach al lowed these changes to become incorporated into 
the research, to some extent as data, bu t also as l e ads ' p rompt ing 
other avenues of explorat ion. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
Fol lowing on from this in t roduct ion , the thesis i s divided along 
conventional l ines into two sections. The first section comprises the 
li terature review, a n d the second section comprises the research, the 
findings a n d the conclus ions emerging from them. 
The literature review comprises three chapters and , as noted above, i t 
i s important to recognise that these were l i v i n g ' chapters i n the sense 
that the li terature review was a n on-going par t of the research, 
identifying relevant research findings a n d pol icy changes w h i c h 
themselves helped either to plot, or modify, the course of the empir ica l 
research informing this thesis. 
The m a i n focus of Chapter One is not par tnership work ing , bu t crime 
prevention. The chapter reviews the development of cr ime prevention 
w i t h i n the police service, from its posi t ion as a founding pr inciple of 
nineteenth century permanent pol ic ing, to a pos i t ion of relative 
obscur i ty a n d marginal i ty . The marginal i sa t ion of cr ime prevention is 
due i n par t to the pr ior i ty afforded to cr ime detection, or detectionism, 
both by the police organisat ion a n d cul ture , a n d by successive 
governments, par t icu lar ly since the ' 1960s. V a r i o u s attempts have 
been made to strengthen the role of cr ime prevention w i t h i n the police 
service a n d outside of it, in i t ia l ly th rough the establ ishment of 
special ist cr ime prevention departments, by encouraging private 
ci t izens a n d non-police agencies to accept their responsibi l i t ies and 
latterly th rough the promot ion of problem-oriented partnerships. 
However, problems regarding the marginal i ty of cr ime prevention to 
the police organisat ion a n d to others, combined w i t h the ambigui ty of 
its meaning , have remained. Th i s his tory of cr ime prevention is 
considered to be a n impor tant ingredient i n a id ing our unders tanding 
of par tnership work ing , since i t provides u s w i t h a n unders tand ing of 
the police service's interest i n , a n d expectations regarding, th is area of 
policy. 
The chapter also provides a n opportuni ty to document the policy 
developments, w h i c h have occurred subsequent to the 1998 Cr ime and 
Disorder Ac t , thereby demonstrat ing that this is a fast moving policy 
area, subjected to ins tabi l i ty and a lmost permanent revolut ion, m a k i n g 
it difficult for C D R P s to anchor themselves i n any k i n d of comfortable 
rout ine. M a n y of the pol icy changes have increased the influence of 
the centre, whi le s imul taneous ly enhanc ing the capaci ty of localities to 
deliver effective practice. In other words, they have been about 
'steering' a n d about 'rowing', to draw u p o n the widely-ci ted analogy of 
Osborne a n d Gaebler (1992). 
Chapter Two sets the par tnership approach to cr ime prevention w i th in 
the wider canvas of police reform. Tha t is to say cr ime prevention has 
not been the only reform pressure exerted u p o n the police service over 
the per iod of i ts h is tor ica l development, a n d par t icu la r ly over the 
per iod from the 1960s onwards, since w h i c h t ime police effectiveness 
has become a n increasingly salient pol i t ica l i ssue. T h u s , i n addi t ion to 
the external pressure to engage more proactively i n cr ime prevention, 
the police service has been pressur ised to engage i n a variety of other 
models of effective practice, i nc lud ing u n i t beat pol ic ing, pol ic ing by 
objectives, problem-oriented pol icing, communi ty pol ic ing, cr ime 
management, zero-tolerance pol ic ing, intell igence-led pol icing, 
reassurance pol ic ing a n d neighbourhood pol ic ing. A t the same time, 
the police organisat ion has been forced along a decentral isat ion route 
w h i c h , as w i t h the recent post-1998 his tory of cr ime prevention, can 
be interpreted as a s imul taneous effort to enhance the central capacity 
to steer, a n d the loca l capacity to row. 
Whi le m a n y of the above-cited models of pol ic ing bare m a n y 
s imilar i t ies w i t h one another, a n d whi le the police organisat ion has 
been able to absorb the differences w i t h i n its departmental ised and 
special ised structures, the problem w i t h s u c h a p le thora of models and 
init iat ives i s that i t renders the essential role of the police service a n 
ambiguous one. Is i t about prevention or detection; i s 'pol ic ing ' police 
service-led or partnership-led; i s the police role ins t rumenta l or 
symbol ic ; i s the pol ic ing mandate determined from the bottom-up, or 
from the top-down? These questions have obvious salience for 
par tnership work ing i n cr ime prevention, a n d they inform the direction 
of m u c h of the research on w h i c h this thesis is based. The ambiguity, 
w h i c h prompts s u c h questions, also opens u p space for seeking 
answers to the way these practice models are implemented and 
negotiated th rough the police organisat ion, a n d par t icu lar ly through 
police occupat ional cul ture , w h i c h has thwarted reform ambit ions i n 
the past. 
Chapter Three looks i n more detail at the l i terature on partnership 
work ing . In its first part, i t reviews the work w h i c h has been 
under taken regarding cr ime prevention par tnerships i n the wake of the 
1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t . Th i s indicates C D R P s have been 
weakened as the consequence of a status differential between 
responsible authori t ies a n d others; a l ack of in i t i a l investment i n 
infrastructure; the disincentive of performance management- imposed 
agency 'core bus iness ' a n d a non-negotiable ' top-down' Home Office 
po l i cy-making style, par t icu lar ly w h e n set against the more loca l i sm-
friendly approach of other central government departments, notably 
the Office of the Deputy Pr ime Min i s t e r (now the Depar tment for 
Communi t i e s a n d Loca l Government). 
In the second par t of Chapter Three the l i terature o n par tnership 
work ing is classified into two broad types. The first, predominant ly 
official type seeks, rather l ike the or iginal a ims of th is research project 
Cbefore' modification), to identify a n d disseminate the cr i t ica l success 
factors for par tnership work ing . It rests on a ra ther impoverished 
unders tand ing of par tnership work ing , w h i c h fails to recognise its 
complexity or its ambiguity, given the k inds of i ssues ra ised by the 
first part of the chapter. The second type of l i terature is more cr i t ical 
i n its orientation, recognising the centrali ty of conflict, a n d par t icular ly 
inter-professional conflict, to par tnership work ing , though this i s often 
wel l h idden i n strategies of conflict avoidance or the 'smorgasbord 
tact ic ' (Crawford, 1997). Th is cri t ique also extends to the role of 
government, whose own depar tmental ism a n d failures at 'joined-up 
government ' set a n unp romis ing context for effective loca l par tnership 
work ing . Government 's anxiety to be 'seen to be doing something ' 
about cr ime, even i n the face of i ts own recognised l imita t ions and 
l imi ted aspirat ions, provides yet more turbulence for those charged 
w i t h a responsibi l i ty for m a k i n g loca l par tnerships work more 
effectively, forcing them to survive i n a cl imate of permanent revolut ion 
and ' init iativitis ' . 
The second section of the thesis is a l l about the research. It begins, i n 
Chapter Four , w i t h the methodology. Th i s chapter sets out the general 
a i m of the research, a n d the research quest ions w h i c h i l luminate the 
a im. The research strategy, w h i c h is the means by w h i c h the author 
sought to answer the research questions, is then- set out. I t 
demonstrates that the strategyj w h i c h is a mul t i -method strategy 
relying mainly , bu t not exclusively, u p o n loose semi-s t ructured 
interviews w i t h key part icipants was selected, a n d is therefore 
defensible, on the basis of a range of pragmatic a n d 'scientific' 
considerations. These inc lude questions of accessibi l i ty and 
resources, bu t also more 'weighty' considerat ions, s u c h as rel iabil i ty 
and validi ty. The research strategy, i t is argued, i s not a perfect one, 
bu t i t is one, w h i c h is good enough for the matter i n hand , and for the 
par t icular requirements of doctoral research. 
Chapter Five presents the results of the research i n one long narrative, 
i l lus t ra ted w i t h a l iberal supply of quotes from the research 
part icipants , a n d a sma l l amount of survey da ta and personal 
observations from the field. A l though the research was guided by a 
number of specific research questions, the da ta is presented i n 
accordance wi th the strongest themes to emerge from the analysis . 
T h u s the data i s not t ied fast to the research questions, bu t is left 
more loosely to speak for itself, giving m a x i m u m opportuni ty for 
themes not ant icipated by the research questions to emerge from the 
data; Mos t of the themes do connect relatively wel l w i t h the research 
questions, w h i c h suggests that the research is relatively wel l bu i l t 
u p o n the foundations of exist ing knowledge from previous research. 
Chapter S ix is the f inal chapter of the thesis. It summar ises the 
content of the thesis, a n d especially the research findings. 
Specifically, i t re turns to the research questions a n d seeks to provide 
answers to them. T h e n i t diverts into a d i s cus s ion of the wider 
significance of the research a n d its findings. There is a fairly widely 
he ld view that par tnership work ing , w h i c h has increased not only i n 
the doma in of cr ime control bu t also i n m a n y other policy areas, 
signifies the emergence of a new way of governing. It is less about 
government, a n d more about governance. It i s less about the 
dominance of bureau-professions, s u c h as the police service, a n d more 
about 'co-production' . Yet the results of th is research suggest that, 
while s u c h tendencies may be i n evidence, ta lk of any profound shift 
from government to governance may be premature. In place of this 
idea of a break from the past, or of d iscont inui ty , there is i n fact a fair 
degree of cont inui ty. Cr ime prevention, and the par tnership work ing 
w h i c h goes along w i t h it, remains relatively marg ina l to the police 
service, and i n i ts guise as cr ime reduct ion i t has become rather more 
police service-friendly t han it once was, incorporated into familiar 
repertoires rather t h a n being a l ien to them. T h u s , whi le rad ica l i n its 
own way, the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t affected no revolut ion for 
the police service, a n d A p r i l 1 1999 cannot be regarded as m a r k i n g 
any k i n d of ^year zero' for a fundamental ly new approach to pol icing. 
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Chapter 1 - A n Overview of the Development of Crime Prevention 
and Community Safety from a Police Service 
Perspective 
Introduction 
The focus of this thesis is p r imar i ly based u p o n the role of the police 
service, as relates to cr ime prevention a n d communi ty safety. In the 
second par t of the thesis this role i s examined th rough empir ica l 
research, w h i c h explores the way a single police force has sought to 
accommodate the new expectations placed u p o n it, par t icular ly i n l ight 
of the l andmark Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t 1998. The purpose of this 
chapter, however, is to set the scene by providing a broad his tor ical 
overview of the development of crime prevention a n d communi ty safety 
as a dis t inct pol icy domain , through to the present. Mos t of this 
development has occurred i n the relatively recent past, over the last 
twenty five years or so. Therefore, as we sha l l come to see, the 
development of cr ime prevention a n d c o m m u n i t y safety is deeply 
entwined w i t h i n broader s t ruc tura l changes i n the nature of governing 
la te-modem societies i n general a n d governing cr ime i n par t icular . A s 
this thesis sha l l explore later, some commentators have characterised 
these changes i n terms of a shift from 'government' to 'governance', the 
former concept giving m u c h more prominence to the role of the central 
state, t han the latter, as relates to the bus iness of governing. 
There have been a n u m b e r of other h is tor ica l overviews regarding the 
emergence of cr ime prevention and communi ty safety as relates to the 
police service (Hughes, 1998; Crawford, 1997 a n d 1998; Gi l l i ng , 1997; 
Koch , 1998). However, whi le this chapter w i l l d raw u p o n the work of 
such authors , i t w i l l also b r ing the d i scuss ion u p to date, examining 
more recent pol icy developments that have h a d a par t icu lar bearing 
u p o n loca l practice, w h i c h were the subject of the empir ica l research 
under taken for this thesis. It is not, therefore, necessary to explore 
the subject i n significant detail , given that this has been done already. 
In examin ing the development of cr ime prevention a n d communi ty 
safety, from a police perspective, two par t icu lar dominan t themes are 
highlighted. Fi rs t ly , cr ime prevention a n d c o m m u n i t y safety raise 
fundamental challenges for the police service i n relat ion to 'what they 
do'. They imply , for example, a need for the police service to move 
more 'upstream', from detecting crime by apprehending offenders to 
preventing cr ime through deterrent or disruptive activities or through 
encouraging others to take a responsibi l i ty for preventing crime, fpr 
example, by act ing as information brokers (Er icson a n d Haggerfy, 
1997) a l lowing others to adopt appropriate s i tua t ional or social cr ime 
prevention measures. F ina l ly by encouraging, a n d cajoling, private 
citizens to act as the eyes and ears of the police w i t h i n their own 
communi ty . Whi le cr ime prevention a n d c o m m u n i t y safety raise s u c h 
challenges, they do not necessari ly resolve them. In par t because 
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there remains contested poli t ics over wha t is the most effective way of 
control l ing or preventing cr ime and , i n part, because the challenge 
posed by cr ime prevention a n d communi ty safety remains ambiguous 
due to contradictory pol icy developments w i t h i n pol ic ing, w h i c h serve 
to quest ion how far they are really in tended to divert the police service 
from their 'day job ' of ca tch ing cr iminals . A s a result , c r ime prevention 
and c o m m u n i t y safety cont inue to r emain relatively marg ina l to the 
police ma ins t r eam (see Chapter 2). 
Secondly, the development of crime prevention a n d comunaunity safety 
raises challenges for the police a round 'how they do their job' , and 
par t icular ly how the tasks associated w i t h cr ime prevention and 
communi ty safety have been incorporated into the police's 
organisat ional map, cul ture a n d funct ional repertoire. Th i s represents 
far more t h a n j u s t a bureaucrat ic or technica l quest ion. A dominant 
theme of pol icy development i n this area has been par tnership, a term 
that has been arr ived at after brief flirtations w i t h others, s u c h as 'the 
mul t i -agency approach ' (Gill ing, 1994), 'the inter-agency approach ' 
(Crawford a n d Jones , 1995) or 'the co-ordinated approach ' (Home 
Office, 1984). The par tnership approach potential ly poses a radica l 
challenge for the police service w i t h regard to the way i n w h i c h i t 
conducts i ts bus iness a n d the services re la t ionship w i t h other 
agencies. It challenges the t radi t ional i so la t ion ism of the police, w h i c h 
some have identified as a key feature of the services occupat ional 
cul ture (Holdaway, 1983), a n d i t also challenges the organisat ional 
and pol i t ica l t radi t ion of Cons tabulary independence, par t icular ly as 
par tnership work ing draws the police service towards loca l authorit ies 
and into the 'challenging' minefield of loca l pol i t ics . Aga in , while 
par tnership work ing issues a challenge, that challenge remains 
unresolved, i n part because of the uncer ta int ies of partnership 
work ing , w h i c h often leave a subs tant ia l gap between theory a n d 
practice a n d i n part because, as a resul t of other pol icy developments, 
the extent to w h i c h the police service is supposed to throw itself into 
par tnership working , as opposed to concentrat ing o n its core business, 
remains fundamental ly unclear . 
The Early Beginnings 
Al though the prevention of crime was wri t ten i n to the police service 
ins t ruct ions , i s sued to the first permanent police force i n the U K , the 
Metropol i tan Police, i n 1829 (Johnston, 2000), i t is generally agreed 
that the concept of cr ime prevention, as i t was then used , h a d a rather 
different mean ing from its contemporary usage. A l though , as the m a i n 
crime prevention texts indicate, cr ime prevention remains , i n m a n y 
ways, a n ambiguous a n d unsatisfactory te rm that has a 'catch a l l ' 
qual i ty to i t (Gil l ing, 1997). Cer ta inly i f the police's early crime 
prevention role was that of what Reiner (1992) cal ls the 'scarecrow 
funct ion ' of preventive patroll ing, then whi le they cer tainly inscr ibed 
this into the way terr i torial pol ic ing was organised into a series of beat 
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areas, t i ie police service carried, i n i ts early years, no broader 
unders tanding of a cr ime preventive mandate, a n d patrol l ing was 
largely perceived as a ' symbolic ' function. In terms of the police 
service's professional aspirat ions and development, i n this early 
period, detection u s u r p e d prevention. Perhaps prevention was 
reconceived by the more rewarding, more exci t ing a n d more macho role 
of detection. 
S u c h a re-conception fitted a time w h e n crime was relatively low, and 
bar r ing the odd mora l panic d id not feature p r o m i n e n c y o n the 
pol i t ica l agenda. It also fitted a t ime w h e n posi t ivist Lombros ian 
cr iminology was dominant , seeing crime as a p rob lem caused by 
relatively few ' c r imina l types' l iv ing amongst a popula t ion of generally 
law-abiding cit izens, w h o m the police cou ld readi ly ca tch so they cou ld 
be t aken out of c i rcu la t ion a n d subjected, as appropriate, to 
pun i shment a n d / o r treatment. However, once established, detection 
became the dominan t feature of the police's professional identity, 
however, not to everyone's satisfaction. G i l l i n g (1997:73), for example, 
notes the cr i t ic isms made by the first secretary of wha t was later to 
become the Howard League, who l ikened the police to "rat-catchers" 
who required a con t inua l supply of rats to just i fy their existence. It 
was mooted that police energies may have been better expended 
ploughing more into preventive efforts i n terms of the k i n d s of mora l 
reforms that might , to cont inue w i t h the analogy, stop the rats from 
breeding i n the first place. 
It is no coincidence that the first movement i n the direct ion of a new 
approach to cr ime prevention coincided w i t h a noticeable increase i n 
the cr ime rates after the Second W o r l d War . M u c h of th is was due, i n 
part icular , to a n increase i n acquisit ive cr ime (O'Malley and 
Hu tch inson , 2007). A l t h o u g h pressure for change was not in i t ia l ly 
intense, significantly, i t came from outside of government circles, 
specifically from the insurance indust ry , whose cont inued profitability 
was threatened by the losses incur red from insurance c la ims, 
especially for losses incur red from commerc ia l premises. J u s t as i n 
the nineteenth century, w h e n it h a d pushed for changes i n the 
phi losophy of fire prevention, p lac ing a m u c h greater responsibi l i ty for 
such prevention into the hands of those seeking insurance cover 
(O'Malley and H u t c h i n s o n , 2007). However, the insurance industry-
sought ways of p lac ing responsibi l i ty back on commerc ia l businesses 
to prevent cr ime th rough their own actions, rather t h a n leaving i t a l l to 
the police. In par t i t achieved this by w o r k i n g w i t h the Home Office to 
r u n a series of publ ic i ty campaigns, w h i c h sought to encourage greater 
security awareness, in i t ia l ly among commerc ia l businesses , but also 
among the general popula t ion . Effectively, the insurance indus t ry was 
playing a key par t i n seeking to change the way cr ime prevention was 
delivered, by encouraging businesses a n d others to engage i n the sort 
of ac tuar ia l r i sk management, w h i c h commentators were later to 
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identify as a d i s t inguish ing feature of cr ime prevention i n the last 
decade of the twentieth century (O'Malley a n d H u t c h i n s o n , 2007). 
The police were encouraged to play their par t i n dr iv ing th is new crime 
prevention message home at the local level, a n d providing security 
advice to those who needed it. Some police forces established Cr ime 
Prevention Depar tments for this purpose, supported by the 
establ ishment i n 1963 of the Home Office Na t iona l C r ime Prevention 
centre. The use of police officers for s u c h purposes was regarded as a 
model of good practice by the Home Office's C o r n i s h Committee i n the 
early-1960s a n d one of the recommendations of that committee was 
for police forces across the country to es tabl ish Cr ime Prevention 
Departments to achieve s imi la r ends (Home Office, 1965). 
In reality, the new crime prevention ' specia l ism' d id not seem to 
threaten the dominance of detection as the m a i n approaches to crime 
control . Indeed, as is often the case w i t h special isat ion, i t was 
accompanied by a degree of 'ghettoisation' as the Cr ime Prevention 
Depar tments l ay wel l outside of the police mains t ream, leaving i t 
generally un touched (Harvey et a l . , 1989). W i t h the benefit of 
hindsight , however, i t is possible to see how the interventions of the 
insurance indus t ry set i n mot ion a c h a i n of events, w h i c h were 
eventually to undermine the sovereignty of the police service as the 
foremost ins t i tu t ion of cr ime prevention. Th i s cou ld be seen as the 
start of a slide, w h i c h has taken the lead responsibi l i ty for crime 
prevention away from the police, and indeed away from the state, 
resul t ing i n i ts d ispers ion more widely into c iv i l society. 
The recommendat ions of the C o r n i s h Commit tee also led to the 
es tabl ishment of the S tanding Committee o n Cr ime Prevention wh ich , 
once again, provided a n opportunity for the insurance indus t ry and 
the Home Office to exercise leverage over commerce to engage i n their 
own cr ime prevention, conceived as future-oriented crime r i sk 
management. Th i s resulted, for example, i n indust ry-wide agreements 
for new securi ty s tandards to be p u t i n place on a l l new house­
bu i ld ing a n d i n the fitting of steering c o l u m n locks to a l l new cars. 
Significantly, the focus of the S tanding Commit tee was very m u c h on 
acquisit ive cr ime, reflecting the par t icular concerns of the insurance 
indus t ry (O'Malley a n d Hu tch inson , 2007). 
The C o r n i s h Committee also recommended the sett ing u p of local 
cr ime prevention- panels (CPPs) where representatives of local 
businesses, loca l authorit ies, voluntary organisat ions a n d the police 
could meet together and examine ways i n w h i c h cr ime prevention 
defences cou ld be enhanced, again by following the mode l of crime r i sk 
management. F r o m the late-1960s onwards s u c h C P P s came to be 
established, eventually i n their hundreds , u s u a l l y based on city a n d 
town boundaries , a n d they provided early examples of partnership 
bodies representing a b luepr in t for m u c h more significant 
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developments i n the 1980s a n d beyond. W h a t was most significant 
about the C P P s , however, was probably the extent to w h i c h they 
managed 'not' to d is turb the loca l cr ime control environment, w h i c h 
remained heavi ly dominated by the police service. 
The recommendat ions of the C o r n i s h Committee m a y wel l have "laid 
the foundations of a structure for cr ime prevention s t i l l visible today" 
(Laycock a n d Hea l , 1989: 315), however, they certainly d id not amount 
to a sea change i n terms of what the police d id , or how they d id it. A s 
the work of Harvey et a l . (1989) regarding police cr ime prevention 
officers has demonstrated, s u c h officers typical ly make u p only a v e r y ' 
sma l l proport ion of total establ ishment strength, they were often 
staffed by officers approaching retirement a n d they r ema in marg ina l to 
core bus iness , bo th organisationally a n d occupat ional ly. Fur thermore, 
as Hea l (1987: 9) says of this period of cr ime prevention, "the climate 
was against it. It was the period of fast developing technology and 
informat ion systems and , for m a n y people, these wonders seemed to 
be the answer to r i s ing crime." In this regard, i t i s impor tant to note 
that the C o r n i s h Committee was establ ished i n 1960 as a committee 
on crime prevention 'and detection'. 
The cr ime prevention developments, d i scussed above, m a y have 
emanated from the report's recommendations, however, so too d id the 
m u c h higher profile 'new system' of u n i t beat pol ic ing, where radio 
communica t ions a n d cars were inter twined w i t h pat rol l ing officers to 
provide a m u c h quicker response time to cr ime incidents and , i t was 
thought, w o u l d significantly improve the police's effectiveness i n terms 
of detection. A t the time, 'official fai th ' was placed m u c h more firmly 
i n the potential of this technological innovat ion to win the fight against 
crime, t h a n i t was i n the capacity of the seemingly m u c h more 
mundane developments i n crime prevention. 
If the insurance indus t ry h a d been responsible for he lp ing to l a u n c h 
the first wave of cr ime prevention reforms i n the 1960s then, 
notwi ths tanding the cont inued interest of that indus t ry i n the context 
of seemingly ever-increasing crime rates, by the mid-1970s the m a i n 
thrus t came from the Home Office. In i ts mid-decade review of 
c r imina l jus t ice pol icy the Home Office commit ted itself to searching 
for solut ions to crime, w h i c h lay beyond the reaches of the c r imina l 
jus t ice system, a n d that drew u p o n new approaches w i t h i n i t (Home 
Office, 1977). It is plausible to suggest that the more ins t rumenta l 
role played by the Home Office was attr ibutable i n par t to the presence 
of key players s u c h as R o n Clarke , who has since played a major part 
i n the global development of s i tua t ional cr ime prevention a n d a rise i n 
the U K of 'crime science'. It was probably also at tr ibutable to the 
growing pol i t ic isat ion of law a n d order, w h i c h Downes a n d Morgan 
(2007) trace to the end of the 1960s, however, was intensified through 
the 1970s, m a k i n g i t more difficult for central government 'not' to be 
seen to be doing something positive about the growing cr ime problem. 
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In the context of the early-1980s, a per iod Laycock a n d Hea l (1989) 
suggest m a r k e d a ' renaissance' for cr ime prevention, i t was certainly 
becoming more difficult for the Home Office not to be countenancing 
serious reforms i n cr ime control policy, for a n u m b e r of specific 
reasons. Fi rs t ly , officially-sponsored research into different sentencing 
alternatives (Brody, 1976) a n d into police pat rol l ing a n d detection 
(Clarke a n d H o u g h , 1980) started to demonstrate s u c h approaches 
were fundamental ly l imi ted i n their effectiveness. In the case of police 
detection this was h ighly dependent u p o n the cont r ibut ion of the 
publ ic , i n the same way cr ime prevention was. Secondly, as the fiscal 
cr is is of the mid-1970s took ho ld , l ike other central government 
departments, the Home Office was faced w i t h a reality that i t cou ld no 
longer s imply invest i n more of the same a n d needed to develop 
effective ways of work ing , w h i c h recognised the l im i t a t i ons ' of the 
c r i m i n a l jus t ice sys tem (Home Office, 1977). 
Thi rd ly , a n d on a related point again, cr ime surveys w h i c h h a d been 
conducted i n the 1970s, a n d par t icular ly the Home Office's first 
B r i t i s h Cr ime Survey (Home Office, 1982), helped to compose a 
picture, w h i c h indicated that the vast majority of cr ime was either not 
reported, recorded or d id not resul t i n a convict ion. T h u s , i f cr ime was 
going to be tackled effectively, i t h a d to be from outside the c r imina l 
jus t ice system. Four th ly , a n d perhaps fortuitously, as noted above, 
w i t h i n the Home Office researchers were beginning to develop a 
concept ion of cr ime as opportuni ty (Mayhew et a l . , 1976), a n d a model 
of s i tuat ional cr ime prevention t l ia t worked w i t h s u c h a conception 
(Gladstone, 1980). Th i s offered a p romis ing way forward for crime 
prevention, shift ing i t from the 'unfocused' (Gil l ing, 1997) form dur ing 
the 1960s, to a problem-oriented form, w h i c h made i t m u c h easier, i n 
theory, to ascer ta in i ts u t i l i ty a n d effectiveness i n specific 
c i rcumstances . E a r l y experience, moreover, suggested that i t was 
indeed effective i n s u c h c i rcumstances (Clarke a n d Mayhew, 1980), as 
a way of direct ing specific tailored measures at par t icu la r crime 
problems w h i c h , i n reality, obviated the need for 'downstream' c r imina l 
jus t ice responses. 
The renaissance of cr ime prevention then, required the adopt ion of a 
problem-oriented, rat ional is t ic s i tua t ional model of cr ime prevention 
by agencies whose resources cou ld be d r awn u p o n to deploy s u c h 
tai lored measures against par t icular cr ime problems. A s Croft (1980:v) 
noted i n h i s foreword to Clarke a n d Mayhew's inf luent ia l work on 
designing out cr ime, "the problem of preventing cr ime is not so m u c h 
knowing what to do, bu t of persuading people to under take the 
necessary action." Th i s h a d also represented a problem i n the 1960s, 
rendered more difficult by the fact that the cr ime r i sks required to be 
managed were prospective, abstract a n d not specific. However, 
following the logic of the s i tuat ional model , the r i sks by the 1980s were 
more concrete, based u p o n specific cr ime problems that were k n o w n 
and , w h i c h cou ld be analysed i n order to identify specific solut ions. 
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Conservative Crime Prevention Policy 
The Home Office's chosen approach for 'persuading' people to 
under take the necessary act ion depended u p o n two m a i n measures. 
In 1982 the Home Office Cr ime Prevention U n i t was established to 
continue gathering evidence of effective approaches to crime 
prevention. It was in tended that these might form part of a n evidence-
based a rmoury for s i tua t ional cr ime prevention a n d they publ ic i sed 
numerous research reports, w h i c h were viddely disseminated. Then , i n 
1984, the Home Office i s sued C i r cu l a r 8 / 8 4 , addressed to the police 
service, the probat ion service a n d par t icu lar ly local authori t ies w i t h an 
uncompromis ing message ar t iculated at its outset (Home Office, 1984: 
1) 
"A pr imary objective of the police has always been the prevention of 
cr ime. However, since some of the factors affecting cr ime lie 
outside the control or direct influence of the police, cr ime 
prevention cannot be left to them alone. Every i nd iv idua l ci t izen 
a n d a l l those agencies whose policies a n d practices c a n influence 
the extent of cr ime shou ld make their cont r ibut ion . Preventing 
crime is a task for the whole communi ty ." 
C i r cu l a r 8 / 8 4 effectively cal led u p o n the pub l i c agencies, to w h i c h i t 
was addressed, to take the lead i n es tabl ishing loca l par tnerships who 
could identify their loca l cr ime problems a n d subject them to the 
r igours of a problem-oriented s i tuat ional approach. The Home Office 
sought to demonstrate wha t cou ld be achieved and , i n 1986, funded 
a n experiment k n o w n as the Five Towns Initiative i n w h i c h co­
ordinators were employed i n each of the five designated areas to b r ing 
together s u c h loca l par tnerships and to drive them towards the 
s i tuat ional approach. In reality, the eighteen-month experiment 
proved to be a l imi ted success (Home Office Cr ime Prevention Uni t , 
1988). 
If one side of the cr ime prevention co in represented self help and 
'persuading people to under take necessary act ions ' to achieve this , the 
other side was persuading the police to 'give u p some of their 
sovereignty'. Th is required the police service to be w i l l i ng for others to 
take actions, w h i c h d id not necessari ly chime w i t h their own 
occupat ional a n d organisat ional cu l tu ra l preferences for a detection 
based approach. 
J u s t as the Home Office came unde r pressure to change i ts approach 
between the mid-1970s a n d early-1980s, so s imi la r pressure came to 
bare u p o n the police service. Fi rs t ly , 'unwelcome' research evidenced 
the ineffectiveness of patrol l ing a n d detection, w h i c h made it harder 
for the police to defend the status quo. Secondly, a n d relatedly 
(because of the importance of pub l i c co-operation to police 
effectiveness), police legit imacy h a d t aken a knock , par t ly because of 
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cor rupt ion scandals , and par t ly because of the b a d image gained by 
the police i n their hand l ing of the 1981 u r b a n riots (Reiner, 1992). 
Th i rd ly , a l though th is took longer to percolate th rough to the police 
service due to the pol i t ica l capi ta l the Conservatives h a d sought to 
make out of invest ing heavily i n the forces of law a n d order, i n 1983 
the police fell under the spotlight of the F i n a n c i a l Management 
Initiative (FMI) a n d pressure was placed u p o n t h e m to demonstrate 
their efficiency a n d effectiveness. 
The police response to C i r c u l a r 1 1 4 / 8 3 (Home Office, 1983), w h i c h 
in t roduced the F M I to the police service, was to seek to ro l l out a* 
model of 'pol icing by objectives', based u p o n Goldstein 's (1979) idea of 
problem-oriented pol icing, w h i c h involved a cer ta in degree of 
management decentral isat ion a n d a focus, as the terminology implies , 
u p o n establ ished local problems, w h i c h cou ld become the targets of 
measurable objectives. There were obvious paral lels or synergies 
between th is problem-oriented approach a n d the problem-oriented 
methodology of s i tuat ional cr ime prevention a l though, significantly, 
they d i d not necessari ly mean exactly the same k i n d of role for the 
police i n each case. 
A fourth pressure for change emanated from w i t h i n the police service 
itself. It d i d not come from those involved i n the cr ime prevention 
specia l i sm who, as noted above, remained relatively marg ina l to the 
police organisat ion a n d their s tandard operating procedures. However, 
i t d id come from wi th in the A C P O ranks , a n d par t icu la r ly from the 
communi ty pol ic ing phi losophy of J o h n Alderson , the former Chief 
Constable of the Devon a n d C o r n w a l l Cons tabulary . Alderson 's 
communi ty pol ic ing phi losophy, w h i c h we do not have the capacity to 
explore i n depth, was one broadly i n support of the Home Office's p u s h 
i n the direct ion of crime prevention; 
"The prevention of crime c a n be achieved by proactive measures 
i n c l u d i n g education, social welfare, environmental p l ann ing and 
socia l is ing influences of a mult i far ious k i n d . It c an i n part be 
achieved by police guarding, patrol l ing a n d scar ing off; or by use of 
a la rms a n d securi ty technology; or by detection, convict ion and 
pena l measures a n d supervis ion. They are a l l impor tan t as a crime 
prevention a n d fear prevention strategy. C o m m u n i t y pol ic ing is 
concerned ma in ly wi th the proactive." (Alderson, 1983; 3). 
A l though Alder son was ambiguous w h e n i t came to defining precisely 
what 'the proactive' was, a n d what the police's role shou ld be w i t h i n it, 
he d id clearly separate i t from detection and , as such , lent support to 
the Home Office's p u s h for a stronger preventive orientation. A s 
Weatheri t t (1983) wryly observed, the promot ion of c o m m u n i t y pol ic ing 
cou ld be regarded as m a k i n g a vir tue out of necessity, since the need 
for a more preventive, collaborative approach was being very strongly 
espoused by the Home Office at this t ime. 
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Alderson has been thought of as something of a maver ick w i th in the 
police service, a n d his t h i n k i n g was not necessar i ly always in-step 
w i t h the perspectives of others w i t h i n A C P O . However, at this 
par t icular j unc tu re the idea of communi ty po l ic ing was very m u c h i n 
vogue, a n d i t was taken u p w i t h some en thus i a sm at a B r a m s h i l l 
conference i n 1982, organised by the Home Office. The conference 
provided a n opportuni ty for the Home Office to exert pressure on the 
police service to accommodate the preventive parad igm being 
developed at this t ime, a n d i t undoubtedly helped i n the aftermath of 
the 1981 u r b a n riots a n d the shak ing of pub l i c confidence i n the 
police. Clear ly , the police service was immersed w i t h i n an " 
environment where there was a need for the police to be more open to 
ideas, i n order to help and consolidate their legitimacy. 
The idea of communi ty pol icing, arguably, provided a n acceptable lens 
th rough w h i c h the police cou ld view their cont r ibu t ion to crime 
prevention wi thout necessari ly d i s tu rb ing the emphasis given 
elsewhere w i t h i n the organisat ion to detection. Significantly, this 
model was adopted by the new Commiss ioner for the Metropol i tan 
Police, S i r Kenne th Newman, who spoke i n par t icu la r of h i s intent ion 
for the Metropofi tan Police to move i n the direct ion of 'multi-agency 
policing ' , w h i c h meant "police col laborat ion w i t h other agencies, 
'social, economic, cu l tu ra l a n d educational ' , to develop solut ions w h i c h 
address the root cause rather than the symptoms of crime." (Nevraian, 
1983: 8). Dis t i l l ed into a n act ion p lan , t i i i s v i s ion of mult i -agency 
pol ic ing was broadly consistent w i t h the orientat ion of the s i tuat ional 
model of cr ime prevention (Weatheritt, 1986). 
Despite C i r c u l a r 8 /84 , i t is apparent that progress i n the development 
of cr ime prevention was painful ly slow. In a s tock- taking article 
regarding s i tua t ional crime prevention towards the end of the 1980's, 
Hea l a n d Laycock (1989: 322) sa id that "the not ion that cr ime and its 
prevention is the responsibi l i ty of the police a n d the c r i m i n a l jus t ice 
system is entrenched; i t is ha rd ly going to be tu rned a round 
overnight." Of course, their point applies as m u c h to the police's 
unwi l l ingness to let go of their monopol is t ic control of loca l cr ime 
control as i t does to other agencies' preparedness to take u p the 
mantle. 
S low progress i n the development of cr ime prevention was one of the 
factors, w h i c h accounted for the announcement of the Safer Cities 
Programme i n 1988. Effectively, Safer Cit ies was a n extension of the 
Five Towns model across a larger number of areas (there were two 
phases of Safer Cit ies that brought i t to 40 or more towns a n d cities 
across the U K by the mid-1990s) , involving a longer t ime period and 
more i n the way of resources. In addi t ion, 1990 saw the Home Office 
issue another c i rcular . C i r c u l a r 4 4 / 9 0 (Home Office, 1990), w h i c h 
reiterated the message of C i r c u l a r 8 / 8 4 a n d was accompanied by the 
booklet 'Partnership i n Cr ime Prevention' , w h i c h h a d been pu t together 
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by Cr ime Concern , a special ist cr ime prevention agency the Home 
Office h a d created i n 1988 to provide a source of expertise, w h i c h 
w o u l d help to drive the cr ime prevention agenda forward. In order to 
lend i t more weight. C i r c u l a r 4 4 / 9 0 also obliged loca l authori t ies a n d 
tiie police, to respond to the Home Office w i t h informat ion regarding 
the cr ime prevention strategies they were under tak ing . 
The responses the Home Office received were clearly a disappointment, 
leading the Home Office to es tabl ish a special ly convened committee of 
wha t h a d by now become the S tand ing Conference, on Cr ime 
Prevention w i t h a remit, "to consider and moni tor the progress made i n 
the loca l delivery of cr ime prevention by the mult i -agency or 
par tnership approach" (Home Office, 1991: 10). Th i s committee, later 
to become k n o w n as the Morgan Committee, au thored a l andmark 
report regarding the development of crime prevention (1991). The fact 
of i ts es tabl ishment bares test imony to the on-going difficulties faced 
by the Home Office i n seeking to translate its 'good idea ' of crime 
prevention into reality, a n d more important iy, ac t ion at the local level, 
despite two c i rculars , a considerable amoun t of centra l funding and an 
equal quant i ty of official exhortat ion. 
The M o r g a n Report provided its own diagnosis of the problems facing 
the local development of the par tnership approach to cr ime prevention. 
The finer details of wha t i t h a d to say w i l l be considered later as 
seeking to unders tand the difficulties of the par tnership approach, 
from a police perspective, is central to the a i m of this thesis, and the 
Morgan Report 's account is one of many, some from 'official' sources 
a n d some from more academic cri t iques, w h i c h w i l l need to be 
considered i n due course. For the present, since the purpose of this 
opening chapter i s to set the scene, the impor tant points to note are 
that the Morgan Report endorsed the par tnership approach, bu t 
recommended that i t shou ld be pu t on a statutory footing, specifically 
for loca l authori t ies and the police, so cr ime prevention partnership 
work ing became obligatoiy, rather t han discret ionary as i t h a d been 
u n t i l th is point. The recommendat ion that par tnership work ing 
shou ld become statutory was clearly in tended to address the problem 
hitherto encountered that whi le cr ime prevention seemed l ike a good 
idea, responses to the 1990 c i rcu la r i n par t icu lar suggested that 
par tnerships were not being set u p local ly as the Home Office h a d 
hoped. The problem as Morgan saw it was that "crime prevention is a 
per ipheral concern for a l l the agencies a n d a t ru ly core activity for 
none of them" (Home Office, 1991: 15). 
The Morgan Report also suggested that a long w i t h a statutory 
responsibi l i ty shou ld come dedicated ring-fenced funding, thereby 
effectively saying that the project experiments developed i n the 1980s -
the Five Towns Initiative a n d the Safer Ci t ies Programme - shou ld be 
rolled out nat ional ly a n d shifted from project status to permanent 
programmes of delivery. F ina l ly , Morgan also suggested that local 
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par tnerships cou ld be made more meaningful i f they were conceived 
not i n terms of 'crime prevention', bu t i n terms of ' communi ty safety', a 
concept that i n Morgan 's view h a d a broader meaning. Cr ime 
prevention, i t was believed, was too nar row a concept imp ly ing only 
s i tuat ional measures of target ha rden ing a n d so forth. Whereas 
communi ty safety, while encompass ing s u c h measures, also involved 
more 'social ' measures focused, for example, on developmental 
prevention a n d communi ty development a n d on address ing the fear of 
crime. Therefore, communi ty safety w o u l d appear to be relevant to a 
wider range of agencies, w h i c h might be inc luded w i t h i n local 
par tnerships a n d therefore, by default, encourage wider participation.-
F r o m a police perspective, the idea of communi ty safety resonated wi th 
Alderson 's v i s ion of communi ty pol ic ing, or Newman's mult i -agency 
pol icing, a n d therefore i t d id not represent a par t icu lar ly contentious 
concept. It m a y have been more contentious for a Conservative 
government whose r ight-wing poli t ics made i t less open to 'social ' 
assessments of the causes of cr ime, a l though as others (Nash and 
Savage, 1994) have noted, this was a period w h e n the Home Office h a d 
entered a less r ight-wing 'age of reason ' a n d w h e n officials h a d 
encouraged minis ters to draw their insp i ra t ion from more 'progressive' 
socia l models of cr ime prevention, s u c h as those operating at the time 
i n France (Jones at a l . , 1994). 
Wha t was potential ly more problematic, for bo th the government a n d 
the police, was the local authori ty involvement i n th is phi losophy. For 
the police there were concerns about being d rawn into loca l poli t ics, 
w h i c h w o u l d inevitably accompany statutory par tnerships w i t h local 
authorit ies and , for m u c h of the rest of the decade, A C P O was 
dis t inct ly l u k e w a r m ' regarding the idea of s u c h par tnerships . For the 
government, there was pol i t ical host i l i ty to a loca l authori ty sector who 
could not be ' t rusted' w i t h addi t ional powers or resources, a n d this 
cou ld expla in the failure of the government to respond to the Morgan 
Report 's recommendat ions. 
Whi le the Home Office cont inued to promote the par tnership approach 
for the rest of the Conservatives period i n office, the idea of statutory 
partnerships, whi le taken u p by both of the m a i n opposi t ion parties, 
was never ser iously entertained by the government. It d i d expand the 
Safer Cit ies Programme, and it cont inued to promote the par tnership 
approach, for example by commiss ion ing Cr ime Conce rn to produce a 
booklet enti t led 'A Pract ica l Gu ide to Cr ime Prevention for Loca l 
Par tnerships ' (Crime Concern, . 1993). Significantly, th is drew the 
following response from the outgoing president of A C P O ' s Cr ime 
Prevention committee (Owen, 1994: 7): "crime prevention activity 
needs core funding, not more glossy brochures endors ing the 
par tnership approach." 
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Crime Prevention Policy under New Labour 
W h e n New Labou r entered power i n 1997 they made very clear i t was 
their legislative intent to es tabl ish statutory par tnerships i n fact, their 
intent h a d been clear since at least 1993 w h e n Tony B l a i r (1993) 
identified th is as one of h i s key objectives whi l s t serving as Shadow 
Home Secretary. Before the pass ing of the Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t i n 
1998 both A C P O a n d the loca l authori ty associat ions were involved i n 
a certain amoun t of TDehind-the-scenes' lobbjdng. The Loca l Author i ty 
Associa t ions were p u s h i n g for the lead statutory responsibility- to be 
handed to them, whi l s t A C P O ' s posi t ion h a d softened to the extent that 
i t was now prepared to 'accept' a jo in t responsibi l i ty w i t h local 
authorit ies, a l though eal-lier (ACPO, 1996) i t h a d been arguing that the 
police service occupied 'the most prominent place ' amongst local 
agencies. 
A s a consequence, the legislators agreed that i t s h o u l d be a jo in t 
responsibi l i ty. However, as the statutory guidance (Home Office, 1998) 
made clear, whi le the police a n d loca l authori t ies were to be 
'responsible authori t ies ' as the terminology named them, neither was 
to be regarded as 'first among equals' , and the whole point was the 
new Cr ime a n d Disorder Reduc t ion Par tnerships (CDRPs) , w h i c h were 
required to be established, shou ld be opened u p to a wider 
const i tuency inc lud ing , not only, the police a n d the loca l authority, 
bu t also any other local agencies from across the m i x e d economy who 
h a d a potent ia l role to p lay i n loca l cr ime prevention. The 
par tnerships were intended to produce fully 'joined u p ' loca l strategies, 
premised u p o n the same problem-oriented approach, w h i c h the Home 
Office h a d been p u s h i n g for since 1984. They were to be based u p o n 
a n analysis of loca l cr ime a n d disorder problems completed every three 
years and presented for loca l consul ta t ion as cr ime audi ts , m u c h as 
Morgan h a d recommended. 
In summat ion . New Labour pu t into effect a l l of Morgan 's earlier 
recommendations, apart from the one proposing a loca l ring-fenced 
budget for communi ty safety. S imi la r to their Conservative 
predecessors. New Labour argued that local par tnerships cou ld be self-
financing because of the l ikely savings that were to accrue from 
successful local cr ime prevention, a fundamental issue, w h i c h was to 
later represent a significant inhibi tor w i t h i n some par tnerships . 
Since the pass ing of the Cr ime and Disorder A c t i n 1998, the structure 
of local cr ime prevention has remained broadly s imi la r , w i t h C D R P s 
cont inu ing to be regarded as the m a i n vehicles th rough w h i c h crime 
prevention s h o u l d be delivered. These C D R P s have pu t i n place three-
yearly cr ime reduct ion strategies, beginning on the first of A p r i l i n 
each of the years 1999, 2002 , and 2005 . It w o u l d be quite wrong to 
assume, however, that the last decade has been m a r k e d by any great 
degree of cont inui ty and stabili ty. Rather, i t has been subjected to 
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what Crawford (2007) cal ls h3^er-pol i t ic isat ion a n d hyper- innovat ion, 
as a constant success ion of changes have been experienced. Some 
changes c o u l d be regarded as the adjustment or fine-tuning of pol icy 
i n response to the experience of pol icy-makers a n d practi t ioners i n 
wha t remains a relatively new departure i n policy. M a n y s u c h 
adjustments were necessary because crime prevention has become 
entwined i n the broader movement of 'modernisat ion' , pu r sued 
par t icular ly th rough the avenues of police reform and" loca l government 
reform (Gil l ing, 2007). 
Some changes, however, m a y be more properly regarded as political '• 
reactions, sometimes of a Imee-jerk' type, as New Labour has 
endeavoured to re ta in law and order as a pol i t ica l strength, rather 
t han as a pol i t ica l l iabi l i ty , hav ing worked so h a r d i n the course of the 
1990s to wrestle the issue from the Conservatives who h a d previously 
been regarded as the 'na tura l ' party of law and order. M a n y of these 
pol icy changes were evidenced i n the course of the research a n d have 
informed this thesis, hav ing a n impor tant effect u p o n the nature of 
par tnership work ing , as w i l l be demonstrated i n subsequent chapters. 
Limita t ions of space mean that i t is not possible to explore these 
changes i n great detail , so what follows is a s u m m a i y of the key 
changes, w h i c h have occurred since 1998, a n d par t icu lar ly those 
changes that may have h a d a n important impac t u p o n local 
par tnership work ing . 
A number of pol icy changes, w h i c h have occurred c a n be grouped 
under the general theme of 'centralisation' . Ini t ial ly, C D R P s were 
established very m u c h at arm's length from the Home Office, and 
under the p resumpt ion that their operation was to ostensibly reflect 
the pr inciple of loca l i sm and , according to the rhetoric, C D R P s were 
established to find l o c a l solut ions for loca l problems' . Whi le this may 
have been the case, since 1998 a number of developments have 
occurred, w h i c h have served to increase the amount of central 
influence a n d direct ion over the activities of loca l C D R P s . Therefore, 
a l though C D R P s were in i t ia l ly provided wi th no addi t ional funds, and 
produced their first set of strategies (in 1999) o n the a s sumpt ion that 
no s u c h funds w o u l d be made available, tiie Home Office actual ly 
performed a U - t u r n on this issue a n d from 1999 through to the 
present, has made a bewildering array of funding streams available to 
C D R P s . S tar t ing from 1999, C D R P s have been able to access funds 
from, amongst others, the Cr ime Reduc t ion Programme, the Safer 
Communi t i es Initiative, the Par tnership Development F u n d , 
Communi t i es Agains t Drugs funding, the B u i l d i n g Safer Communi t i e s 
fund, the B a s i c C o m m a n d U n i t fund, and the Stronger a n d Safer 
Communi t i es fund. Whi le s u c h funding may have been used to o i l the 
cogs of local practice, enabl ing C D R P s to move from aspira t ion into 
act ion its effect has, i n reality, been to extend centra l influence over 
the business of loca l C D R P s because, as one might expect, the central 
funding comes very m u c h w i t h significant 'strings' at tached. 
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S u c h strings have subsequently taken a variety of forms. Cr ime 
Reduct ion Programme funding, for example, was allocated on a 
competitive basis to localities who cou ld demonstrate, i n response to a 
l is t of centra l pr ior i ty problems, that they h a d both a sufficiently 
serious p rob lem a n d a credible 'evidence-based' so lu t ion to it. 
Condi t ions for the receipt of other funds have generally t aken the form 
of a sk ing C D R P s to set out p lans i n relat ion to how they w o u l d in tend 
to spend funds, not ional ly allocated to them, a sk ing that these plans 
address a set of centra l priorit ies, a n d requir ing a n acco imt as to how 
the funds have been spent a n d how effective s u c h spending has been. 
Cent ra l priori t ies have been art iculated, since 1999, th rough Home 
Office Pub l ic Service Agreements (PSA's), w h i c h consti tute contractual 
agreements between the Treasury a n d the Home Office over wha t the 
latter w i l l 'deliver' i n re turn for funding allocated every three years 
through the Comprehensive Spending Review. These PSA ' s have been 
supported local ly by a n array of Bes t Va lue Performance Indicators 
(BVPI's) against w h i c h the performance of i nd iv idua l C D R P ' s a n d police 
B a s i c C o m m a n d U n i t s (BCU's) c an be measured. C D R P ' s , i n other 
words, have h a d to respond to Home Office P S A ' s , w i t h the 
effectiveness of their response being measured by the use of BVPI ' s , 
w h i c h sought to provide a ' common currency ' for performance 
measurement across the country. Th i s served to facilitate the 
product ion of performance league tables', the use of w h i c h has been 
enhanced by p lac ing C D R P ' s into 'family' groups, the purpose, to 
enable a degree of l ike-aga ins t - l ike ' compar ison. 
Centra l isa t ion has been assisted to a great extent by the establ ishment 
of what, i n effect, amounts to a v icar ious presence of the Home Office 
across the regions of E n g l a n d a n d Wales . F r o m 2000 onwards, a 
Cr ime Reduc t ion Directorate was placed i n each of the 10 Regional 
Government Offices a n d W e l s h Assembly . Amongs t other functions, 
the Cr ime Reduc t ion Director a n d their sma l l teams of c iv i l servants 
have been required to act as the regional condui ts for Home Office 
funding. It is they who distr ibute the funds to the loca l C D R P s , and i t 
is they who operate the Home Office's performance management 
regime requi r ing C D R P s to b id , a n d account, for centra l funding. They 
monitor the C D R P s ' general performance against a cont inuous 
performance ethos of Bes t Va lue a n d a 'closing the gap' mentality, 
w h i c h par t icu lar ly scrut inises those C D R P s who find themselves i n the 
'poorest performing' quartile, as measured by the highest rates of 
priori ty cr imes i n their family groupings. 
Together the regime, w h i c h accompanies central funding and the 
performance management activities of the regional Cr ime Reduct ion 
Teams, consti tute a means by w h i c h central government exerts its 
influence by effectively micro-managing the bus iness of C D R P s . In 
part, this micro-management can be seen as the contemporaiy 
expression of the accountabi l i ty relat ionship, w h i c h has always existed 
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between cent ra l a n d local governmental bodies. Loca l bodies have 
his tor ical ly h a d to account for, at the very least, their probi ty i n the 
use of pub l i c funds. 
Clearly, however, this accountabi l i ty relat ionship appears to have 
become more prescriptive from the centre. Perhaps i n part this is due 
to the pol i t ic isa t ion of l aw a n d order, w h i c h provides central 
government w i t h a m u c h greater 'stake' i n the 'performance' of local 
bodies i n a n area that can, at extreme levels, serve to determine the 
'poli t ical fate' of governments at election t imes. A l so , perhaps this is 
because centra l government is mis t rus t fu l of C D R P s a n d s u c h 
mis t rus t m a y be a corollary to the new pub l i c management, w h i c h has 
been wel l descr ibed as "the ins t i tu t ional isa t ion of mist rust" (Crawford, 
2001). It m a y also be a response to evidence, w h i c h raises concerns 
regarding the capacity of local C D R P s that came from, amongst other 
sources, a n early Home Office review of C D R P activities (Phill ips et a l . , 
2000 a n d 2002), a n d a review of the Cr ime Reduc t ion Programme 
identifying a range of important ' implementat ion failures ' (Hedderman 
& Wi l l i ams , 2001 ; Til ley, 2004), m a n y of w h i c h were l a id at the feet of 
C D R P s . 
Yet the mis t rus t m a y also represent the default pos i t ion of a 
government who remain uncer t a in i n relat ion to exactly how 
partnerships , a n d the new approach to governing that they represent, 
fit into t radi t ional modernis t s tructures of publ ic adminis t ra t ion . 
Whatever the cause of the mist rust , i ts presence has inserted a top-
down ' pu l l ' dynamic into the business of local par tnership working, 
w h i c h has h a d important knock -on effects as w i l l be explained later. 
If one theme of pol icy change since 1998 has been central isat ion, 
another theme has been a strengthening of loca l s t ructures and 
capacity. A l t h o u g h arguably, this is l i n k e d to central isat ion i n so far 
as the under ly ing a i m of s u c h strengthening has been to facilitate the 
centre's abi l i ty to govern ' through' C D R P s . To some extent, of course, 
central funding has achieved this , providing some C D R P s w i t h an 
opportuni ty to employ dedicated communi ty safety officers (CSOs) or 
to employ analysts and other technological aids s u c h as Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS), or M O S A I C w h i c h enhanced the technical 
capacity or competence of C D R P s . A t the same time, the Home Office 
has pu r sued a general strategy of at tempting to increase the expertise 
of loca l practi t ioners, for example, by provid ing them w i t h a range of 
on-line cr ime reduct ion ' toolkits ' a n d by providing access for C D R P s to 
the consu l tancy expertise of agencies s u c h as N A C R O a n d Cr ime 
Concern . 
A l though it has been a long time coming, the 2006 Police a n d Jus t ice 
Ac t also served to strengthen local capaci ty by reforming the 
informat ion-shar ing provisions of the 1998 Act . Those provisions, i t 
was originally believed, wou ld open the door to a n easy exchange of 
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aggregated da ta between agencies who were p l ann ing loca l crime 
reduct ion strategies. However, experience indicated that the 
provisions l acked 'teeth' enabling, bu t not requir ing, the exchange of 
informat ion a n d therefore not overcoming some of the tradi t ional 
obstacles such, as c la ims of confidentiality. The 2006 A c t has imposed 
a positive duty on loca l agencies to exchange informat ion w h i c h , i t is 
thought, w i l l help to overcome these sorts of obstacles. 
Strengthening loca l s tructures has also been achieved by other means. 
Thus , for example, in i t ia l ly only the loca l police commander a n d the 
local author i ty chief executive were identified as the responsible 
authorit ies charged wi th es tabl ishing C D R P s a n d fulfill ing the 
statutory mandate to produce audits a n d strategies. Fol lowing the 
Police Reform A c t 2002, however, the l i s t of responsible authorit ies 
was increased i n A p r i l 2003 to inc lude Police Author i t ies a n d Fire 
Author i t ies and , from A p r i l 2004, P r imary Care Trus ts . The same Ac t 
required either the merger of, or (particularly i n two-tier areas) the 
establ ishment of closer work ing relat ionships between, C D R P s a n d 
D r u g a n d A l c o h o l A c t i o n Teams (DAATs). Meanwhi le , the Ant i -Soc ia l 
Behaviour A c t 2003 endowed C D R P s w i t h a centra l responsibi l i ty for 
developing loca l ant i -social behaviour policy, vnih addi t ional Home 
Office funding, a l lowing m a n y to employ new ant i -socia l behaviour co­
ordinators to facilitate the pursu i t of this task. A l l of these changes, i t 
cou ld be argued, were intended to es tabl ish C D R P s as more 'joined u p ' 
local bodies, a n d for the purposes of th is research project i t is 
par t icu lar ly impor tant to note the incorporat ion of local Police 
Author i t ies into C D R P s , as a means of s t reaml in ing C D R P crime 
reduct ion strategies a n d local pol ic ing plans . 
The th i rd theme of policy changes since 1998 is , given the first theme, 
somewhat paradoxical , as at the same time a number of developments 
have served to enhance central isat ion, others have sought to increase 
the loca l i sm of C D R P s . The seeds of s u c h loca l i sm were sown by the 
A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n (2002) i n a report, w h i c h was generally cr i t ica l of 
the direct ion taken by previous Home Office policy. 
Amongs t other things (see Chapter 3), the A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n 
suggested that loca l authorit ies needed to exert more of a 'steer' over 
the bus iness of local cr ime prevention and , to this end, i t 
recommended that a portfolio responsibi l i ty, for what the A u d i t 
C o m m i s s i o n preferred to ca l l communi ty safety, shou ld be lodged wi th 
a member of the loca l authority 's new cabinet-style government 
structure. It also saw the business of C D R P s fall ing neatly w i t h i n the 
domain of the new Loca l Strategic Par tnerships (LSPs), established 
under the Loca l Government A c t 2000 , to produce communi ty 
strategies to address t±ie social , economic a n d environmental wel l -
being of their areas. The ul t imate responsibi l i ty for p roduc ing s u c h 
strategies, o n this occasion, rested with the loca l author i ty i n a newly 
conceived ' communi ty leadership ' role (Stoker, 2004). 
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The idea of enhanc ing the loca l i sm of C D R P s was t aken u p by the 
Home Office, par t icu lar ly under the leadership of D a v i d Blunke t t , who 
showed a s trong personal commitment bo th to a 'new loca l i sm ' 
(McLaughl in , 2007) a n d to the idea of c iv i l renewal, i n w h i c h i t was 
imagined that cit izens wou ld play a m u c h more integral role i n the 
governance, a n d indeed the 'co-production' , of loca l cr ime control . 
Thus , at the same time as the neighbourhood pol ic ing agenda was 
being unfolded for the police service (see Chapter 2) so C D R P s were 
required, unde r the arrangements for the new B u i l d i n g Safer 
Communi t i e s fund i n .2004, to spend some of those funds on-
enhancing communi ty engagement. In the same year, the fund's name 
was changed to the Stronger a n d Safer Communi t i e s fund, a n d i t was 
made into one of the four priori ty pol icy areas of the newly-announced 
Loca l A r e a Agreements (LAA's), w h i c h were to be operat ional i n some 
areas by A p r i l 2005 . The L A A ' s were in tended to provide a n 
opportuni ty for loca l areas to be more 'flexible' regarding the way they 
delivered key pub l i c service areas, l ike cr ime prevention, m a k i n g them 
less vulnerable to central prescr ipt ion a n d direct ion. Al though , 
i ronical ly, pr ior i ty outcomes are stUl identified nat ional ly through 
PSA's . The idea is that L A A ' s enable localit ies, a n d specifically LSP ' s 
for w h i c h L A A ' s serve as the delivery plans , a n d have more flexibility 
su r round ing the way s u c h outcomes w i l l be achieved. 
F ina l ly , the process of enhancing loca l i sm was cont inued w i t h the 
publ ica t ion i n J a n u a r y 2006 of the Home Office's (2006) long-awaited 
review into the workings of C D R P ' s a n d the pass ing of the 2006 Police 
and Jus t i ce Ac t , w h i c h subscr ibed to m a n y of that Review's 
recommendations. In par t icular , the A c t confirms the in tent ion of 
embedding the bus iness of C D R P ' s into LSP ' s by requi r ing that, i n two-
tier areas, the C D R P ' s shou ld be spl i t a long operat ional a n d strategic 
l ines so that strategic bodies cou ld operate at the county level, the 
same level of operation as the L S P . 
A l though this strategic merging of C D R P ' s i n two-tier areas may 
appear to r u n counter to the pr inciple of loca l i sm, the subsequent 
embedding of them i n LSP ' s , i n theory, re-establishes a n d consolidates 
s u c h loca l i sm providing opportunit ies for flexible local delivery w h i c h 
are not, i n theory, so achievable by the lower tier dis tr ic t counci ls 
operating i n two-tier areas. In terms of accountabi l i ty arrangements, 
the 2006 A c t places m u c h greater emphasis u p o n loca l -visibility, 
requir ing C D R P s to make regular progress reports to local 
communi t ies . It also requires them to ho ld 'face the people' sessions 
where senior members of the C D R P m u s t make themselves available to 
the loca l communi ty i n a fashion not d i s s imi la r to that u t i l i sed by 
police communi ty l i a i son panels. It also empowers members of the 
communi ty , operating v i a loca l counci l lors , to instigate a ' communi ty 
call-to-action' , whereby C D R P s are required to address issues, w h i c h 
they may have hitherto been shown to have neglected. Last ly, the 
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legislation places the bus iness of C D R P s w i t h i n the purview of local 
authori ty Overview a n d Scru t iny Committees, w h i c h perform a s imi lar 
function to that performed at Westminster by select committees. 
M a n y of the changes d iscussed above have either occurred recently, or 
are i n the process of unfolding. Some fall outside of the temporal 
l imi ts set down by this research project, a l though since m a n y of the 
changes were either t rai led i n earlier documents (e.g. the idea of the 
communi ty cal l- to-act ion h a d been mooted i n a 2004 Whi te Paper), or 
anticipated w i t h some confidence quite poss ib ly because of the odd 
l eak ' from the Whi t eha l l machine , they h o l d some relevance for the 
research o n w h i c h this thesis is based. 
Chapter Summary and Discussion 
This chapter has covered the development of cr ime prevention over the 
m o d e m period, pa inted w i t h a necessari ly broad b ru sh . In 
chronological order i t has shown that a l though the police service was 
originally given a preventive mandate, i n practice i t has preferred to 
pursue its ends th rough a par t icular organisat ional emphasis u p o n 
detection. The development of cr ime prevention, conceived of as a 
more 'upstream' activity, was left in i t ia l ly to the insurance industry , 
inspi red by its concerns about the negative effects of r i s ing acquisit ive 
crime on its cont inued profitability, latterly i t has been addressed by 
the Home Office who has h a d to deal w i t h the consequences of fiscal 
cr is is a n d the crises of confidence a n d competence that have 
accompanied research evidence about the effectiveness of pol ic ing a n d 
sentencing a n d about the ful l extent of cr ime, w h i c h lies beyond the 
reach of the c r i m i n a l jus t ice system. 
The model of cr ime prevention the Home Office has sought to develop 
has been a relatively consistent one since the mid-1970s , based u p o n 
the idea of a problem-oriented focus pu r sued th rough a par tnership 
approach. U n d e r the Conservatives, this model failed to make m u c h 
headway, for reasons that w i l l be explored i n more detai l i n Chapter 3. 
Under New Labour , the model has been ins t i tu t ional ised i n statutory 
C D R P s , however, despite becoming a feature of the pol icy landscape 
over the last decade, a n d into the foreseeable future, the par tnerships 
have not thrived. Aga in , the reasons for th is w i l l be more fully 
explored later bu t this chapter has shown, i n mit igat ion, C D R P s have 
been subjected to a range of contradictory pressures. Whi le their 
capacity has been enhanced to address some of the ' s t ructural 
instabi l i t ies ' (Gil l ing, 2007), w h i c h were inscr ibed into their 
establishment i n 1998 they have, i n reality, sat uncomfortably between 
central is ing a n d local i s ing pressures a n d subsequent pol icy 
developments. O n the one hand , the Home Office and the govemment 
offices have attempted to micro-manage the bus iness of C D R P s , while 
on the other, more pressure has been placed u p o n loca l authori t ies to 
'own' crime prevention a n d u p o n local communi t ies to participate i n its 
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'co-production' . C D R P s w o u l d be excused for not knowing w h i c h way 
to face. 
In contrast to some of the more established histories of cr ime 
prevention (Gil l ing, 1997 etc.) some attempt has been made to offer a 
'police reading ' of th is history. Wi thou t going into more detai l on the 
different pressures to w h i c h the police service has been subjected i n 
recent decades, i t has proven difficult to facilitate th is i n anything 
other t han a relatively cursory way. Hence, to deepen uriderstanding, 
i n Chapter 2 a n attempt sha l l be made to contextualise the 
development of cr ime prevention w i t h i n the broader a n d equally 
complex context of police reform. Fo r the present, the police 
perspective demonstrates that, in i t ia l ly , the police service was able to 
manage cr ime prevention by ghettoising i t w i t h i n specialist 
departments. However, as cr ime prevention has evolved, its problem-
oriented a n d partnership-oriented form has connected i t w i th 
developments i n communi ty pol ic ing a n d problem-oriented policing, 
both of w h i c h began to take root i n the police service du r ing the early 
1980s. A s we sha l l see, these developments have their own paral lel 
police histories a n d despite their 'elective affinity' • w i t h crime 
prevention, do not always connect w i t h i t i n practice. 
Re turn ing to the quest ion of the two challenges posed to the police 
service by the emergence of cr ime prevention, namely what the police 
service shou ld be doing a n d how they s h o u l d be doing it, the 
developments d i scussed i n this chapter raise far more questions than 
answers. 
Cr ime prevention pol icy under the Conservatives was in i t ia l ly premised 
u p o n a s i tua t ional approach, w h i c h was cr i t ic ised by the Morgan 
Report (Home Office, 1991) for its narrowness of perspective. However, 
while New Labour in i t ia l ly appeared to suppor t Morgan 's broader 
conception of communi ty safety, most Home Office pol icy since 1997 
has operated w i t h the idea of cr ime reduct ion, w h i c h w h e n translated 
seems to imp ly a mixture of 'upstream' s i tua t ional approaches a n d 
more 'downstream' measures s u c h as enforcement activity against 
prolific offenders a n d ant i -social behaviour, delivered by means of 
tact ical measures s u c h as penalty notices for disorder. The tight 
confines under w h i c h C D R P s have operated, combined w i t h time-
l imited funding a n d pressure to deliver short- term results , serve to 
const ra in opportunit ies for more long-term 'socia l ' c r ime prevention 
measures. A l t h o u g h it has to be highl ighted that opportunit ies for 
these k inds of measures do exist elsewhere, beyond C D R P s , for 
example i n the neighbourhood renewal activities of L S P s . Since 
C D R P s are increasingly connected into these L S P s , on w h i c h the police 
service is also represented, this raises the impor tant quest ion of 
through w h i c h bodies, and i n w h i c h ways s h o u l d the police's crime 
preventive role be pursued? The i n c l u s i o n of 'downstream' 
enforcement activities i n cr ime reduct ion, a n d indeed the further 
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i n c l u s i o n of h igh vis ib i l i ty ' reassurance pol ic ing ' (see Chapter 3) raises 
the poss ib i l i ty that the police's cr ime prevention mandate can continue 
to be pu r sued beyond the boundar ies of the C D R P , potentially 
marg ina l i s ing the latter, a n d once more incorporat ing prevention into 
detection, as the police service succeeded i n doing du r ing the 
nineteenth century. 
Where the insurance industry 's v i s ion of cr ime prevention cou ld be 
easily met, albeit somewhat unsatisfactori ly, by the establishment of 
special ist cr ime prevention officers a n d departments, the ambigui ty of 
central government's v i s ion since 1997 makes i t more difficult for the 
police to locate the 'new' cr ime prevention funct ion. Does i t belong 
w i t h the cr ime prevention specicLlists, or does the 'responsible 
authori ty ' status require a more strategic involvement of B C U or 
dis tr ic t commanders or their deputies? Or shou ld their involvement 
be directed at the L S P ? S h o u l d the police service second officers to the 
v i r tua l par tnership wor ld of C D R P s , to work alongside loca l authori ty 
communi ty safety officers a n d perhaps resources d r awn from other 
responsible authori t ies? Or shou ld the responsibi l i ty be pushed down 
the r anks , to those i n the front l ine of ne ighbourhood policing? 
Conversely shou ld it, perhaps, operate at a l l of these levels? 
Alongside s u c h difficult questions regarding where police involvement 
s h o u l d be organisat ionally located sit others, w h i c h raise even more 
impor tant issues. S h o u l d the police service occupy equal status wi th 
other responsible authorit ies, or shou ld they occupy more of a 
leadership role, as envisaged i n the models of communi ty pol ic ing and 
problem-oriented pol ic ing that share m u c h i n c o m m o n wi th the 
characteris t ic features of cr ime prevention? If the former, how m u c h 
space s h o u l d be afforded to loca l poli t ics from w h i c h , one cou ld argue, 
the police service has previously sought to r ema in aloof? 
In the pol icy document 'Gett ing to Gr ips w i t h C r i m e ' (Home Office, 
1997) New Labour h a d explici t ly rejected the idea of loca l authori ty 
leadership of C D R P s on the grounds that a lead role for local 
authori t ies wou ld give them u n d u e influence over the resource 
deployments of other agencies s u c h as the police. Yet , by the time of 
the 2006 Police a n d Jus t i ce A c t they were prepared to pu t C D R P s 
under local authori ty overview a n d scru t iny committees, ra is ing the 
possibi l i ty that police B C U Commanders might be answerable, at least 
i n part, to local authori ty members for their services actions. Yet 
might not police polar ised leadership roles reverse the problem, 
pu t t ing the police i n a posi t ion of undue influence over local , 
democrat ical ly-control led pub l i c services? 
The impor tant point i s , no th ing from the his tory of cr ime prevention 
covered i n this chapter provides clear answers to any of these 
questions, a n d ambigui ty lies at the heart of the development of local 
cr ime prevention under New Labour . Notwi ths tanding the future 
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potential role of overview a n d scru t iny committees, w h i c h lies outside 
the t ime l imi t s of this research, answers to the quest ions posed above 
have to be worked out by the police. 
The police service has been left, to a large extent, to read the leaves left 
beh ind i n the Home Office's teacup. H o w they have done this , and 
wi th wha t consequences, is the subject of this thesis. However, before 
the empir ica l research, i t is necessary to p i c k u p further clues i n 
relat ion to the police's response by examin ing more broadly the issue 
of police reform, w h i c h has served to p u s h the police service i n a 
number of directions a n d th is m a y help to unde r s t and the pushes 
being exerted by cr ime prevention. Police reform is , therefore, the 
subject of Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 - Police Reform 
Introduction 
One of the inherent problems regarding t racing the developments of 
cr ime prevention pol icy (as ar t iculated i n Chapter 1) is that, i n the 
process of doing so, the 'domain ' of cr ime prevention resul ts i n being 
artificially separated from those other domains w i t h w h i c h i t interacts. 
In par t icular , there is a danger that cr ime prevention is segregated 
from other developments i n pol ic ing policy. 
V a r i o u s pol ic ing pol icy has not stood s t i l l as developments i n crime 
prevention have unfolded, a n d crime prevention is not therefore the 
only th ing to have generated ' turbulence ' i n pol ic ing . Other 
developments, not necessari ly i n sympathy w i t h those t ak ing place i n 
cr ime prevention, have h a d a n equally impor tant bear ing u p o n the 
direct ion of pol ic ing pol icy a n d practice, sometimes m a k i n g it difficult 
for practi t ioners to make sense of pol icy shifts, a n d thereby respond i n 
a coherent way to s u c h shifts. 
Consequently, i n th is chapter, the a i m is to contextualise the 
developments highl ighted i n the last chapter, w i t h i n broader changes 
t ak ing pla:ce i n pol ic ing policy. A l though the same t ime period w i l l be 
considered, the dis tant pas t w i l l be dealt w i t h i n a more cursory way, 
w i t h most attention being pa id to- the success ion of changes, w h i c h 
have occurred over the last two decades, as th is has a par t icu lar ly 
important bear ing u p o n the empir ica l focus of th is thesis. The title of 
the chapter reflects the reali ty that over this t ime period the dominant 
theme has been that of police reform, as was the case w i t h cr ime 
prevention, where there have been a number of impor tant changes. 
Cr ime prevention has been a part of this reform process, however, the 
direct ion of the changes have been neither un id i rec t iona l nor 
unambiguous . The purpose of this chapter, then, i s to explore some of 
these ambiguit ies, a n d the d i lemmas they generate for the police 
service as i t is required to respond a n d react to developments i n the 
cr ime prevention domain . 
The Emergence of Permanent, Professional Policing 
Al though there is a tendency to assume, th rough modern eyes, that 
the police service m u s t always have been w i t h u s , a permanent police 
service w i th in E n g l a n d and Wales has a his tory of less than two 
centuries. The c i rcumstances su r round ing the es tabl ishment of the 
permanent police are wel l covered i n the li terature (Reiner, 2000), and 
there has been a broad div is ion between those academic 
commentators who point to the 'new police ' as a ra t iona l improvement 
u p o n the inefficient a n d inadequate pol ic ing arrangements, w h i c h 
existed before their a r r iva l a n d those who implicate t hem i n a strategy 
of c lass control a n d order maintenance, facil i tat ing the dominance of 
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i ndus t r i a l cap i ta l i sm. Whi l s t , as Reiner (2000) observes, the reality 
m a y wel l be something in-between, a n d local ly more contingent, there 
exists more agreement regarding what par t icu lar ly interests this work, 
w h i c h is the direct ion i n w h i c h pol ic ing pol icy moved after their 
establishment, first of a l l i n London , from 1829. 
The new police, whi le endowed w i t h a preventive mandate, accorded 
pr ior i ty to the pat rol function, par t icular ly as a means of secur ing 
legit imacy from a sceptical publ ic , composed of middle classes who 
suspected the police of being a 'continental-style ' state spying agency, 
a n d a w o r k i n g class who resented the police's invas ion of their 'street 
space' a n d cul ture . Moreover i n the eyes of reformers, m e n l ike 
C o l q u h o u n , B e n t h a m , Peel a n d Chadwick , h igh-vis ib i l i ty patrol l ing 
also provided the police w i t h the most efficient means by w h i c h they 
cou ld fulfil their preventive mandate, thereby delivering tJhie u t i l i t a r ian 
end of 'the greatest good for the greatest number ' . 
Whi le i n theory the police were supposed to priori t ise preventive 
patrol l ing, i n practice, i t was detection a n d invest igation w h i c h came 
increas ingly to the fore. Wright (2002) observes that s ince C o m m o n 
L a w was not the King ' s Law, its enforcement was not in i t ia l ly regarded 
as a n appropriate task for the King ' s s w o m - i n constables a n d i t was, 
instead, a c o m m u n i t y matter left to a n assortment of individuals , 
private ' thief-takers ' a n d others s u c h as traders who grouped 
themselves into 'associations for the prosecut ion of felons'. Yet despite 
th is array, the first specialist un i t of plainclothes detectives was 
establ ished ins ide the Metropol i tan Police i n 1842, a n d by 1877 the 
Cent ra l Intelligence Depar tment (CID) h a d been established, as a 
model , repl icated across the country. The shift from the 'scarecrow 
funct ion ' of patrol l ing, to pat rol l ing combined w i t h investigation a n d 
detection m a y i n par t be due to the pressure exerted from central 
government, w h i c h from 1855 provided a centra l grant to a l l forces on 
the proviso that they demonstrated their efficiency i n th is regard 
(Gil l ing, 1997). In the absence of cr ime statistics, the sort w h i c h is 
now commonplace, the most manifest way for the police to 
demonstrate their efficiency was th rough prosecut ions, wh ich , 
therefore, required a n effective detective funct ion. Th i s represents a n 
early h i s tor ica l para l le l to the more recent pressure exerted by the 
Home Office over the police service to demonstrate its effectiveness i n 
s u c h areas as 'crime reduct ion ' or 'br inging offenders to just ice ' . 
Conceivably, the police were not necessari ly u n w i l l i n g to place s u c h an 
emphasis u p o n detection, as i t provided a m u c h more glamorous and 
'macho' means by w h i c h the police cou ld demonstrate their 
competence, a n d par t icular ly their professional credentials (O'Malley 
a n d H u t c h i n s o n , 2007). Over most of the next century, this b lend of 
patrol l ing a n d detection was susta ined, w i t h the latter being regarded 
as the more professional 'hard end ' of pol ic ing, a n d a specia l i sm that 
most new officers aspired to become a par t of, even though the 
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cu l t u r a l image of the police detective from the outside was often that of 
the bung l ing s impleton work ing i n the shadow of their social 
superiors , the amateur s leuths of novelists s u c h as A r t h u r C o n a n 
Doyle, Doro thy L . Sayers or Aga tha Chr is t ie (McLaughl in , 2007). 
Patrol l ing, meanwhile , s t i l l h a d a vi tal ly impor tan t par t to play i n 
secur ing communi ty consent, par t icu lar ly th rough the iconic image of 
P C George D i x o n , w h i c h was lent weight by early sociological 
ethnographers who demonstrated that most police activity was about 
'peace-keeping', w i t h police officers most frequently being cal led u p o n 
to help ci t izens i n distress or to provide authoritat ive adjudicat ion, and 
not necessar i ly to fight crime (McLaughl in , 2007). 
However, despite s u c h sociological revelations, cr ime control became 
more of a n issue i n the 1960s as a consequence, of the r i s ing crime, 
w h i c h h a d not abated, as some h a d predicted i n the' wake of growing 
post-war social stabili ty. The tripartite agreement enacted by the 1964 
Police Ac t , moreover, h a d given the Home Secretary a ' formal ' interest 
i n the efficiency of police forces, a n d a l though the mean ing of efficiency 
was not clearly ar t iculated at that point (Weatheritt, 1986), i t is 
reasonable to suggest that m u c h of this interest was l ikely to be 
directed at the police's abil i ty to 'control ' cr ime. Notwi ths tanding the 
contemporaneous concerns of the insurance indus t ry , the 
es tabl ishment of the C o r n i s h Committee to examine the issue of crime 
prevention 'and detection' might be seen i n this l ight. Cer ta inly the 
mid-1960s m a r k s a n impor tant junc tu re i n police history, w h e n the 
Home Office started to take m u c h more of a n 'interest' i n operational 
aspects of pol ic ing. 
A s d i scussed i n Chapter 1, i n terms of cr ime prevention, Cornish ' s 
recommendat ions led to the establ ishment of special is t police Cr ime 
Prevention Departments (CPDs). However, he was also keen to ensure 
that the creation of s u c h specialist departments a n d officers d id not 
lead to a n abrogation of responsibi l i ty for cr ime prevention elsewhere 
w i t h i n the police organisat ion. Hence, for example, i t was anticipated 
that the m a i n crime preventive responsibi l i ty w o u l d s t i l l rest w i t h area 
beat officers (ABOs), a n d that officers work ing i n C P D s w o u l d have an 
impor tant role to p lay i n t ra in ing the A B O s to perform s u c h a role. A s 
events t ranspired, C P D s were absorbed into the police organisat ion as 
something of a "specialist backwater" (Weatheritt, 1986: 45), w i th 
C P D s account ing for no more t han 0.5% of police establ ishment 
strength, at tract ing a reputat ion as the f inal s taging post for officers 
approaching retirement, rather t han for the appointment of "young 
turks". 
Accord ing to Weatherit t (ibid.: 53), C P D s were l ike 'security ghettos' 
w i t h i n the police service, interpreting the cr ime preventive roles as 
being a lmost exclusively concerned w i t h developing a knowledge of 
appropriate securi ty technologies, a n d communica t ing s u c h knowledge 
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to the pub l i c th rough publ ic i ty materials , ta lks a n d the l ike . A n A C P O 
work ing par ty at the end of the 1970s explici t ly rejected any idea of 
integrating C P D s more closely w i t h the work of preventive patroll ing. 
C P D s were steered clear of any involvement w i t h ' social ' approaches to 
cr ime prevention, w h i c h were being developed i n other parts of the 
police service (such as communi ty relations departments a n d juvenile 
bureau's), a n d they were not regarded as the relevant locus for 
developing the new problem-oriented approach of s i tua t ional crime 
prevention, w h i c h researchers w i th in the Home Office Research and 
P lann ing U n i t h a d developed, also by the end of the 1970s (Gladstone, 
1980). These points are impor tant as they foreshadow later 
developments i n the 1990s and beyond, demonstra t ing that the • 
quest ion of wha t cr ime prevention is , a n d where i t shou ld be 
organisat ional ly located, is one shrouded i n definit ional a n d 
organisat ional pol i t ics . 
A further example of Home Office intervention i n police operational 
matters c a n be found w i t h i n the in t roduct ion of u n i t beat pol ic ing 
(UBP) w h i c h , l ike the establ ishment of C P D s , occurred i n the 1960s. 
A s Weatheri t t (1986: 88) recounts, U B P was described by the Chief 
Inspector of Cons tabu la ry as "the biggest change i n fundamental 
operational police methods since 1829", a l though given the intervening 
in t roduct ion of the police detection function, the Chie f Inspector cou ld 
unders tandably be accused of slight overstatement. Nevertheless, U B P 
was a n impor tan t innovat ion, w h i c h sought a n efficient so lu t ion to the 
problem of the unpopu la r i ty of, a n d staffing shortages i n , foot patrol i n 
the 1960s. Its take-up was advocated i n a 1967 Home Office Ci rcu la r , 
w h i c h also provided a n incentive to Police Author i t ies i n the form of 
central loans to pay for purchase of the necessary pat rol cars and 
communica t ions technology. The concept was to integrate foot patrol 
and mobile pat rol officers w i t h CID resources th rough a n enhanced 
and more effective communica t ions capacity, provid ing a stronger 
patrol l ing presence a n d a n abi l i ty for fast response to incidents wh ich , 
when combined w i t h intelligence from CID sources, w o u l d lead to a 
more effective detection capacity. 
A l though U B P has subsequently been 'credited' w i t h t u rn ing the police 
service into a 'fire-brigade' response service, w h i c h fundamental ly 
poli t icised the relat ionship between the police a n d the publ ic 
(Holdaway, 1977), i t is important to remember that i n its idealised 
concept, i t was an early effort to integrate preventive patrol l ing wi th 
detection, thereby jo in ing u p the two sides of operat ional pol ic ing as 
they h a d evolved since 1829. S imi lar ly , whi le i t s tands accused of 
having al ienated police from the publ ic , a n d serving to increase publ ic 
dissatisfaction w i t h the police, i t was actual ly in t roduced, i ronical ly i n 
part, to address exist ing pub l i c dissatisfaction w i t h foot patrols, a n d 
the 1967 C i r c u l a r confidently predicted that U B P was very m u c h going 
to give the pub l i c the service they wanted. 
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U B P is a very c ruc i a l example, w h i c h demonstrates a number of 
impor tant issues of direct relevance for the research u p o n w h i c h this 
thesis i s based. Fi rs t ly , i t set down a model of Home Office intervention 
i n operat ional pol ic ing matters subsequent ly to become increasingly 
commonplace, par t icu lar ly since the 1980s w i t h the emergence of a 
managerial is t agenda (see below). A s vidth the C o r n i s h 
recommendat ion for es tabl ishing C P D s , i t c an be seen as having set 
the central isat ion ba l l ro l l ing. Secondly, as Weatheri t t (1986) has 
observed, U B P was heavily promoted by the Home Office who made 
c la ims about its l ike ly success, w h i c h s imply were not warranted given 
the very l imi ted a n d patchy qual i ty of the research evidence available 
at that t ime. 
In reality, the Home Office, i t w o u l d seem, effectively sold U B P to the 
police. The fact that i t tu rned out to be little shor t of a disaster, i n the 
sense that i t d id not demonstrably improve police effectiveness, i t 
appears to have worsened pol ice-publ ic relations a n d m a y wel l have 
served to engender a degree of c y n i c i s m about th is , a n d future. Home 
Office interventions into operat ional pol ic ing matters. In essence, the 
police service, effectively, h a d h a d their fingers b u r n t by the whole 
experience. 
Thi rd ly , however, while U B P was a failure, the failure was i n part due 
to implementa t ion problems w h i c h the Home Office might not 
necessari ly have foreseen. The CID remained largely on the outside of 
this process a n d u p o n reflection th is l ack of integrat ion m a y have been 
a determinant to later isolat ionis t operations a n d functions. In some 
areas U B P was in t roduced wi thout A B O s , a n d once i n the cars, officers 
seemed reluctant to get outside of t hem w i t h the enhanced opportunity 
for qu ick responses p lay ing into the hands of the 'action-oriented' 
police occupat ional cul ture , w i t h detr imental consequences. 
Thus , whatever Home Office-led interventions m a y have been intended 
to achieve, i t is important to remember that they h a d to negotiate a 
police organisat ion, l ike any other organisat ion, w h i c h is littered wi th 
obstacles a n d banana sk ins that make the real isat ion of ra t ional goals 
m u c h harder to achieve t han is often appreciated. Indeed, this 
problem reared i ts head again i n a demonstra t ion project targeting 
school vanda l i sm (Hope a n d M u r p h y , 1983), th rough w h i c h the Home 
Office sought to promote the s i tuat ional cr ime prevent ion approach i n 
the 1980s. 
'Modernisat ions ' s u c h as the establ ishment of C P D s or the 
in t roduct ion of U B P d id not have a demonstrable impac t u p o n the 
cr ime problem, a n d research conducted by the Home Office i n the 
1970s (Clarke a n d Hough , 1980) reached the pess imis t ic conc lus ion 
that the two mains tays of operat ional cr ime control pol ic ing, namely 
patrol l ing a n d detection, were of l imi ted effectiveness. Th i s was the 
pol ic ing equivalent of a 'nothing works ' c r is is , w h i c h touched 
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sentencing pol icy at m u c h the same t ime (Brody, 1976). If this 
research heralded a cr is is of competence for the police, then 
revelations i n the med ia a n d elsewhere about police malpractice, 
par t icu la r ly i n the activities of special ist squads, regarding the 
(mis)use of police investigative powers a n d i n heavy-handed order 
maintenance tactics, heralded a n accompanjdng cr is is of confidence, 
w h i c h came to a head par t icular ly i n the u r b a n riots of the early 1980s 
(Reiner, 2000). 
Weatheri t t (1986) suggests that the aftermath of those riots provided 
the Home Office w i t h a rationale for intervening i n matters of ' 
operat ional pol ic ing, a l though another mot ivat ion she identifies is the 
changing economic climate, w h i c h led the govemment to demand 
greater value for money from its pub l i c services. G iven the in i t ia l ly 
favourable treatment that they obtained from the Conservatives i n 
1979, th is pressure came belatedly to the police, i n the form of Home 
Office C i r c u l a r 1 1 4 / 8 3 , w h i c h brought to bare the requirements of 
centra l government's F i n a n c i a l Management Initiative (FMI). 
In the 1980s there were further operat ional interventions from the 
Home Office, w h i c h sought to p u s h the police service i n a par t icular 
preferred direct ion. A l though the concept notor iously l acks precis ion, 
m u c h of the pressure was i n the direct ion of communi ty pol ic ing 
(Sharp, 2005). T h u s , for example L o r d Scarman 's (1981) proposal , i n 
the wake of the B r i x t o n riots, that the police shou ld strengthen 
mechan i sms for communi ty consul ta t ion became enshr ined i n Sect ion 
106 of the 1984 Police a n d C r i m i n a l Evidence Ac t . A l though , models 
of c o m m u n i t y po l ic ing envisaged that foot pat rol officers w o u l d also 
make stringent efforts to engage w i t h a n d work alongside 'the 
communi ty ' . 
The concept that communi ty police officers might work closely wi th 
other loca l agencies to develop more ' social ' solut ions to cr ime 
problems, meanwhile , was always impl ic i t i n Alderson 's v is ion of 
c o m m u n i t y pol ic ing. Th is was manifest i n the Exeter-based 
C o m m u n i t y Pol ic ing Consul ta t ive G r o u p init iat ive (Moore a n d B r o w n , 
1981), though s u c h a n approach h a d been encouraged more widely i n 
Home Office C i rcu la r s addressing responses to y o u t h cr ime i n 1978 
a n d 1980 (Weatheritt, 1986). Fur thermore , as noted i n Chapter 1, 
there was also a strong overlap between communi ty pol ic ing a n d the 
Home Office's promot ion of a s i tuat ional approach to cr ime prevention 
i n C i r c u l a r 8 / 8 4 a n d beyond, i n so far as, bo th required a par tnership 
approach i n the search for more creative solut ions to cr ime problems, 
w h i c h lay beyond the nar row a n d largely reactive reaches of the 
c r i m i n a l jus t ice system. 
Meanwhi le , i n terms of the deployment of police resources, i n parts of 
the Metropol i tan Police a n d Surrey Cons tabu la ry a programme of 
ne ighbourhood pol ic ing was implemented. Geographica l responsibi l i ty 
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was allocated to s m a l l groups of officers who were expected to consul t 
w i t h their communi ty a n d organise duty rosters i n l ine w i t h demand 
for their presence i n each area, supported by the resources from the 
wider police organisat ion w h e n required. Where the neighbourhood 
pol ic ing experiment was not fully implemented, variat ions on the 
theme were found w i t h i n the roles of area beat, or permanent beat, 
officers widely deployed i n other parts of the country, again as a 
response to the general p u s h towards communi ty pol ic ing. M a n y of 
these init iat ives foundered on a n u m b e r of key issues inc lud ing , the 
inabi l i ty of beat officers to engage w i t h more t h a n a t iny proport ion of 
the communi ty they were supposed to police, o n their l imi ted capacity" 
to identify local problems a n d on a frequent abst ract ion of officers to 
fi l l temporary gaps i n service provis ion elsewhere vsathin the police 
organisat ion (list of refs - inc lude Chat ter ton 85 Rogers, Irving et a l , 
etc.). In addi t ion, as h a d been the case w i t h U B P , foot pat rol and soft 
communi ty pol ic ing lacked any great resonance w i t h the action-
orientat ion of the dominant police occupat ional cul ture of that time. 
Yet none of these problems real ly hal ted the drift towards commimi ty 
pol ic ing i n one form or another, prompted i n par t by the consumer i sm 
that came to infuse government policy, par t icu lar ly following J o h n 
Major 's l a u n c h of the Cit izen 's Charter , w h i c h served to sensitise the 
police a n d other pub l i c agencies to delivering their services i n a way 
orientated to meet 'consumer ' expectations. A l t h o u g h s u c h a concept, 
i n reality, remains problematic i n respect of potential ly coercive 
services s u c h as pol ic ing. 
However, whi le one s t r ing to the managerial is t bow may be 
consumer i sm, another is the requirement for greater value for money, 
w h i c h i n t u r n exerted pressure on the police to pay closer attention to 
wha t they do, a n d how wel l they do it. Accord ing to Sharp (2005), the 
impos i t ion of C i r c u l a r 1 1 4 / 8 3 was accompanied by strong minis ter ia l 
support for the idea, imported from the U S A , of pol ic ing by objectives, 
w h i c h required senior police managers to set out their miss ion 
statements from the top of the organisat ion whi le those at the 'delivery 
end ' were required to formulate a n d implement ac t ion plans , w h i c h 
w o u l d meet the requirements of s u c h m i s s i o n statements (Weatheritt, 
1986). However, as Sharp suggests, i t proved difficult to implement i n 
the police service because "it required senior police officers to move 
from the h ighly s t ruc tured a n d h ie rarch ica l c o m m a n d management 
model w i t h w h i c h they were famil iar to one based o n teamwork and 
part icipat ion." (2005: 453). 
Newburn (2003: 97) more crypt ical ly notes that pol ic ing by objectives 
failed to make m u c h headway i n the face of host i l i ty from both A C P O 
and the Police Federat ion "because of the potent ial consequences for 
the terms and condit ions of employment", p resumably through 
concern that officers might become ind iv idua l ly accountable for 
performance against stated objectives. In other words, a Home Office-
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backed measure of police reform once again met w i t h significant 
barriers to successful implementat ion, i n this case, a resistance to 
change caused by the fact that the police service was tradi t ional ly a 
top-down hierarchica l organisat ion, w h i c h cou ld not easily 
accommodate new ^bottom-up' ways of w o r k i n g and , i n w h i c h i t found 
difficulty envisaging a more direct form of accountabi l i ty . Aga in , this 
problem foreshadows issues that were to arise i n the empir ical 
research u p o n w h i c h this thesis is based. 
C i r c u l a r 114 /83 marked a t u rn ing point i n pol ic ing for a number of 
reasons. A s ment ioned above, the const i tu t ional tripartite agreement 
enshr ined i n the 1.964 Police A c t gave the Home Secretary a n interest 
i n promot ing the efficiency of the police, though the mean ing of this 
concept was not clearly art iculated. A s Weatheri t t (1986) records, i n 
practice, from the 1960s th rough to the beginning of the 1980s the 
decision as to whether or not a force was effective or efficient was left 
to the a n n u a l report of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Cons tabulary 
(HMIC) and , i n practice, H M I C treated efficiency as a technical 
considerat ion, based very broadly o n the fact that police forces 
cont inued to operate i n the same way as they h a d i n the previous year, 
a n d that no th ing un toward h a d occurred du r ing the intervening time 
period. Th i s is why, according to Weatheritt , the H M I C reports of this 
period read i n the same "bland" way as a n n u a l Ch ie f Constable 's 
reports. F r o m 1983, however, the impos i t ion of the F M I carried a 
threat that inefficient forces w o u l d have their requests for addi t ional 
h u m a n resources declined. The 'teeth' to back u p th is threat came i n 
the guise of a new requirement that H M I C shou ld now start to 
scrut inise force activities more closely, obl iging Chie f Constables to 
recognise that i n condi t ions of resource scarci ty they shou ld be m u c h 
more careful i n ' justifying' their deployment of resources against 
robus t objectives. In other words, they h a d to t h i n k more carefully 
about wha t pol ic ing was a l l about - wha t was i ts purpose? Sharp 
(2005) reminds us , o n this point, that this purpose h a d never been 
clearly detailed, while Weatherit t (1986: 9) observes; 
" U n t i l quite recently, the usefulness of these activities [patrolling 
a n d detection] i n achieving their in tended effects has been more or 
less taken for granted." 
D u r i n g the 1980s, Home Secretaries m a y have been u n w i l l i n g to p u s h 
the point too far, perhaps mindfu l of the l imi t s of their own powers 
over Chief Constables, w h i c h were more persuasive t h a n coercive; and 
perhaps mindfu l of the controversy that h a d su r rounded the 1984-85 
miners ' strike, the pol ic ing of w h i c h looked l ike i t h a d been co­
ordinated from the centre, m u c h to the a l a rm of some Police 
Author i t ies . Thus , a l though the logic of C i r c u l a r 1 1 4 / 8 3 impl ied a re­
th ink of the purposes, priorit ies a n d objectives of pub l i c pol ic ing, there 
was a reluctance to p u s h th is too far, a n d to specify from the centre 
what these shou ld be.-
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In addi t ion to s u c h reluctance, there was l imi ted technica l capabil i ty 
i n the police's analyt ic capaci ty to scrut inise i ts own performance. 
S imi la r ly there existed l imi ted abil i ty for H M I C , bo th to scrut inise 
police performance and to identify a n d disseminate good practice 
(Weatheritt, 1986). Consequently, as Weatherit t (ibid: 110) observed of 
the period 
"Scept ic ism about the possibi l i t ies of devising overall performance 
measures is ... apparent i n the Home Office's expressed in tent ion to 
cont inue to rely on the professional judgement of H M I s i n reaching 
conclus ions about the efficiency of police forces." 
Whi le this m a y we l l have been the case w h e n Weatheri t t conducted the 
research u p o n w h i c h her book was based i n the 1990s, there was 
about to be dramat ic change. 
Despite C i r c u l a r 1 1 4 / 8 3 , a n d i n the absence of s trong central 
direct ion, the police service s t i l l remained i n a relatively strong 
posi t ion w i t h regard to determining its own agenda. A s was discussed 
i n Chapter 1, the police service was pu t under pressure to move more 
i n the direct ion of a strategic, problem-oriented, par tnership approach 
to cr ime prevention by C i r c u l a r 8 / 8 4 a n d th rough i ts involvement i n 
init iat ives s u c h as the Five Towns Initiative a n d the Safer Cit ies 
Programme. W h a t is interest ing about the police response to this 
pressure is firstly, where the response was positive, i t d id not generally 
involve specialists from the C P D s (Weatheritt, 1986). Evident ly , the 
strategic par tnership approach to cr ime prevention was different to the 
k i n d of cr ime prevention being under taken i n C P D s , a n d was 
considered to belong to another part of the police organisat ion. 
Secondly, whi le there were cases of a positive response by the police to 
the cr ime prevention 'call- to-arms' of C i r cu l a r 8 / 8 4 , more u sua l l y the 
response was not so positive, ind ica t ing w h y the Home Office was 
sufficiently frustrated by the l ack of loca l progress to b r ing out another 
C i r c u l a r (Circular 44 /90) to address the issue again. A reason for the 
l ack of a more positive response m a y have l a in , i n part, i n the l ack of 
resources for the police to envisage developing a more strategic role i n 
cr ime prevention. However, i t also lay, probably more so, i n ideological 
opposi t ion to the idea of shift ing the police service away from its 
'detectionist ' mental i ty, w h i c h remained dominan t i n the 1980s 
(Morgan a n d Newburn , 1997), m u c h as i t h a d done for most of the 
pub l i c police's short his tory (see above). M o r g a n a n d Newburn (ibid.: 
72) make the point that, "the emphasis du r ing the 1980s on two 
aspects of pol ic ing - cr ime prevention a n d crime detection - pu l l ed the 
police i n quite different directions, outwards a n d inwards ." In theory 
they may be right, as cr ime prevention created a need for more 
resilience i n outside expertise a n d partners, whi le detection required a 
m u c h stronger focus on their own in te rna l expertise. However, i n 
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practice i t seems clear that, at least i n the 1980s, the orientation of 
the police service faced a predominant ly i n w a r d focus. 
The police service was clearly mindfu l of the consumer is t and 
managerial is t pressures under w h i c h it was placed towards the end of 
the 1980s. In par t icu la r i t was mindfu l of the need to respond to the 
problem of decl in ing pub l i c confidence a n d r i s ing cr ime, w h i c h 
cont inued a lmost unaba ted th rough u n t i l the mid-1990s . Seen i n this 
light, A C P O ' s (1990) 'Strategic Policy Document ' a n d the jo in t 
'Operat ional Pol ic ing Review' c an be regarded as a n attempt to set the 
agenda for police reform i n the 1990s, w i t h both documents aspi r ing 
to emphasise the 'service role ' of the police, thereby attempt to temper 
the police's own preferred cr ime-control l ing a n d detectionist self-
image. However beyond the symbolic emphasis on service, the A C P O 
document i n par t icular , is notable for setting down what i t regarded as 
the police's five m a i n operat ional service areas, w h i c h as they termed 
them, inc luded ' communi ty policing ' ; ' reassurance/order maintenance ' 
a n d 'crime management ' . 
The significance of this specification is these service areas became the 
m a i n performance themes as far as the Home Office was concerned 
(Morgan a n d Newburn , 1997). C o m m u n i t y pol ic ing cou ld be seen, to 
some extent, as incorporat ing the Home Office's expectation that the 
police shou ld be work ing more closely w i t h other agencies i n local 
preventive par tnerships , a l though i ts mean ing is also obviously wider 
t han that. Reassurance, meanwhile , p i cks u p on the symbolic 
importance of pat rol l ing a n d a visible police presence w h i c h , drawing 
u p o n the h ighly inf luent ia l 'broken windows ' theory (Wilson a n d 
Kel l ing , 1982), justif ies i t as a means both of address ing the fear of 
crime a n d preventing cr ime by hal t ing the sp i ra l of decline that 
unchecked b roken windows are otherwise l ike ly to produce. 
Cr ime management, meanwhile , is more t han j u s t another word for 
detection a n d investigation, rather, i t also supplements these w i t h a 
focus also u p o n cr ime reduct ion (which cou ld be achieved by 
detections, bu t equally cou ld be achieved by other problem-oriented 
approaches, s u c h as high-vis ibi l i ty sa turat ion patrols, or the 
d is rupt ion of c r imina l networks), a n d better v i c t im support . 
The specification of these service areas i n A C P O ' s 'Strategic Pol icy 
Document ' c an be seen as the ar t icula t ion of a new, more proactive 
a n d r isk-oriented approach to pol ic ing (Johnston, 2000) and , as such , 
i t offers a 'modernised ' view of pol ic ing a n d a bo ld at tempt by A C P O to 
provide an answer to the quest ion of 'what pub l i c po l ic ing is a l l about'. 
A s a number of cr iminologis ts have pointed out, s u c h a n ar t icula t ion 
does not do jus t ice to the 'reality' of pol ic ing, par t icu lar ly the 
importance of its peace-keeping role (Newbum, 2003). One 
consequence of th is i s , i t sets down a rather ins t rumenta l i s t view of 
pol ic ing, w h i c h fits the m u c h more 'business- l ike ' managerial is t 
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concerns of centra l govemment and , perhaps, not s m p r i s i n g l y w h e n 
confronted w i t h this a r t icula t ion the Home Office seized the 
opportuni ty to emphasise this ins t rumenta l i s t view. 
A C P O ' s 'modernised ' view of cr ime management found favour w i t h the 
A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n , the publ ic body responsible for sc ru t in i s ing the 
'3Es ' (effective, efficient, economic) of loca l pub l i c services who h a d 
been 'let loose' o n the police service from the mid-1980s onwards, to 
complement a n d supplement the managerial is t pressure, s tar t ing to be 
exerted by H M I C . The A u d i t Commiss ion ' s (1993) inf luent ia l report 
'Helping W i t h Enqu i r i e s ' provided a n endorsement of crime 
management as something that was proactive, intell igence-led and 
better integrated w i t h mains t ream pol ic ing (Morgan a n d Newburn , 
1997), targeting prolific offenders i n par t icu lar (Johnston, 2000). In 
many ways, this model of cr ime management cou ld be seen as an 
ins t rumenta l evolut ion of the 1960s U B P model of integrated patrol 
and detection. Its emphasis u p o n crime control very m u c h found 
favour w i t h the new Home Secretary Kenne th C la rke who h a d been 
brought into office, i n part, to re-assert the cr ime control credentials of 
the Conservative govemment i n the face of a resurgent New Labour 
opposit ion. New Labour was lay ing c l a im to the pol i t ica l ly v i ta l issue 
of l a w a n d order' th rough the person of Tony B l a i r , the then Shadow 
Home Secretary, w i t h the infamous ' tough on crime, tough on the 
causes of cr ime ' s o u n d bite. 
Under Clarke 's leadership the Police Reform White Paper stated boldly 
that the police's m a i n task was to catch c r imina ls , a n d the 1994 Police 
a n d Magistrates ' Cour t s A c t was intended broadly to facilitate this task 
by reforming Police Author i t ies into more iDusiness- l ike ' loca l bodies 
a n d by empowering the Home Secretary to set na t iona l objectives for 
the police service, i n order its 'collective m i n d ' cou ld be focused on 
catching c r imina ls . The 1994 A c t represented a defining moment i n 
the h is tor ica l development of pub l i c pol icing. F i rs t ly , i n the face of 
conflicting research evidence regarding what the police actual ly d id , 
the Home Office set i tself the task of decisively answer ing the quest ion 
of what the police were there to do, thereby doing something that 
Home Secretaries i n the 1980s has fought shy of, despite their or iginal 
in t roduct ion of a managerial is t ethos into pub l i c pol ic ing . 
Secondly, this re-assertion of the police's role i n ca tch ing c r imina ls 
appeared to contradict the under ly ing message communica ted by 
developments i n areas s u c h as communi ty po l ic ing a n d crime 
prevention policy, that message being control l ing cr ime was something 
that the police service cou ld not achieve i n isola t ion. It served to 
restore faith i n detection (albeit as a more integrated form of crime 
management) at a t ime w h e n the dominance of detection as the 
police's p r imary modus operandi was being ser iously questioned, both 
from ins ide a n d outside the service. In addi t ion, i t re-asserted the 
police's sovereignty as the p r imary local cr ime control agency. 
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W i t h reference to Chapter 1, i t m u s t be remembered that this time, 
a round 1993 a n d 1994, was also the aftermath of the Morgan Report 
(Home Office, 1991) w h e n the p r imary recommendat ion h a d been that 
cr ime prevention, or rather communi ty safety, needed to become a 
statutory responsibi l i ty of loca l authori t ies to work i n par tnership w i t h 
the police service. In the wake of Morgan , m a n y localit ies, i nc lud ing 
those i n Devon a n d Cornwa l l , h a d either not wai ted for the Home 
Office's response, or h a d gone ahead anyway a n d set u p local 
communi ty safety partnerships- (Local Government Management 
Boa rd , 1996). In m a n y ways the 1994 Police a n d Magistrates ' Cour ts 
A c t cou ld be seen to have unde rmined s u c h developments p u s h i n g the 
police, i n M o r g a n a n d Newman's (1997) terms, to become more inward 
t han outward-looking, a n d ensur ing that the lead for loca l pol ic ing 
priori t ies w o u l d come not from these local par tnerships , bu t from the 
Home Secretary's na t iona l objectives, thus m a r k i n g a decisive shift 
towards the central isat ion of pol ic ing policy. 
A m o n g others, Newburn (2003) suggests that experience of the first 
few years of na t iona l objectives demonstrated that fears about 
excessive central isat ion were unfounded, as the objectives were drawn 
so broadly that they d id not undermine loca l priori t ies, w h i c h fitted 
quite comfortably w i t h i n them. Nevertheless, the existence of na t ional 
objectives always raised the possibi l i ty that they 'might ' undermine 
local priori t ies, a n d the operat ional emphasis u p o n crime 
management, at the very least resul t ing i n confusion for the police 
service, made them unsu re of whether to t u r n outwards or inwards i n 
pu r s u i t of its cr ime control mandate. 
In a prescient moment, Weatherit t (1986) argues that innovat ions i n 
pol ic ing, w h i c h i n this instance might inc lude cr ime management, tend 
to be in t roduced on the back of evangelical a n d unsubs tan t ia ted 
c la ims about their l ikely success. Th i s i s far better than the 
alternative, w h i c h w o u l d be acknowledging wha t Morgan a n d N e w b u m 
(1997) suggest, i n that, the police can do relatively little by themselves 
to impac t u p o n the problem of cr ime, ra i s ing fundamental questions 
about the legit imacy of pol ic ing, w h i c h are better glossed over. For 
reasons of electoral poli t ics arid organisat ional surv iva l , i t is arguably 
not i n the interests of neither the Home Office nor the police, to expose 
themselves to a potential legit imacy cr is is . However, the cost of this 
may have been chas ing false trai ls i n pu r su i t of the elusive goal of 
police effectiveness. 
Police Reform under New Labour 
W i t h the exception of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t , d i scussed i n 
Chapter 1, there were no fundamental changes i n pol ic ing policy 
du r ing New Labour ' s first te rm of office (Savage a n d C h a r m a n , 2002). 
In theory, th is A c t shou ld have made the police service more outward-
looking, encouraging them to es tabl ish par tnerships w i t h other 
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agencies for the purpose of local cr ime a n d disorder reduct ion. In 
practice, however, s u c h a theoretical outcome h a d to compete wi th 
other pressures w h i c h , i f anything, were dr iv ing the police i n the 
opposite direct ion. To begin wi th , the 1998 A c t needs to be seen i n the 
context of the ' threats' to the police service experienced over the 
preceding five years, beginning vidth the Sheehy Report, a n d later, the 
Home Office's review of core a n d anci l la ry tasks . A l though these 
threats d i d not resul t i n subs tant ia l policy changes, they d id challenge 
'taken-for-granted' assumpt ions about the police's sovereignty i n the 
field of loca l cr ime control . Combined w i t h growth occur r ing i n the 
private po l ic ing sector (Johnston, 1992 a n d 2000), a n d i n other forms 
of non-police patrol l ing, the resul t was a m u c h more coinpetitive 
environment (Lister, 2006) i n w h i c h the police service h a d to 
demonstrate their wor th . One way to c i rcumvent th is 'competit ion' 
was to assert that the police service was after a l l , a n d despite research 
evidence to the contrary, a n effective crime-fighting force. The 
emphasis given to cr ime management from the mid-1990s cou ld be 
seen very m u c h i n th is light, a n d so cou ld the emergence of the very 
'hard l ine ' of 'zero-tolerance' pol ic ing (ZTP). 
Z T P was strongly advocated as a n operat ional strategy by New Labour 
pol i t ic ians, s u c h as J a c k Straw, who found themselves travell ing 
across the At lan t ic to witness firsthand the 'New Y o r k miracle ' , where 
W i l l i a m Brat ton 's pol ic ing experiment h a d been associated w i t h an 
impressive fall i n cr ime rates, t ransforming the reputa t ion of New Y o r k 
Ci ty i n the process. A s w i t h crime management, zero-tolerance 
pol ic ing suggested the police cou ld achieve positive resul ts i n terms of 
crime control a n d i t is no coincidence that one name, u s e d for the 
adaptat ion of zero-tolerance pol ic ing i n the U K , was 'confident pol ic ing ' 
(Dennis a n d M a l l o n , 1997). A t precisely the t ime that they were being 
expected to establ ish C D R P s a n d to move more i n the direct ion of 
cr ime prevention, here was a police service marke t ing that, w i th 
sufficient resources, i t cou ld 'do the job ' by i t se l f 
The reassert ion of the police's p r imacy i n cr ime control , represented by 
crime management a n d Z T P can be at tr ibuted, i n part, to the police 
service's desire to reposi t ion itself i n wha t h a d now become a more 
competitive pol ic ing environment. It c an also be at t r ibuted to a 
paral lel central governmental desire to be seen to be t ak ing decisive, 
authoritative act ion against cr ime (Garland, 2001). Arguably , both 
sets of interests also coalesced over the deliberate re -naming of the 
bus iness of loca l par tnerships as cr ime (and disorder) reduct ion rather 
t han communi ty safety par tnerships . A s i t w i l l be remembered from 
Chapter 1, communi ty safety was the te rm preferred by the Morgan 
Report i n its promot ion of statutory par tnerships i n 1991, a n d it h a d 
been a s sumed by most that w h e n New Labou r came to power, given its 
back ing for Morgan 's recommendations, c o m m u n i t y safety wou ld be 
the chosen nomenclature to describe the new par tnership bodies. 
However, the choice of cr ime reduct ion rather t h a n communi ty safety 
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c a n be interpreted, i n the l ight of the above, as a n attempt to give the 
new par tnerships a par t icular police-led steer. In the same vein, i t is 
notable that the A C P O sub-committee deal ing w i t h this pol icy domain 
deliberately chose the title of cr ime reduct ion rather t h a n communi ty 
safety a n d that the Home Office Cr ime Prevention Centre's name was 
changed to the Cr ime Reduc t ion Centre at m u c h the same time. For 
the police, as A C P O (1990) h a d previously made clear, cr ime reduct ion 
was a par t of cr ime management and , therefore, a par t of police core 
bus iness . 
However, the emphasis placed u p o n cr ime reduct ion s h o u l d not be 
taken to m e a n that a n a.ttempt was being made to absorb pressure for 
change into exist ing approaches to pol ic ing a n d thereby leading, i n 
effect, to no change. Rather, i t represented a p u s h i n the direct ion of 
cr ime reduct ion, w h i c h was supported not only by the 1998 A c t but 
also by H M I C (1998) i n its publ ica t ion B e a t i n g Cr ime ' , a n d by the 
Home Office's sister document 'Gett ing the Grease to the Squeak ' 
(Tilley a n d H o u g h , 1998). It cou ld be interpreted that this was i n fact 
a n attempt to manoeuvre the police service into a more modernised, 
proactive direct ion, i n pu r su i t of a more r isk-or iented approach 
(Johnston, 2000). The key question, for the purposes of this thesis, is 
how this more proactive approach cou ld be realised. 
The strongest message to come th rough from B e a t i n g Cr ime ' a n d 
'Gett ing the Grease to the Squeak ' was the police service needed to 
adopt a problem-solving approach, w h i c h was impl ic i t iy proactive, as a 
means of finding loca l solut ions to loca l problems. B o t h publ icat ions 
backed the ins t rumenta l , bottom-up model of problem-oriented 
pol ic ing (Goldstein, 1979) w h i c h h a d been inf luent ia l i n the U S A and 
was becoming increasingly inf luent ia l i n the U K a n d bo th docxmients 
saw this mode l as being h ighly applicable to the bus iness of C D R P s . 
However, a l though they supported a par tnership approach to problem-
solving and , a l though, the 1998 A c t pu t pressure o n the police service 
to follow s u c h a n approach, i t was not a foregone conc lus ion that this 
indeed represented what was going to happen on the ground. 
There are two m a i n reasons for this . F i r s t iy as these publ ica t ions and 
m a n y others both , before a n d after, have recognised there are m a n y 
impediments a n d barriers to par tnership work ing , w h i c h make i t 
difficult for the police service to pursue a n effective, jo ined-up 
problem-solving approach w i t h other agencies. These barriers, and 
the wider issues su r round ing them, are the subject of the next 
chapter. Secondly, par t icular ly i n the context of their new-found 
confidence i n their capacity to fight cr ime (HMIC [1997: 9] h a d 
remarked u p o n a "growing confidence w i t h i n the police service as a 
whole that cr ime can be successfully confronted"), i t was possible for 
the police service to pursue a problem-oriented approach 'without ' the 
involvement of other agencies. One ind ica t ion that th is m a y already 
have been happening can be found i n H M I C ' s (1997) survey detai l ing 
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that 70% of police forces were already, before the implementat ion of 
the 1998 Act , sett ing themselves a n n u a l cr ime reduct ion targets and 
roughly the same proport ion h a d integrated cr ime reduct ion w i th in 
their cr ime management processes. S u c h processes, operating 
th rough B a s i c C o m m a n d U n i t (BCU) -level t a sk ing a n d co-ordinat ion 
groups, were at this time un l ike ly to have h a d a n i npu t from other 
agencies. 
Therefore, i t was perceived cr ime management cou ld incorporate a 
problem-oriented approach wi thout recourse to par tnership work ing 
a n d despite the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t further developments i n 
pol ic ing, i f anyth ing , made this more rather t h a n less, l ikely. One of 
these developments was intelligence-led pol ic ing (ILP), w h i c h as Sharp 
(2005:155) observes is "the refinement a n d reinforcement of something 
that has been pract ised by the police for over 100 years." Sharp 
acknowledges that ILP is new, i n so far, i t affords a more proactive 
approach to pol ic ing, however, he is also correct i n h i s observation 
that i t reinforces exist ing police practice. It achieves th is by p lac ing 
the emphasis ma in ly u p o n enforcement as a na tu r a l corollary of the 
use of intelligence, most of w h i c h is based u p o n informat ion i n respect 
of offenders. In other words, problem-oriented approaches depend 
very m u c h u p o n the information, w h i c h frames the problem. If 
p r imar i ly informat ion is about the activities of k n o w n offenders, as is 
the case w i t h ILP a n d the Nat ional Intelligence M o d e l (NIM) w h i c h was 
derived from it, then i t is l ikely, to encourage 'detectionist ' responses 
that m a r k a 'point of cont inui ty ' w i t h the past, as Sharp 's observation 
acknowledges. 
In the absence of good intelligence regarding the activities of k n o w n 
offenders, another s tandard police response is high-vis ibi l i ty 
patrol l ing. To some extent Z T P breathed a new lease of life into this 
approach, jus t i fying i t by l i n k i n g with the idea of order maintenance, 
as deployed i n b roken windows theory (Wilson a n d Kel l ing , 1982). 
However, h igh-vis ib i l i ty pat rol l ing has also become a n integral par t of 
the reassurance pol ic ing agenda, w h i c h Sharp (2005: 156) calls "not a 
strategy i n itself bu t rather a descr ipt ion of a number of different 
initiatives intended to impact u p o n the l i nked problems of fear of crime 
a n d lack of pub l i c support for the police." Th i s m a y be a sl ightly 
cyn ica l view i f i t is t aken to imply that reassurance pol ic ing is a purely 
symbolic exercise, as i t is apparent m u c h of the emphasis of 
reassurance pol ic ing focuses u p o n address ing those loca l 'signal 
cr imes ' (Innes, 2005) w h i c h generate m u c h fear a n d anxiety w i th in 
loca l communi t ies . It m a y achieve th is by p u s h i n g problem-solving 
down to very local ised levels, as Innes recommends, a n d this cou ld 
wel l involve some k i n d of par tnership act ion. However, equal ly i t cou ld 
mean little more t han increas ing the v is ib i l i ty of the police, something 
that i n recent years has been achieved through the widespread use of 
Police C o m m u n i t y Suppor t Officers (PCSOs), as in t roduced by the 
2002 Police Reform Act . 
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While the first few years of the New Labour govemment were relatively 
quiet i n relat ion to further police reform, the pace of change increased 
markedly into the new m i l l e n n i u m . M c L a u g h l i n (2007) suggests that 
Dav id B l u n k e t t was brought i n to the Home Office as a Toig hitter ' to 
take on the forces of conservat ism w i t h i n the police service, w h i c h 
threatened to dera i l the government's reform agenda, a n d under 
Blunke t t ' s leadership the process of central isat ion (Newbum, 2003) 
cont inued. A l t h o u g h H M I C (1998, 2000) h a d noted improvements i n 
the police's cu l tu ra l adopt ion of a more ins t rumenta l problem-solving 
approach, there were also signs of frustrat ion w h i c h suggested, for 
example, that A C P O remained less t han totally convinced about the 
place of cr ime reduct ion i n cr ime management, or about the merits of 
decentral is ing more responsibi l i ty for local pol ic ing to the B C U level. 
The 2002 Police Reform A c t addressed s u c h problems by imposing 
stronger central control (Long, 2003), m a k i n g further adjustments to 
the triparti te s t ructure of police accountabi l i ty , s u c h as changing the 
role of Ch ie f Constables from one of 'operational independence ' to one 
of operat ional responsibi l i ty (McLaughl in , 2007). The same Ac t also 
enabled the Home Secretary to draw u p a na t iona l p l an , w h i c h 
specified how na t iona l objectives w o u l d be delivered, a n d how they 
w o u l d be measured. In addi t ion, i t in t roduced the Police Standards 
U n i t to scrut inise the performance of B C U s (Newbum, 2003) and wi th 
a power to intervene i n forces, deemed to be fai l ing by the new police 
performance assessment framework. 
Under the Bes t V a l u e regime in t roduced i n the 1999 Loca l Government 
A c t a more r igorous set of performance indicators h a d been 
int roduced, m a n y of them focusing u p o n the measurement of progress 
towards cr ime reduct ion targets specified i n the key nat ional 
objectives, w h i c h preceded the 2002 Act . Performance statistics, 
furthermore, h a d been produced at B C U level from 2000 onwards, a n d 
from 2001 the H M I inspect ion regime h a d complemented force 
inspect ions wi th inspect ions at B C U level (Long, 2003). W i t h the 
addi t ion of provisions w i t h i n the 2002 Police Reform Act , M c L a u g h l i n 
(2007) appears to be just i f ied i n h i s c l a i m that the resul tant effect was 
a s i tuat ion, w h i c h al lowed the Home Office to micro-manage the police 
service. 
It m u s t be remembered, as d iscussed i n Chapter 1, that a l l this 
occurred at m u c h the same t ime that C D R P s were being promoted i n 
govemment policy. Indeed, once central funding became available for 
C D R P s , after the l a u n c h of the Cr ime Reduc t ion Strategy i n 1999, the 
same Bes t Va lue performance management regime was applied to 
C D R P s . Increasing pressure was appl ied to the C D R P s to respond to 
nat ional objectives i n their 2002 strategies a n d beyond. In the 
process, this t u m e d the or iginal b luepr in t of l o c a l solut ions for local 
problems ' into more a n d more of a fiction. L o n g (2003) suggests that 
this performance management agenda is incompat ible w i t h the idea of 
par tnership work ing and Crawford (2007: 898) concurs , arguing that 
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"the myopic impl ica t ions of performance measurement afford scant 
regard to the complex process of negotiating shared purposes." 
The c l a i m here is a l though the police service is being cal led u p o n to 
work i n par tnership w i t h other agencies i n pu r su i t of loca l crime a n d 
disorder reduct ion, the use of performance indicators encourages a 
na r row focus u p o n the core bus iness of i nd iv idua l agencies, a 
phenomenon that Crawford (1997) h a d noted m u c h earlier i n a 
cri t ique of new pub l i c management i n general. Th i s encourages a n 
intra-agency ra t i ier t han a n inter-agency orientat ion. It may be 
argued that the use of the 'same' performance indicators for different 
agencies, as employed under the Bes t V a l u e regime,, mitigates s u c h 
problems. However, this neglects a poss ibi l i ty that, while the police 
a n d loca l authori t ies may both be required to demonstrate their 
performance i n terms of cr ime reduct ion, there s t i l l remains 
considerable scope for debate regarding "how' cr ime reduct ion might be 
achieved, the p rob lem of 'negotiating shared purpose ' identified by 
Crawford i n the above quote. A s H M I C (1998, 2000) h a d pointed out, 
there are m a n y different ways to reduce cr ime, some short-term, 
others long-term, some targeting offenders, others targeting social or 
environmental causes. Because cr ime reduct ion was becoming 
increasingly embedded i n the police's operat ional strategy of crime 
management, i t was lending itself more to short- term police solutions 
v i a the targeting of offenders, as J o h n a n d Maguire ' s (2003) research 
into the police's use of the N I M i n t ask ing a n d co-ordinat ion groups 
demonstrated. A l though as these authors note, there is no reason, i n 
pr inciple , why the N I M cannot be u sed for approaches to crime 
reduct ion other t han ju s t delivering detection a n d enforcement. 
Whi le the work of Crawford a n d others suggest that performance 
management hampers par tnership work ing a n d forces cr ime reduct ion 
down a nar row police-led path , i t is impor tant to recognise that this 
view is not shared by a l l commentators . Byrne a n d Pease (2003: 288), 
for example, argue quite to the contrary, i n a sense, w i t h i n the police 
service cr ime reduct ion "has begun to escape from its peripheral 
posi t ion, only to be subsumed i n a par tnership w i t h agencies outside 
the [police] organisation." In par t icular , they suggest cr ime reduct ion 
par tnerships are 'vulnerable to capture ' by a govemment office 
agenda's, w h i c h are oriented m u c h more to matters of economic a n d 
c o m m u n i t y development t han i t is to matters of s i tua t ional crime 
prevention. Moreover, they suggest (ibid: 296-7) that "there is a 
danger of the cr ime reduct ion enterprise be ing shaped by the 
preferences a n d prejudices of those most eager to be engaged i n 
par tnership working." 
Wha t is meant by this , i n par t icular , is local author i ty i npu t into local 
par tnerships is dominated by departments who have litt le interest i n 
questions of phys ica l design, w h i c h w o u l d be of mos t relevance to 
s i tuat ional cr ime prevention. They suggest, rather, that par tnerships 
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are dominated by 'social ' interests, inc l ined to address more remote 
social causes of cr ime rather than the more immediate s i tuat ional 
ones, w h i c h B y r n e a n d Pease evidently believe shou ld be the focus of 
crime reductive effort. The existence of this difference i n opin ion 
serves to demonstrate the possibi l i ty that different processes may be at 
work i n different contexts, a n d thus the importance of conduct ing 
empir ica l inqu i ry . 
Fol lowing the 2002 Police Reform Act , a number of commentators have 
drawn at tention to a change of emphasis i n Home Office th ink ing . A s 
Newburn a n d Reiner (2007) point out, since 1993 the m a i n policy 
thrust h a d been one of central isat ion, i n effect forcing the police 
service to become better at their 'core bus iness ' of ca tching crirriinals. 
In McLaugh l in ' s (2007: 184) words, the intent was to t ransform the 
police "from a pub l i c service into a cr ime control business ." However, 
the employment of new pub l i c management techniques to achieve this 
end had the effect of "breeding cyn ic i sm among the publ ic , who viewed 
professionals a n d practi t ioners as responding not to their needs but to 
the auditors a n d inspectors of the manager ia l state." (McLaughl in , 
ib id : 187). The most visible symptom of th is c y n i c i s m was the 
'reassurance gap' whereby, despite fall ing cr ime rates, the publ ic 
perception was that cr ime was con t inu ing to rise, a n d that they 
cont inued to be unprotected, thus feeling insecure, resu l t ing from a 
largely invis ible police service a n d communi ty safety infrastructure. 
The government response to th is 'public concern ' was delivered under 
the banner of a 'new local ism' . A 2003 consul ta t ion document entitled 
'Bu i ld ing Safer Communi t i e s Together' h a d D a v i d B l u n k e t t arguing 
that "we m u s t t ranscend our t radi t ional not ions of po l ic ing by consent, 
a n d establ ish a new pr inciple of pol ic ing th rough co-operation" (Home 
Office, 2003). In the document , i t was made abundan t ly clear that 
local par tnerships h a d to be strengthened, a n d this meant generating 
changes bo th to loca l pol ic ing, a n d to C D R P s . W i t h regard to policing, 
the White Paper 'Bu i ld ing Communi t ies , Bea t ing C r i m e ' (Home Office, 
2004) set out expectations for the na t iona l roU-out of wha t was to be 
called 'neighbourhood policing ' , predicated u p o n sma l l teams of 
geographically-based police officers. Acco rd ing to the pr inciples 
out l ined i n the Whi te Paper, these officers w o u l d spend more of their 
time engaging w i t h the communi ty , i nc lud ing other agencies, thereby 
becoming more accountable to loca l communi t ies , better placed to 
solve communi ty problems and , thereby, enhanc ing their effectiveness 
as wel l . 
Importantly, the Whi te Paper also announced there was to be a formal 
review of C D R P s , m a k i n g the point; 
"some C D R P s are demonstrably less effective t han others. For 
example, par tnerships sometimes struggle to ma in t a in a ful l 
cont r ibut ion from key agencies. L a c k of clar i ty about roles a n d 
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responsibil i t ies a n d b lu r red l ines of accountabi l i ty can lead to some 
agencies abrogating their responsibi l i ty for cr ime reduction. 
Fur thermore, u n d e r present arrangements, C D R P s are neither fully 
visible nor properly accountable to the communi t ies they serve, nor 
are they fully embedded i n the loca l democratic framework. These 
issues lie at the heart of the Government 's reform programme." 
((Home Office, i b id : 158) 
The outcome of the review, i n the 2006 Police a n d Jus t i ce Act , has 
been described i n Chapter 1. Here i t is sufficient to note that it also 
complies w i t h the broad thrus t of New Labour ' s 'new loca l i sm ' and, for 
the purposes of th is chapter, the impor tant i ssue ra ised is the 
quest ion of impact of this new loca l i sm u p o n crime prevention 
par tnerships . M c L a u g h l i n (2007: 195) suggests, "serious questions 
have to be posed about whether there is genuine centra l government 
commitment to suppor t local ised, post-managerial forms of police 
accountabili ty", par t icu lar ly because, even with the imp l i ed loca l i sm of 
neighbourhood pol ic ing a n d Loca l A r e a Agreements, central 
government's performance management framework is s t i l l largely i n 
place. A s d iscussed above, this framework c a n cast a shadow over 
operat ional pol ic ing, w h i c h impacts u p o n the police service's capacity 
to contr ibute to par tnerships . 
Unde r managerial is t pressures i t may be more straightforward for the 
police service to incorporate cr ime prevention as cr ime reduct ion into a 
cr ime management process w h i c h sus ta ins short- term, enforcement-
oriented police solut ions to cr ime problems. J o h n s t o n (2000) suggests 
that par tnership work ing is often pu t forward as a putative solut ion to 
a governmental p roblem of es tabl ishing coherence w i t h i n policy 
domains , w h i c h are increasingly character ised by complexity a n d 
fragmentation. The assumpt ion , he says, is par tnerships w i l l work by 
al lowing common interests to prevail . However, the problem as it has 
been explored here is s u c h common interests are not necessarily 
al lowed to surface i n the context of prescriptive performance 
management frameworks a n d processes, w h i c h encourage a n int ra-
agency, focus a n d thus inh ib i t par tnership work ing . In brief, the 
paradox of par tnerships is wel l captured i n Crawford's (2001) 
observation that they may be 'joined u p bu t fragmented'. 
Chapter Summary 
In th is chapter, a n attempt has been made to steer a course through 
the complex and m u r k y waters of pol ic ing pol icy. No c l a i m is made 
regarding comprehensiveness, as far more has happened than could 
ever be satisfactorily documented i n a chapter s u c h as th is . However, 
the purpose of this journey has been to demonstrate that the domain 
of pub l ic pol ic ing has been a constant ly evolving, complex and 
confusing one, w i t h the pace of change hav ing qu ickened noticeably i n 
the last two to three decades. Hav ing been establ ished as pr imar i ly a 
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preventive agency the police organisat ion, over the next century or so, 
bu i l t i ts professional service orthodoxy a round the twin pi l lars of 
detection a n d preventive patrol l ing, the former premised more on its 
putative effectiveness a n d sub-cu l tu ra l appeal, a n d the latter on its 
legi t imacy-bui lding funct ion. Th is orthodoxy experienced pressure for 
change i n the 1960s, w i t h s u c h pressure having become increasingly 
ins t rumenta l i s t since the 1980s, under a manageria l is t man t r a of 
value for money. A l though most recently, the pressure has also 
reflected concerns about legit imacy a n d the accountabi l i ty of the 
publ ic police to loca l communi t ies i n the context of increasingly 
p lura l i sed pol ic ing provis ion. 
Th is pressure for change has resul ted i n a host of strategic and 
operational pol ic ing innovat ions a n d experiments. Those covered i n 
this chapter inc lude u n i t beat pol ic ing; the es tabl ishment of crime 
prevention departments; communi ty pol ic ing; zero-tolerance policing; 
intelligence-led pol ic ing; reassurance pol ic ing; ne ighbourhood policing; 
pol ic ing by objectives; problem-oriented pol ic ing; cr ime reduction; 
cr ime management, and the na t iona l intelligence model . What 
remains impor tant regarding a l l of these innovat ions a n d experiments 
is that they a l l share a n essential ambigui ty i.e. they do not provide a 
clear statement about what pub l i c pol ic ing is a l l about. Whi le most 
are ins t rumenta l i s t i n their orientation, they generally do not 
completely shake off the more sjmibolic side of po l ic ing a n d some, 
s u c h as reassurance pol ic ing, give this a m u c h higher profile. Some 
provide more of a priori ty to detection a n d crime-fighting, whi le others 
emphasise a more preventive role. Some are more top-down, while 
others are more bottom-up. Amongs t those that are more bottom-up, 
some are oriented more to B C U s , others more to 'sectors' a n d 
'neighbourhoods' , some rely more o n efforts t aken by the police service 
alone, whi le others c a n y stronger expectations about partnership 
work ing . 
A l though init iatives, s u c h as u n i t beat pol ic ing, have passed out of 
fashion, at least i n terms of their terminology, these innovat ions are 
often overlain o n one another. Rarely is i t the case that the star of 
one rises as the star of another fades, so innovat ions i n pol ic ing are 
not a zero-sum game. Mos t of these innovat ions have been imposed 
u p o n the police service from outside, from influencers s u c h as the 
Home Office, the A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n a n d H M I C . However, i t shou ld not 
be assumed that they a l l necessari ly s ing from the same h3min sheet. 
Police representative bodies s u c h as A C P O have played a greater or 
lesser role i n some of these innovat ions, a n d again i t shou ld not be 
assumed that A C P O sings from the same hjonn sheet as these external 
bodies, or other police-related bodies. A l l of these innovations, 
moreover, have h a d to be 'negotiated' th rough the body of the police 
service, whose organisat ional cul ture i s predominant ly top-down a n d 
mil i tar is t ic , whose dominant occupat ional cul ture remains a n act ion-
oriented, detectionist one a n d whose professional competence is often 
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l imi ted by the general l ack of a n analyt ic orientat ion a n d by the lack of 
t ra in ing i n certain areas. These a l l serve as obstacles, w h i c h ensure 
there is no straightforward t rans la t ion between the drawing board 
theory, w h i c h informs these innovat ions, a n d their eventual 
manifestat ion i n police practice. 
H o w is one, therefore, to make sense of the pressure to engage i n 
cr ime prevention par tnerships i n the context of a l l of the factors 
above? It is a n empir ica l issue for this research, representing a 
fundamental quest ion to be considered by the thesis. However, on the 
basis of what has been covered i n this chapter, i t i s reasonable to 
speculate that the pressure to engage i n cr ime prevention partnerships 
has to be seen as yet another pressure amongst the m a n y described 
here, a n d that i t is ambiguous i n terms of the demands i t places u p o n 
the police service, a n d i n terms of the way those demands are 
interpreted through the var ious obstacles, w h i c h comprise the police 
organisat ion. In par t icular , i t c an be seen as cont r ibu t ing to a number 
of impor tant strategic d i lemmas, notably: 
• W h a t shou ld be the balance between prevention, detection and a 
symbolic police role? 
• W h a t shou ld be the balance between police leadership, 
par tnership work ing , a n d a n intra-organisat ional focus? 
• W h a t shou ld be the balance between top-down a n d bottom-up 
approaches, or between force, B C U a n d ne ighbourhood levels of 
operation? 
These strategic d i lemmas, a n d police attempts to resolve them, w i l l 
loom large i n the research, w h i c h follows. However, the literature 
review is not yet complete. 
A l though the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t provided a watershed 
moment by m a k i n g par tnership w o r k i n g a statutory requirement for 
the police service, i t is impor tant to remember that partnership 
work ing i n cr ime prevention is not a new concept for the police service. 
There is a considerable li terature, w h i c h examines partnership 
work ing i n cr ime prevention, m u c h of i t preceding the 1998 Act . Some 
of th is has been a l luded to briefly i n pass ing du r ing this chapter and 
i n Chapter 1, a l though i t has not formed a centra l analyt ic focus of 
either. Consequently, this l i terature is to be the subject of the next 
chapter, the last of the li terature review chapters. The purpose of the 
next chapter w i l l be to examine th is l i terature i n order to uncover 
l eads ' w h i c h m a y assist i n both p l ann ing a n d m a k i n g sense of the 
empir ica l research upon , w h i c h this thesis is based. 
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Chapter 3 - 'A Review of the Literature on Crime Prevention 
Partnerships' 
Introduction 
The a i m of this last chapter i n the l i terature review section of this 
thesis i s to explore the l i terature on par tnership work ing , specifically 
as i t relates to cr ime prevention, as a d is t inct domain . There is 
extensive li terature o n par tnership work ing i n other c r i m i n a l just ice-
related areas w h i c h involve the police service, s u c h as c h i l d protection 
(Barton, 2002) or domestic violence (Hague, 2000), however, while this 
l i terature m a y address some s imi la r i ssues a n d concerns, it lies 
outside the immediate focus of th is present s tudy and , for this reason, 
is excluded from considerat ion here. The chapter w i l l begin wi th an 
overview of the operation of the par tnership approach to crime 
prevention following, as w i t h the previous chapters, a chronological 
account from the incept ion of the par tnership approach. 
The date of this incept ion is t aken to be the per iod following the 
i s su ing of the l andmark Home Office C i r c u l a r 8 / 8 4 . A s discussed i n 
Chapter 1, elements of a par tnership approach preceded this date, 
however, the significant issue about C i r cu l a r 8 / 8 4 is i t set down the 
model for a strategic, problem-oriented par tnership approach w h i c h 
has since become inst i tu t ional ised, since 1998, i n the shape of C D R P s . 
The model may not have been widely adopted i n the immediate 
aftermath of the c i rcular , nevertheless i t is s t i l l the parad igm that has 
been adhered to since. 
Fol lowing the chronological account, w h i c h examines how 
par tnerships have evolved, sometimes as a response to cr i t ic isms of 
their ineffective operation a n d sometimes i n response to external 
changes, the chapter w i l l move on to examine the two dominant 
themes w i t h i n the par tnership li terature i n th is area. The first theme 
is predominant ly a pragmatic one, concerned w i t h m a k i n g 
par tnerships work more effectively, u s u a l l y th rough the 
recommendat ion of par t icu lar models of good practice or of 'cri t ical 
success factors' that par tnerships shou ld adopt. M u c h of the 
l i terature i n this theme originates from official sources a n d it reflects a 
concern w i t h the in te rna l workings of par tnerships a n d w i t h the 
competence (the knowledge, sk i l l s a n d values) of those who constitute 
their membership . G i l l i n g (2005) refers to th is as the 'what makes a 
good par tnership ' t radi t ion of par tnership research, w h i c h usua l ly 
reflects the manager ia l a n d governmental concerns of those who have 
a stake i n promoting the par tnership approach. 
The second theme i n the par tnership l i terature i s one that has a more 
cr i t i ca l orientation. It tends to place par tnerships i n their broader 
social context rather t han separating them from it, as the others do. 
Consequently, i t is more interested, for example, i n the power relations 
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between those agencies involved i n par tnership work ing and the 
influences generated i n respect of what is done a n d not done i n the 
name of those par tnerships a n d i n the different ways they frame crime 
problems a n d solut ions. It is also interested i n those external 
influences w h i c h affect the fate of par tnerships , s u c h as inter-agency 
^baggage' agencies b r ing to the par tnership table. In addi t ion, the 
tensions that arise as t radi t ional ly vert ical l ines of publ ic 
accountabi l i ty , w h i c h trace po l icy-making 's i los ' from loca l publ ic 
services u p to central govemment 'parent' departments and are 
crossed a n d flattened i n pu r su i t of the more 'horizontal ' way of 
work ing , impl ic i t i n the par tnership approach. Th i s theme tends to be 
found more i n the work of independent academic commentators . 
A l t h o u g h two thematic tradit ions can be identified i n the quite 
extensive literature o n par tnership work ing i n cr ime prevention, i t is 
impor tant that these tradit ions are regarded as a n ideal typical 
d is t inc t ion as, i n reality, there may be more c o m m o n ground between 
them. Thus , for example, the cr i t ica l academic li terature is often 
underp inned by a desire on the part of i ts authors to see partnerships 
work more effectively, even i f i t does raise uncomfortable issues. To 
th is extent, this l i terature reflects the 'correctional b ias ' of cr iminology 
(Cohen, 1988) as i ts authors subscr ibe to the view that crime 
prevention par tnerships represent a fmi t fu l way of address ing crime, i f 
only their l imitat ions m a y be overcome. F r o m the other side m u c h of 
the official l i terature, despite its pragmatic preoccupations, does 
engage w i t h more cr i t ica l issues , s u c h as the problems encountered as 
cent ra l govemment fails to five u p to i ts aspi ra t ion for ' joined-up' 
government (Clark, 2002). 
F ina l ly , before tu rn ing to a n overview of par tnership work ing , i t is 
impor tant to note that most of the fiterature i s predominant ly oriented 
toward examining par tnership work ing between pub l i c sector statutory 
agencies. In part this is l ike ly to reflect the interests of those 
government agencies who sponsor the product ion of the literature, 
who are concerned w i t h how wel l ' their ' loca l agencies undertake 
par tnership working . It m a y also reflect the pol i t ica l concerns of 
academics regarding what i s done w i t h the considerable powers 
bestowed u p o n pub l i c agencies to act i n the pub l i c interest i n a n area 
as pol i t ical ly sensitive as cr ime control . However, i t also reflects the 
relative lack of control or influence those who promote the par tnership 
approach can exercise over private, voluntary a n d communi ty 
organisations who might be considered appropriate members of local 
par tnerships . Since this thesis is concemed w i t h the role of a 
statutory publ ic sector organisat ion, i.e. the police service, this bias or 
gap i n the literature is not necessari ly a problem. However, i t is 
impor tant to acknowledge it as a n issue of some relevance, par t icular ly 
as there is a growing recognit ion of the need to 'de-centre' the state 
from our analysis , a n aspect J o h n s t o n a n d Shear ing (2003) 
deliberately ca l l securi ty governance rather t h a n pol ic ing. There is a 
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growing interest i n how these other sectors of the mixed economy fit 
into the loca l governance of crime, however, i t i s not a focus of this 
thesis. 
Tracing the Development of the Partnership Approach to Crime 
Prevention 
The Home Office's promot ion of a par tnership approach was premised 
u p o n two essential ' truths' . The first of these was that the c r imina l 
jus t ice system, i n c l u d i n g the police service (Morgan a n d Newburn , 
1997), cou ld do litt le by itself to address the causes of cr ime and, 
whether immediate or distant, lie beyond its direct control . The 
second t ru th , related to the first, i s that s ince s u c h causes lie 
elsewhere, for example i n communi t ies a n d i n the design decisions of 
architects a n d planners , then others beyond the t radi t ional c r imina l 
jus t ice system need to be encouraged to p lay their par t i n addressing 
these causes, thereby, preventing crime. O n the basis of these 
'apparent truths ' , the Home Office's deductive logic i s , therefore, that a 
par tnership provides the best ins t i tu t iona l means for b r ing ing together 
the necessary const i tuent elements for a more effective approach to 
preventing crime. In reality, this represents a compel l ing logic, though 
far from a n unproblemat ic one, since i t requires those who once h a d a 
p r imary responsibi l i ty for cr ime control to accept, poss ib ly against 
their professional pride, that this i s no longer a job they can do by 
themselves and i t requires those who m a y not necessar i ly regard crime 
as being their responsibi l i ty or interest to suddenly maJke i t so. One 
can unders tand, i n prac t ica l terms, w h y a par tnership approach may 
be the appropriate way to proceed, as i t i s l ike ly to be a great deal less 
complicated or controversial t han redesigning a new approach to crime 
control from scratch. Despite its logical at t ract ion as a good idea, one 
shou ld not neglect, however, possible problems. 
Home Office C i r cu l a r 8 / 8 4 encouraged the es tabl ishment of a co­
ordinated approach where, at a strategic level, agencies shou ld work 
together to analyse loca l cr ime problems (by combin ing data sources, 
thus not rel5dng solely on police statistics) a n d then identify a n d 
implement preventive solut ions, d rawing u p o n the combined resources 
of partner agencies pr ior to moni tor ing a n d evaluat ing the impact of 
these solut ions. Th is problem-oriented approach, s t i tched together 
through the specifically appointed co-ordinator, was adopted i n the 
Five Towns Initiative and the Safer Cit ies Programme, two flagship 
Home Office init iat ives that were intended to showcase the par tnership 
approach as a means to encourage wider adopt ion. However, as w i l l 
be recollected from Chapter 1, there was no widespread adoption of 
the par tnership approach after 1984, despite the official exhortat ion 
and the guidance produced by bodies s u c h as Cr ime Concern , who 
sought to demonstrate how a par tnership approach cou ld be achieved. 
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This eventually prompted a Home Office inqui ry , w h i c h delivered its 
findings v i a the Morgan Report (Home Office, 1991). Morgan 's ^big 
idea ' was par tnerships w o u l d be more l ike ly to take root i f their 
bus iness was conceived, not narrowly as cr ime prevention, bu t more 
expansively as communi ty safety, and i f loca l authori t ies were to be 
given a statutory responsibi l i ty w h i c h compelled them to do it, 
underp inned by a dedicated budget to realise this responsibil i ty. 
Morgan also out l ined a n u m b e r of cr i t ica l success factors par tnerships 
w o u l d be vidse to adopt, as d id other Home Office-sponsored research 
pub l i shed a little later (Liddle a n d Gelsthorpe, 1994a, 1994b, and 
1994c). However, m u c h of this was overshadowed by the pol i t ical 
unacceptabi l i ty of Morgan 's b ig idea, w h i c h meant that further 
development of the par tnership approach from the centre, more or 
less, g round to a ha l t after 1991. 
Ironically, Morgan 's big idea found favour at the loca l level, a n d 
prompted the establ ishment of communi ty safety par tnerships i n a 
number of localit ies (McLaughl in , 1994; Loca l Govemment 
Management Boa rd , 1996), though obviously they were not on a 
statutory basis a n d they often lacked m u c h i n the way of funding, 
a l though the Single Regeneration Budget was a n impor tant source of 
funding for some, par t icu lar ly i n u r b a n areas. 
In opposi t ion New Labour appeared to l end its suppor t to Morgan's 
headline recommendat ions a n d when i n office their pol icy proposals 
(Home Office, 1997), a n d subsequent legislative ac t ion i n the 1998 
Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t , demonstrated their commitment to give local 
authorit ies a statutory responsibi l i ty. Importantly, however, while the 
te rm 'crime prevention ' was dropped i t was replaced, not by 
' communi ty safety', bu t by 'crime reduct ion ' a n d thus the name of the 
par tnerships was to be cr ime a n d disorder reduct ion par tnerships 
(CDRPs), a l though interestingly i n Wales they were to be called 
C o m m u n i t y Safety Par tnerships . Subsequent to the legislation i t 
shou ld be noted that m a n y loca l par tnerships have he ld on to the title 
' communi ty safety', or some var iant on it, rather than 'crime 
reduction' . However, the Home Office's choice of terminology is 
nevertheless significant. 
The 1998 A c t also deviated from Morgan i n not providing any 
addi t ional resources for the partnerships, w i t h the government in i t ia l ly 
preferring the argument that successfully prevented crime generates 
its own resources through a v i r tuous circle of savings w h i c h cou ld be 
ploughed back into further preventive act ion, more savings, a n d so on. 
Predictably, th is argument survived no longer t han i t was poli t ical ly 
necessary for the new govemment to satisfy i tself that i t h a d convinced 
the publ ic of i ts f iscal prudence. A s soon as addi t ional governmental 
resources became available, following the 1999 Comprehensive 
Spending Review a n d the subsequent l a u n c h of the Cr ime Reduct ion 
Strategy (CRS), addi t ional funding started to be directed towards 
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C D R P s , in i t ia l ly to further the cause of evidence-based pol icy through 
the Cr ime Reduc t ion Programme. 
It is wor th dwel l ing for a whi le o n the finer details of C D R P s as set 
dovm i n statute by the 1998 Act . Accord ing to the legislation, 
par tnerships were to be formed i n order to conduct loca l audits of 
crime, to consu l t local ly on the findings of the audi t a n d to produce a 
re-viewable cr ime reduct ion strategy, the whole process being repeated 
every three years. The responsibi l i ty for the formation of s u c h 
par tnerships , a n d thus also for the activities of them, rested w i t h what 
the legislat ion referred to as the responsible authori t ies , namely the 
local police commander (not chief constable), a n d the district-level 
local author i ty chief executive. 
The Home Office i s sued extensive guidance to these responsible 
authorit ies, m ind fu l of the fact for m a n y local authori t ies this was an 
entirely new development. Th is guidance, a n d official documents 
produced i n i ts wake (Hough a n d Tilley, 1998; H M I C , 1998; A u d i t 
Commiss ion , 1999) repeated m u c h of the acc imiu la ted stock of 
knowledge on good practice i n par tnership work ing . However, the 
guidance also made i t clear the par tnerships s h o u l d not become 
bogged down i n bureaucrat ic detail as the pr ior i ty for the par tnerships 
was the 'delivery' of cr ime reduct ion. 
W i t h the benefit of h indsight , s u c h guidance cou ld be regarded as 
cavalier i n nature. Init ially, the b u c k effectively stopped w i t h the two 
responsible authori t ies providing other agencies w i t h a n opportuni ty to 
evade direct responsibi l i ty themselves. The legislat ion d i d introduce 
two further 'classes' of agency, namely those [statutory agencies^ 
required to co-operate w i t h the responsible authori t ies , a n d those 
others invi ted to participate. However, since par t ic ipat ion was not 
obligatory for these other classes i t w o u l d be wrong to presume the A c t 
fundamental ly altered the par tnership w o r k i n g landscape for ' a l l ' 
agencies. Secondly, by p lac ing the responsibi l i ty for par tnership 
work ing not on the police force bu t u p o n the loca l police commander, 
the legislat ion has to be seen i n the context of the drive for 
decentralisation, w h i c h h a d been encouraged par t icu lar ly by the A u d i t 
C o m m i s s i o n since the mid-1990s . Despite the A u d i t Commiss ion ' s 
support for decentral isat ion this d id not necessar i ly si t comfortably 
w i t h the way pol ic ing was delivered locally. 'Beat ing C r i m e ' (HMIC, 
1998) for example revealed that decis ion mak ing , i n m a n y police 
forces, s t i l l remained heavily over-centralised i n the hands of chief 
constables a n d headquarters. The c lash between central ised pressure 
for uni formity a n d local ised pressure for flexibility a n d terri torial 
var ia t ion was a potential ly serious one. 
Thirdly , i n a s imi la r vein, w i t h i n two tier areas responsible authorit ies 
status rested pr imar i ly wi th dis tr ic t counci ls , w h i c h meant that upper 
tier county counci ls , responsible for important service areas s u c h as 
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educat ion a n d social services, were l ike ly to come unde r pressure to 
respond to the differential demands of the lower tier authorit ies. In 
theory, s u c h var ia t ion m a y have been ant ic ipated due to the variat ion 
i n the locat ion a n d intensi ty of loca l cr ime a n d disorder problems. In 
practice this ra ised pol i t ica l questions regarding equitable provis ion 
a n d terri torial jus t ice , w h i c h were un l ike ly to be easily resolved. 
Four th ly , i n view of the above, there was every poss ibi l i ty that the 
par tnerships , establ ished by the 1998 Act , were going to be v i r tua l 
par tnerships , exis t ing more i n the paper documenta t ion (e.g. the 
audi ts a n d strategies) created i n their name, t han i n the 'flesh', 
a l though this does beg the fundamental quest ion of wha t a 'real ' 
par tnership looks l ike . The Home Office's statutory guidance made it 
clear the responsible authorit ies shou ld not be regarded i n any way as 
be ing 'first among equals ' w i t h i n the loca l par tnerships . However, w i th 
no compuls ion for others to j o i n i n , i t i s difficult to see i t i n any other 
way, as G i l l i ng (1999) suggests. 
Research conducted into the early operation of C D R P s by a n d for the 
Home Office (Phillips et a l . , 2002) does suggest that C D R P s d id , i n 
practice, rely disproport ionately u p o n the cont r ibu t ion from the two 
responsible authorit ies. Tha t does not mean that C D R P s were not able 
to construct large inter-agency forums, however, as previous research 
indicated (e.g. Crawford, 1997), s u c h forums often failed to progress 
beyond ' talking shops' . In addi t ion. Cr ime A u d i t s relied 
disproportionately u p o n data provided by the police, a n d par t icular ly 
their cr ime statistics (Tierney, 2001), a n d voluntary, private a n d 
communi ty bodies either sat on the sidelines or out of the picture 
altogether, as the impress ion remained that C D R P business was 
largely statutory sector business . Pol icy changes after 1999, notably 
the Cr ime Reduct ion Strategy w i t h i ts release of centra l funding a n d 
the new "Best V a l u e ' performance management framework, d id little to 
change s u c h a n impress ion . In the case of funding i t was the 
statutory agencies who h a d to b i d for Cr ime Reduc t ion Programme 
funding, and subsequent programme funds from the Safer 
Communi t i e s Initiative onwards, have been channel led down through 
regional govemment offices to, usua l ly , the loca l authorit ies. 
Addi t ional ly , as the performance of the C D R P s came to be assessed, so 
inspect ion regimes i n the shape of Bes t Va lue reviews a n d H M I C B C U 
inspect ions were also directed at the two m a i n responsible authorit ies. 
The survey of loca l author i ty communi ty safety managers conducted 
by G i l l i n g a n d Hughes (2002) confirmed th is pic ture of responsible 
authori ty dominance, as respondents confirmed that heal th 
authorit ies and the probat ion service h a d been h a r d to engage, a n d 
there was also c o n c e m regarding the cont r ibu t ion of upper tier local 
author i ty service areas, s u c h as educat ion a n d socia l services. Th is 
m a y have been attr ibutable to their upper tier status, thereby, 
conf i rming the problems encountered by par tnerships operating i n two 
tier areas. However, equally, i t cou ld have been at tr ibutable to the 
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possibi l i ty that some 'social ' agencies d id not see where they fitted i n 
to the Home Office's nar row conception of cr ime reduct ion, i n contrast 
to the more accommodat ing not ion of communi ty safety. Th i s was a n 
issue, w h i c h h a d been ra ised previously i n the M o r g a n Report (Home 
Office, 1991), bu t unresolved by the terminological shift from crime 
prevention to cr ime reduct ion. 
Despite the Home Office's anxiety to see quest ions of delivery 
pr ior i t ised over questions of bureaucracy the local government lobby, 
a n d specifically the Loca l Government Assoc ia t ion (LGA), made i t clear 
to the Home Office that the bureaucrat ic requirements • o f ' the 
legislation, a n d the accompanying performance a n d funding regiriies, 
were impos ing a considerable administrat ive burden- on C D R P s , many 
of w h o m d i d not have the resources to cope.- In par t icular , the 
audi t ing process represented a notable bu rden as C D R P s lacked the 
resources to consul t -widely (Newbum a n d Jones , 2002) a n d the 
competitive b idd ing process of the C R P forced m a n y to d o u b t whether 
a b id , w i t h only a remote prospect of success, was wor th the requisite 
investment of t ime, energy a n d resources. Fo r those who d i d receive 
C R P funding, however, the picture was not m u c h rosier. 
Hedderman a n d Wil l i ams ' s (2001) analysis of the Reduc ing Burg la ry 
Initiative, a comers tone of the C R P , demonstrated that a subs tant ia l 
proport ion of successful b ids h a d failed effectively to get off the 
ground, even a year into hav ing received the funding. In par t the 
authors attribute this to capaci ty issues, a n d par t icu la r ly the l ack of 
necessary project management sk i l l s , a l though i n part, they also 
attribute i t to a supervisory gap between the 'strategic' C D R P and the 
operat ional end of delivery teams who were being left to manage 
themselves, resul t ing i n s u c h implementat ion problems w i t h the C R P 
being l a i d bare -within a more subs tant ia l Home Office report (Homel et 
a l . , 2005). Furthermore, G i l l i n g a n d Hughes 's (2002) survey research 
indicated that communi ty safety practi t ioners were spending a 
disproportionate amount of their time at tempting to keep their C D R P 
s tmc tu res afloat, rather t han hon ing s u c h ' technical ' sk i l l s as audi t ing 
a n d cr ime pat tern analysis . Evidence supports the idea expressed 
above, i n so far as par tnership bodies, C D R P s were more 'v i r tual ' t han 
real a n d certainly a long way from being the sort of stable a n d cohesive 
par tnership bodies envisaged i n governmental guidance. 
In addi t ion to wha t has been d iscussed thus far, three further sources 
of evidence suggested that C D R P s were far from thr iv ing . Fi rs t ly , there 
was a Home Office pathfinder report (Home Office, 1999) w h i c h 
examined the early experiences of 12 different C D R P s from audi t ing 
through to the product ion of their first three-year strategies i n A p r i l 
1999. The report suggested that the audi t ing experience h a d proven to 
be m u c h more burdensome i n two-tier loca l authori ty areas, not least 
due to the demands placed u p o n agencies operat ing at the upper tier, 
s u c h as the police a n d county counci ls . It also identified a problem 
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w i t h leadership. In some cases, the strategy-setting process h a d been 
left a lmost entirely i n the hands of communi ty safety officers, whose 
l ack of executive author i ty made it difficult for t h e m to exercise 
leverage to secure agency contr ibut ions from those beyond the 
responsible authori t ies . Hea l th a n d educat ion bodies were found to be 
par t icular ly re luctant to collaborate, i n part because they d id not see 
the relevance of C D R P s to their core business , however, i n par t also 
because their terr i torial scale of operation presented them w i t h the 
same difficulties encountered by the upper tier authori t ies yet, i n real 
terms, none of the compuls ion . F ina l ly , a n d perhaps inevitably, 
despite the enabl ing provisions of the 1998 Act , there was a problem i n 
some areas w i t h the lack of effective information exchange. 
The second source of evidence was H M I C ' s (2000) follow u p to B e a t i n g 
Crime ' , enti t led 'Ca l l ing Time on Crime ' . B a s e d u p o n a thematic 
inspect ion conducted between November 1999 a n d M a r c h 2000, w h e n 
par tnerships were i n the process of implement ing their three-year 
strategies, this report confirmed the pathfinder study's observations by 
not ing that; 
"agencies other t han the two responsible authori t ies often appear 
not to be whol ly commit ted to par tnership work." (2000: 23). 
The problem was at t r ibuted i n part to the proliferation of p lans and 
initiatives at central govemment level, w h i c h meant that agencies 
beyond the two responsible authorit ies h a d other 'core bus iness ' 
ensur ing that cr ime prevention was un l ike ly to be seen by them as a 
priority. One potential solut ion, suggested by H M I C , was for section 
17 of the 1998 A c t to be appl ied to central government as wel l as to 
local govemment so that the minds of ' a l l ' agencies were more focused 
u p o n cr ime prevention. More generally, H M I C also noted the l imited 
engagement of elected counci l lors , the private a n d voluntary sectors 
a n d the communi ty . 
H M I C (2000) also confirmed the pathfinder report 's observations 
regarding the tendency i n some areas for the responsibi l i ty for crime 
prevention to be abdicated to communi ty safety officers, m a k i n g them 
the de facto C D R P s . One inevitable consequence of s u c h a tendency 
was a resul tant l ack of leadership w h i c h made i t even more un l ike ly 
that other agencies w o u l d 'come on board' . A l t h o u g h H M I C evidenced 
a stated commitment to par tnership work ing d u r i n g i ts inspections, 
there remained a susp ic ion that this was m a i n l y rhetor ical . One 
problem ar i s ing from this was that i t made i t more u n l i k e l y that 
C D R P s w o u l d connect into more hol is t ic or jo ined-up approaches to 
addressing cr ime. Thus , for example, H M I C found a l ack of connect ion 
between C D R P s a n d d m g a n d alcohol ac t ion teams (DAATs), despite 
their obvious 'coincidence of interest'. S imi la r ly , there was a noted 
l ack of connect ion between C D R P strategies a n d police author i ty plans 
i n places where they were terri torially l inked . 
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The H M I C report highl ighted a considerable amoun t of local disquiet at 
the Home Office's po l icy-making style, par t icu lar ly following the 
announcement of its Cr ime Reduc t ion Strategy. The Home Office, i t 
was thought, h a d been insufficiently consultat ive i n ' imposing' , rather 
t han 'negotiating over', the strategic priori t ies of the C R S . This 
ins t i l led a sense that cr ime prevention priori t ies were being largely 
steered from the centre. Th i s m a y help to expla in the l a ck of local 
leadership i n some places, as the requisite commitment was replaced 
w i t h a cer ta in amoun t of fatal ism. H M I C made some other points i n 
relat ion to effective par tnership work ing , w h i c h w i l l be addressed later 
i n th is chapter. 
The f inal source of evidence, w h i c h quest ioned the efficiency of C D R P s 
was the A u d i t Commiss ion ' s report of 2002 , controversial ly entitled 
' C o m m u n i t y Safety Par tnerships ' a n d was based _upon a number of 
loca l inspect ions a n d the results of a Loca l Government Associa t ion 
survey i n 2001 . The Commiss ion ' s boldly stated view that "local 
par tnerships have not made a n obvious impac t on communi ty safety" 
serves as a n indic tment of loca l practice. A t one level, the C o m m i s s i o n 
attributes the problem to a l ack of local capaci ty for partnership 
work ing , a n d i ts f indings here echo the findings of other reports and 
i ts prac t ica l recommendat ions cover s imi la r g round (see below). O n 
another level, however, the C o m m i s s i o n provides a more cr i t ical 
reading of C D R P s , a n d par t icu lar ly the cons t ra in ing role of central 
govemmen t . policy. It shou ld be remembered that the A u d i t 
C o m m i s s i o n has a par t icu lar interest i n the operation of local 
govemment, a n d i t is significant that i n the report i t i s c r i t ica l of "the 
l ack of a clear na t iona l pol icy that inc ludes the impor tant role of non-
police agencies i n communi ty safety." (2002: 22). 
In i ts report, i t ins is ts on u s i n g the terminology of ' communi ty safety 
par tnership ' rather t han of ' C D R P ' , cmc ia l l y , i t notes the disjuncture 
between the Home Office's cr ime reduct ion agenda a n d the more 
expansive communi ty safety perspective, he ld by loca l authority 
practi t ioners. The impl ica t ion of th is analysis reveals that the Home 
Office is at tempting to force C D R P s down a nar row crime reduct ion 
pa th that is really the same pa th a long w h i c h the police service is 
being forced. Loca l author i ty resistance to this s i tua t ion explains why 
par tnership work ing has proven to be to a large extent ineffective, a n d ' 
the impress ion is of C D R P s being used as one a r m of a pincer 
movement intended to create a more compl iant police service. Chapter 
2, i t w i l l be remembered, reviewed the" pressures exerted u p o n the 
police service to adopt a cr ime management approach w i t h i n w h i c h 
cr ime reduct ion played an integral part. 
In their different ways, H M I C a n d the A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n were both 
cr i t ica l of central govemment pol icy a n d its negative impac t u p o n 
par tnership working . How receptive the Home Office was to s u c h 
c r i t i c i sm is a moot point, a n d judg ing by its subsequent policy 
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responses i t found the cr i t ic isms about local capaci ty rather more 
palatable t han those about the detr imental effects of 'central steering'. 
The 2002 Police Reform A c t cou ld be seen as a response to these 
reports as i t increased the n u m b e r of responsible authorit ies to 
inc lude , from A p r i l 2003 , Police Author i t ies a n d Fire Author i t ies and 
from A p r i l 2004, P r imary Care Trus t s (PCTs), a l though, s u c h changes 
arr ived too late to have a n impac t u p o n the formation of the second 
r o u n d of three year strategies, from 2002 to 2005 . The A c t also 
required closer work ing relat ionships between C D R P s a n d D A A T s , 
favouring, bu t not compel l ing, merger i n un i t a ry areas. A s noted i n 
Chapter 1, the Home Office also established regional Cr ime Reduct ion 
Directorates, w i t h a specific brief to work more closely w i t h C D R P s i n 
pu r su i t of na t iona l objectives. The regional directorates were to 
dis tr ibute a n d account for the spending of new funding streams s u c h 
as the Safer Communi t i e s Initiative (SCI), a n d th is gave them a n 
opportuni ty to performance manage C D R P s i n a way that the Home 
Office w o u l d have found more difficult work ing from the centre. 
In response to loca l govemment concems regarding l imi ted resources, 
the Home Office also established the new par tnership development 
fund (PDF), i n w h i c h £20 m i l l i o n was made available over each of three 
years to assis t C D R P s i n bu i ld ing capacity, for example through 
investment i n informat ion technology to enhance loca l cr ime analysis , 
or th rough the employment of communi ty safety officers, par t icular ly 
i n areas that l acked the funds to make s u c h appointments . In this 
regard, the A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n (2002) h a d noted some 10% of C D R P s 
l acked a dedicated communi ty safety officer, a n d i n m a n y areas the 
communi ty safety responsibi l i ty was 'bolted o n ' to the 'day jobs ' of 
other local govemment roles. F ina l ly , i n recognit ion of the difficulties 
that m a n y C D R P s h a d h a d i n developing init iat ives based u p o n the 
pr inciple of 'evidence-based practice ' (HMIC, 1998 a n d 2000) w h i c h the 
Cr ime Reduct ion Strategy h a d heavily promoted, the Home Office 
r e s tmc tu red its cr ime reduct ion website to inc lude a number of 
' toolkits ' in tended as repositories of evidence-based good practice u p o n 
w h i c h local practi t ioners cou ld access advice a n d guidance for 
implement ing their strategies. 
The ' t inkerings ' of the 2002 Police Reform A c t were not sufficient to 
resolve a l l the problems that C D R P s faced, i n terms of engaging 
agencies beyond the pub l i c services, nor were they l ike ly to be. The 
reali ty is , legislation cannot compel non-statutory agencies to engage 
i n partnerships, for s u c h agencies, cont r ibut ion to the process w i l l 
a lways represent a voluntary engagement. In terms of getting C D R P s 
to work effectively, the problems of a loca l capaci ty deficit a n d a heavy-
handed steer from the centre bo th remained unaddressed . W i t h 
regard to the former, for example, the Home Office's official report into 
the less than impressive operation of the Cr ime Reduc t ion Programme 
(Homel et a l . , 2005) revealed a series of weaknesses i n C D R P s a round 
issues s u c h as project management. In its jo in t review into the Street 
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Cr ime Initiative, moreover, H M I C (2003: 44) noted very cr i t ical ly that 
"the largely ineffective nature of Cr ime a n d Disorder Reduct ion 
Par tnerships (CDRPs) was, once more, highlighted." The Nat ional 
A u d i t Office (NAO) (2004), meanwhile , was c r i t i ca l that a fair 
proport ion of C D R P init iat ives lacked careful project management, w i t h 
their targets often not being clearly expressed a n d their rationales not 
always wel l connected w i t h exist ing knowledge bases. 
W i t h regard to the latter point, as relates to centra l steering, H M I C 
(2003: 44) highl ighted the tensions a r i s ing from this , a n d observed; 
"In some areas, the in t roduct ion of SCI was perceived by partners 
as 'enforced', w o r k i n g against local ly-consul ted priori t ies and ... 
d i sp lac ing effort in tended for exist ing or fully endorsed local 
activities." 
The N A O (2004), w i t h its greater focus u p o n value for money, 
recognised complex funding a n d account ing arrangements, from a 
myr i ad of different central funding pots, imposed a n excessive 
administrat ive bu rden w h i c h diverted the meagre resources of C D R P s , 
creat ing w i t h i n them, what Crawford (2007) refers to, as a 'compliance 
mentality ' . The N A O also realised that Home Office funding 
settlements, w h i c h were often short- term a n d delayed, h a d knock-on 
effects at the loca l level, leading to project implementa t ion delays due 
to f inancia l uncer ta in ty a n d the prac t ica l problems of bo th recrui t ing 
a n d re ta ining staff for s u c h projects. Importantly, i n view of 
subsequent developments, the N A O recommended smal ler C D R P s 
shou ld be merged i n order to reduce administrat ive costs a n d it also 
supported the s impli f icat ion of funding arrangements, w h i c h the Home 
Office was already tak ing steps to facilitate, i n l ight of the shift to Loca l 
A r e a Agreements (LAAs - see Chapter 1). 
Despite the changes made by the 2002 Police Reform Act , as early as 
2003 the Home Office consul ta t ion paper 'Bu i ld ing Safer Communi t i es 
Together' recognised the need to strengthen par tnership arrangements. 
In the 2004 White Paper 'Bu i l d ing Communi t i e s , Bea t ing Cr ime ' the 
Home Office commit ted i tself to a formal review of C D R P s , m a k i n g the 
point that; 
"Some C D R P s are demonstrably less effective t h a n others. For 
example, some par tnerships struggle to ma in t a in a ful l contr ibut ion 
from key agencies. L a c k of clari ty about roles a n d responsibil i t ies 
a n d b lu r red l ines of accountabi l i ty can lead to some agencies 
abrogating their responsibi l i ty for cr ime reduct ion. Furthermore, 
under present arrangements C D R P s are neither fully visible nor 
properly accountable to the communi t ies they serve, nor are they 
fully embedded i n the local democratic framework. These issues lie 
at the heart of the Government 's reform programme." (Home Office, 
2004: 158). 
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This review of C D R P s betrays a governmental attempt to merge the 
Home Office's nar row crime reduct ion agenda w i t h the local 
govemment reform agenda of the Office of the Deputy Pr ime Min i s te r 
( O D P M , now the Depar tment for Communi t i e s a n d Loca l Govemment 
[DCLG]), hence the par t icu lar emphasis given to loca l v is ib i l i ty and 
accountabi l i ty . Importantly, the very same agenda was exerting 
pressure, as seen i n Chapter 2, on the police service to orientate its 
service i n the direct ion of neighbourhood pol ic ing, w i t h a m u c h greater 
emphas is u p o n loca l i sm a n d communi ty engagement. In the case of 
C D R P s , engagement w i t h the local govemment reform agenda impl ied 
a s imul taneous shift 'upwards ' to the strategic, authori ty-wide focus of 
the Loca l Strategic Par tnership (LSP), described by K e i t h (2004) as the 
loca l ' i iber-partnership ' ; a n d 'downward ' to neighbourhood 
management. 
The resul ts of the review of C D R P s were pub l i shed i n J a n u a r y 2006 
(Home Office, 2006). In the l ight of the emergence of L A A s w i t h their 
'safer a n d stronger communi t i es ' theme, the review recognised the 
need for C D R P s to 'fit in to ' the L S P s tmc tu re and , while 
straightforward i n un i t a ry areas, became deeply problematic i n two-
tier authori t ies as the L S P s were s i tuated at the upper tier county 
level. The review's proposed solut ion was not to merge district-level 
C D R P s at the county level (unless there was s t rong loca l pressure for 
this), bu t rather to effect a s t rategic/operat ional spli t , so distr ict 
C D R P s effectively became the delivery a rms of strategic plans , 
generated at L S P level. Th i s preserved the ' independence' of district-
level C D R P s , whi l s t accommodat ing the need for C D R P s to engage 
more effectively w i t h upper tier agencies s u c h as the police, the county 
counc i l a n d D A A T s , thus addressing a problem w h i c h h a d originally 
been identified by H M I C (2000) a n d others. L o c a l i s m was to be 
preserved, under s u c h arrangements, by engaging dis t r ic t counci l lors 
w i t h the communi ty safety portfolio, together, unde r the L S P umbre l l a . 
The review also recognised that the three-year audit-to-strategy cycle 
h a d not proved a success, absorbing resources w h i c h may have been 
placed, more profitably, into delivery. It recommended this 'cycle' 
shou ld be amended, not by abol i sh ing the three year p lans , bu t rather 
by m a k i n g them 'roll ing p lans ' subjected to a n n u a l revis ion i n the light 
of s ix month ly strategic assessments, conducted under the 
methodology of the Nat iona l Intelligence Mode l (NIM). Significantly, 
s u c h recommendat ion ties C D R P s m u c h more closely into the 
bus iness of loca l pol ic ing, given that the N I M has become the vehicle 
through w h i c h the police service delivers cr ime management. The 
impl ica t ion is that the task ing a n d co-ordinat ion groups (TCGs) 
th rough w h i c h the N I M operates at B C U level s h o u l d take o n more of a 
mult i -agency focus as a resul t of the incorporat ion of C D R P business . 
F ina l ly (although the review covered a lot of other g round that is not 
directly relevant to this section), the review also recognised the 
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problems w i t h information exchange, a n issue C D R P s h a d faced since 
incept ion. If C D R P s were to fit into the N I M , then more h a d to be 
achieved to unb lock the flow of information a n d intelligence, and thus 
the review recommended a revis ion to section 115 of the 1998 Cr ime 
a n d Disorder Act , so informat ion-shar ing was not j u s t 'permissive' bu t 
ra ther a positive duty of responsible authori t ies, whose number (the 
review also recommended) the Home Secretary shou ld be empowered 
to add to, as deemed necessary. 
These, a n d other recommendat ions of the review of C D R P s , were 
incorporated into the 2006 Police a n d Jus t i ce Ac t , w i t h a view to them 
becoming operational by the summer of 2007, a per iod of time w h i c h 
lies outside of the direct empir ica l focus of th is thesis. It is 
nevertheless important to recognise the review a n d the changes that 
are to be made i n its wake, as i t demonstrates the problematic status 
that C D R P s have experienced since their incept ion combined wi th the 
a lmost permanent revolut ion to w h i c h they have been subjected, 
resu l t ing from the constant success ion of pol icy changes affecting both 
their s tructure a n d operation. It w o u l d appear, i n summary , that 
C D R P s have been bl ighted by problems of l imi ted capacity, a n d by the 
dis t rac t ion of a s trong steer from the Home Office. The changes 
in t roduced i n 2006 complement the Home Office steer w i t h one from 
the D C L G . However, while at a s t ruc tura l level they serve to ensure 
that C D R P s are better 'joined u p ' bo th w i t h L S P s a n d w i t h local 
pol ic ing , they do not necessari ly remove the difficulties that central 
steering generate for local par tnership work ing . S imi la r ly , local 
capaci ty m a y be improved by a less unpredictable funding regime 
ins t i tu ted under L A A s , a n d by the new duty on responsible authorities 
to share information, yet i t is by no means clear that a l l the capacity 
problems have been addressed by the pol icy changes. 
Critical Success Factors in Partnership Working 
A s stated at the beginning of this chapter, since the incept ion of the 
par tnership approach to cr ime prevention there has been a steady 
s t ream of literature, most of i t from official sources, oriented towards 
impar t ing knowledge of effective par tnership work ing . The presence of 
th is l i terature, w h i c h generally takes the form of guidance, some of i t 
premised u p o n a cri t ique of exist ing practice, is indicative of a general 
unders tanding that par tnership work ing is new, a n d potentially 
difficult. It is a deviat ion from the s tandard operating procedures of 
agencies more u s e d to work ing by themselves t h a n i n par tnership wi th 
others more u sed to independence t han the inter-dependence factors 
u p o n w h i c h par tnership approaches are generally premised (Hudson, 
1987). 
A t the r i sk of over-generalisation, th is l i terature i s generally 
prescriptive. It demonstrates a normative commitment to partnership 
work ing a n d seeks to uncover a n d impar t the essential elements of 
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good or effective par tnership work ing . It often achieves this by-
cr i t ic i s ing arrangements w h i c h fall short of the normative ideal , and 
providing case studies regarding instances of effective practice from 
w h i c h others c a n learn th rough emulat ion. These instances tend to be 
assembled into recipes or b luepr ints for success. S u c h blueprints 
tend to disconnect par tnership work ing from its broader context, 
a l though that i s not to say that the l i terature neglects th is context and 
m u c h of it , for example, carries impl ic i t or explici t cri t iques of 
govemment pol icy. Notwi ths tanding s u c h cri t iques a n d contextual 
unders tanding , however, the l i terature is guided by the pragmatic 
purpose of impar t ing a message of guidance to practi t ioners about how 
to 'do' effective par tnership work ing . 
The purpose of this section is not to pro-vide a n exhaustive account of 
th is guidance as there is not the space to do this . A g a i n at the r i sk of 
over-generalisation, the purpose here is to document wha t amounts to 
a general or thodoxy i n this l i terature as relates to wha t constitutes 
good par tnership work ing i n cr ime prevention. The literature 
emanates from a variety of sources. A l though , s u c h guidance 
preceded the M o r g a n Report (Home Office, 1991), th is watershed 
document is t aken as our start ing point . Subsequent ly, we take into 
account the cont r ibut ion of Home Office-sponsored research (Liddle 
a n d Gelsthorpe, 1994a, 1994b a n d 1994c; Sut ton , 1996; Til ley and 
Hough , 1998), the A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n (1998, 1999 a n d 2002), a n d 
H M I C (1998, 2000), a l though it is acknowledged that m a n y other 
sources may have been d rawn upon . 
Th i s l i terature offers a general composite image of wha t a good 
par tnership looks l ike . The par tnership shou ld be fit for purpose i n 
the sense that its membersh ip profile is determined by what i t is there 
to do. If the purpose is cr ime prevention, the membersh ip shou ld 
constitute service areas w h i c h impact i n one way or another on crime 
prevention. Membersh ip shou ld be guided by the pr inciple that 
smaller par tnerships can be more bus iness- l ike , whereas larger 
par tnerships are less so a n d m n the r i s k of becoming, i n effect, 
' ta lking shops' . 
There i s -widespread agreement there needs to be a spl i t between the 
strategic a n d operat ional or tact ical parts of the par tnership. The 
strategic par t of the par tnership shou ld be responsible for the v is ion 
and for the p l a n or strategy, intended to b r ing about that v is ion . It 
needs to be populated by representatives who h o l d senior posit ions 
w i t h i n their agencies, whose seniority signals the commitment of their 
'parent' agency (hence representatives from different agencies should 
ho ld s imi la r levels of seniority), and allows them to make decisions and 
commit resources on behalf of that agency. Strategic partnerships 
have a par t icu lar role to play i n agreeing informat ion-shar ing protocols 
a n d i n ensur ing da ta compatibi l i ty, since the col lect ion a n d analysis of 
information plays a key part i n the cr ime prevention process. The 
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need for compatible da ta sources provides" one rationa.le for the 
argument that the agencies si t t ing on the strategic par tnership shou ld 
have, coterminous boundaries , though another rationale resides i n the 
fact that coterminosify gives agencies a un i t ed purpose averting the 
possibi l i ty , for example, that agencies m a y have to contr ibute to more 
t h a n one crime prevention par tnership. 
There shou ld be cont inui ty i n representation to facilitate familiari ty 
a n d t rus t -bui ld ing , however, also to ensure that agency contr ibut ions 
are followed-up a n d reviewed. There shou ld be a process w h i c h guides 
the strategic body, for example th rough rout ine meetings set" to 
develop, implement a n d review the strategy. Th i s ensures the focus- of 
the par tnership is not lost i n the event of personnel changes arid, 
therefore, the par tnership does not become over-dependent u p o n the 
cont r ibu t ion of ind iv iduals . There shou ld also be a process l i n k i n g the 
bus iness of the strategic par tnership to each 'parent' agency so the 
cont r ibu t ion of each agency is rout inely supported a n d reviewed by 
that agency, rather t h a n being dependent o n the goodwil l or interest of 
i nd iv idua l representatives. 
Between the strategic a n d operat ional aspects of the par tnership there 
shou ld be a co-ordinator role. Recognis ing that the administrat ive and 
bureaucrat ic functions of the strategic par tnership exist outside of the 
'day jobs ' of the senior agency representatives requir ing, not only the 
formulat ion of the strategy, bu t also the on-going review of its 
implementat ion. The co-ordinator role (typically performed after 1998 
by a communi ty safety manager) is more or less a funct ional necessity. 
M a n y of the attributes identified above are also relevant to the 
operat ional par t of the par tnership. T h u s , i t too s h o u l d be process-
focused and, as far as possible, have cont inu i ty of agency 
representation. Operat ional parts of par tnerships are l ike ly to focus 
u p o n specific cr ime problems or geographical areas. The process they 
s h o u l d follow is a problem-oriented process, geared towards the 
development of jo in t operations to address k n o w n cr ime a n d disorder 
problems. Since the problem-oriented process i s iterative and 
adaptive, the par tnership s tructure at this level is l ike ly to be more 
fluid a n d flexible and there is less need for the formal s t ructures , l ikely 
to exist at the strategic level. Th i s lesser need for formal s tructures, 
however, shou ld be ba lanced against the need to ensure that 
operat ional parts of the par tnership adopt a m e d i u m to long-term 
perspective, alongside a more flexible short- term one. The need for 
both flexibility a n d a longer-term v i s ion attests to the importance of 
hav ing a leadership or ' champion ' role at this level. Named indiv idua ls 
s h o u l d be responsible for this leadership role a n d there shou ld be a 
good l ine of communica t ion a n d accountabi l i ty r u n n i n g from s u c h 
indiv idua ls back to the strategic par tnerships , to account for progress 
a n d to seek assistance i n u n b l o c k i n g ' implementat ion iner t ia ' a n d so 
forth. 
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A s the operat ional parts of the par tnership shou ld be engaged i n the 
problem-oriented process they clearly need the requisite ski l l s to 
conduct this effectively. They require, i n par t icular , good analyt ical 
sk i l l s to deal w i t h the information a n d intelligence on w h i c h crime 
prevention projects are based. They require good project management 
sk i l l s to ensure projects are pu t into practice w h e n needed and 
effectively monitored. They also require evaluat ion sk i l l s i n order to 
determine the outcome effectiveness of implemented projects. 
E n s u r i n g these sk i l l s are represented at the operat ional level a n d that 
those agencies who have a role to p lay i n address ing the cr ime 
problems that fall w i t h i n the ambi t of the operat ional par t of the 
par tnership are involved, i n tu rn , ensures that th is level of par tnership 
is 'fit for purpose' . 
F ina l ly , good practice guidance tends to recognise that good 
par tnerships do not appear overnight. They take t ime to develop as 
agencies m u s t become famil iar w i t h one another o n a n ind iv idua l level, 
w i t h t rus t being regarded as a v i ta l par tnership commodity. B u i l d i n g 
t rus t may also require acqui r ing a famil iar i ty w i t h different 
professional a n d organisat ional cul tures , as we l l as overcoming 
aspects of those cul tures that m a y provide barr iers to jo in t working . 
Th i s process can be facilitated, i t is suggested, by look ing for early 
'quick w i n s ' for the partnership, as wel l as th rough the role of 
' champions ' who carry a par t icular en thus i a sm for par tnership 
work ing . 
Critical Perspectives on Partnership Working 
Whi le , as noted above, the guidance li terature o n par tnership work ing 
does not neglect some of the more cr i t ica l i ssues i n relat ion to 
par tnership working , its basic flaw is that i t is predisposed to assume 
what Cha l l i s et a l . (1988) refer to as a n "optimist ic model" of policy. It 
does this because of its s tatus as guidance. The opt imist ic model 
betrays the reasonable expectation that par tnerships indeed can be 
shaped to deliver the outputs a n d outcomes expected of them by their 
architects a n d this expectation, i n t u rn , rests u p o n a 'benevolent 
mode l ' of col laborat ion (Sampson et a l . , 1988), w h i c h assumes that 
agencies w i l l be d rawn into par tnership work ing th rough a desire they 
describe as one of "paternalistic corporatism". In other words, 
agencies w i l l work together i n pu r su i t of the greater good, recognising 
that they w i l l provide a better service to the pub l i c by work ing i n 
par tnership, rather t han work ing i n relative isola t ion. It i s hardly 
su rp r i s ing that this guidance carries s u c h unde rp inn ing assumpt ions , 
otherwise there w o u l d be no motivat ion to provide the guidance i n the 
first place. 
There is a n extensive li terature available, however, w h i c h carries no 
s u c h unde rp inn ing assumpt ions a l though the t r u th may lie 
somewhere i n between. The authors cited above also identify 
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pessimist ic (Chall is et a l . , 1988) a n d conspira tor ia l (Sampson et a l . , 
1988) models, where par tnership work ing becomes a m u c h more 
problematic phenomenon. In this section, the m a i n themes a n d issues 
ra ised by th is more cr i t ica l l i terature w i l l be reviewed. In view of its 
relevance to the research u p o n w h i c h th is thesis i s based, the 
li terature focused u p o n here w i l l be that w h i c h concentrates 
specifically u p o n the par tnership approach to cr ime prevention. 
However, i t shou ld be acknowledged there is a wider l i terature drawn 
from other pol icy domains a n d reflecting other issues of governance, 
on w h i c h this l i terature sometimes draws. 
Inevitably, this c r i t ica l l i terature on crime prevention par tnerships 
follows pol icy developments, so i t first began to appear i n the 1980s, 
the decade w h e n the mult i -agency or co-ordinated approach to crime 
prevention was in i t ia l ly promoted by government. There is l imited 
space for this l i terature to be covered i n great detail , yet i t is important 
to recognise that the themes explored i n the l i terature have changed 
over t ime. W h e n the par tnership approach represented a relatively 
new policy departure i n the 1980s, the l i terature focused par t icular ly 
o n inter-professional djmamics and ideological conflicts, part ly 
reflecting the fact relations between the police a n d other agencies were 
often quite s t rained du r ing this period. More recently, as par tnerships 
have become a more famil iar par t of the pol icy landscape, a n d as the 
par tnership approach has been driven from the centre as a par t of a 
deliberate pol icy to modernise, j o i n up , restructure or even reinvent 
the business of governing, so the focus of the l i terature has tended to 
shift from the inter-professional to the inter-govemmental , examining 
i n par t icular the relat ionship between central a n d local government. 
The conspirator ia l model (Sampson et a l . , 1988) presents par tnership 
as an opportuni ty for the police's 'colonisat ion ' (Kinsey et a l . , 1986) of 
other agencies. Accord ing to the model , the police effectively take over 
the partnership agenda, u s i n g other agencies to further their own 
ends, s u c h as intelligence-gathering a n d the offloading of ' rubbish 
work' . Th is conspira tor ia l model reflects the tone of m u c h cr i t ical 
wr i t ing i n relat ion to the police i n the 1980s, w i t h a n impl ic i t concern 
that the l ack of local democratic accountabi l i ty made the police service 
a difficult agency to 'control ' , combined w i t h a p resumed disregard for 
matters s u c h as c iv i l l iberties. Wi thout democratic accountabi l i ty , a n d 
w i t h a s t ruc tura l pos i t ion w h i c h endowed them w i t h p r imacy over 
matters of local cr ime control by virtue of their h is tor ica l mandate, the 
concern reflected was that the police service was always going to be 
the dominant partner. In reality, the research S a m p s o n et a l . (1988) 
conducted into a range of different instances of par tnership work ing 
indicated that neither benevolent nor conspira tor ia l models provided 
adequate accounts of wha t they found to be m u c h more variable forms 
of par tnership work ing . 
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Their research demonstrated, as one might expect, that different 
agencies framed crime problems, a n d their putative solut ions, i n 
different ways according to their different organisat ional and 
professional ideologies. Yet this difference d i d not necessar i ly result i n 
the presence of conflict i n par tnership forums. Confl ict was more 
l ikely i f there was competi t ion over scarce resources, however, at other 
t imes conflict remained latent because some 'framings' of problem and 
so lu t ion carr ied more weight t han others. In par t icular , there was a 
tendency for par tnerships to priori t ise problems, w h i c h figured 
prominent ly i n police statistics a n d approaches to resolve those 
problems that h a d a ' common sense' appeal . Th i s often mitigated 
against ' social ' approaches because of their more distant or 
tendentious l i n k w i t h cr ime problems. Th i s might have privileged 
police priori t ies a n d s i tuat ional , or enforcement-oriented solut ions, yet 
it d id so i n an indirect way. 
Confl ict cou ld also be 'managed away' by t ak ing informal act ion 
outside of, a n d thus beyond the sc ru t iny of, par tnership forums. Th is 
made par tnership work ing more effective, however, also less visible 
and accountable. Confl ict cou ld also be managed away by subvert ing 
the purpose of par tnership forums, so they became occasions for 
networking, par t icu lar ly between senior managers , rather than 
occasions for ser iously addressing loca l cr ime problems through jo in t 
act ion. The jo in t ac t ion effectively was represented by the par tnership 
forum, a ' ta lking shop ' rather than a site for purposive decision­
m a k i n g a n d act ion. 
Crawford a n d Jones (1995) also researched loca l cr ime prevention 
par tnerships , f inding that the nature of par tnership w o r k i n g was more 
variable t han might be expected from any determinist ic model . L ike 
S a m p s o n et a l . (1988) they found despite very different perspectives, 
conflict between agencies was a n infrequent feature of par tnership 
forums, ma in ly due to the way it was managed out by var ious tactics 
of 'conflict avoidance' being employed. Th i s i nc luded the use of 
informal agreements or deals beyond the gaze of the partnership 
forum. However, i t was also by the use of wha t they cal led a 
'smorgasbord tact ic ' by w h i c h par tnerships t r ied to accommodate a l l 
interests a n d perspectives i n their dec is ion-making , so that no 
par t icu lar perspective was excluded at the expense of others. 
The capacity to deliver a smorgasbord approach to cr ime prevention, 
w h i c h is indicative of the more inclus ive or a l l -embrac ing communi ty 
safety approach, may depend u p o n the avai labi l i ty of sufficient 
resources. In Hope a n d M u r p h y ' s (1983) invest igat ion into the 
implementat ion of the Manchester schools v a n d a l i s m project, w h i c h 
provided a testing ground for the problem-oriented methodology of the 
s i tuat ional approach, there was evidently a difference of opin ion over 
how the problem shou ld be tackled, w i t i i some favouring s i tuat ional 
measures, a n d others, favouring social measures . In the m a i n i t 
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appears a smorgasbord approach was effectively squeezed out by the 
two dominan t agencies, the police a n d school bu i ld ings department, 
who were able to use their c la ims as 'experts' to ensure that their 
preferred s i tua t ional ideas were pr ior i t ised. C l a i m s to expertise, then, 
m a y be seen as a way of avoiding or resolving potent ial points of 
conflict. In a s imi la r way, Gi l l ing ' s (1993) single case s tudy research 
showed that the potential conflict between social a n d s i tuat ional 
advocates was resolved through 'objective' c la ims , w h i c h privileged 
s i tua t ional measures resul t ing from their basis i n 'hard ' rather than 
'soft' data. 
In h i s overview of par tnership work ing i n cr ime prevention, w h i c h 
incorporates this analyt ic shift, referred to above, from inter­
professional to in ter-govemmental relations, G i l l i n g (2005) stresses the 
importance of examin ing par tnership work ing i n terms of the interplay 
between three levels of analysis . These are the macro or 
environmenta l level, the meso or organisat ional level a n d the micro or 
interpersonal level. The macro frames the other two, a n d the meso 
frames the micro , however, each is also relatively autonomous , so the 
re la t ionship between the three levels are not determinist ic or even 
un id i rec t iona l as, for example, micro level act ions c a n come to shape 
organisat ional practices. A good example of th is is the way a lot of 
par tnership measures originate i n the innovative 'experiments ' of local 
practi t ioners. 
Gi l l ing ' s work drew u p o n that of others (e.g. Dav idson , 1976; H u d s o n , 
1987), w h i c h examined par tnership w o r k i n g i n other domains . He is 
cr i t ica l of the 'what makes a good par tnersh ip ' approach of the 
guidance li terature as i t serves to abstract par tnerships from the 
complex context of these interact ing levels of analysis , as i f 
par tnership w o r k i n g is only a meso level phenomenon. H i s purpose, 
rather, is to show that par tnership work ing is inf luenced by these 
different levels. T h u s , for example, the capaci ty of C D R P s to develop 
into effective par tnerships depends u p o n conducive^ s t ructura l 
condit ions, par t icular ly through government pol icy bu t also through 
the wider social , economic, pol i t ical a n d ideological context to w h i c h 
govemment pol icy i s i tself a response. 
Th i s wider context includes the impact of globalisat ion on the business 
of governing (Pierre and Peters, 2000). In its broadest sense, 
global isat ion has h a d the effect of shortening the reach of government, 
requi r ing i t to work w i t h and , to 'enable' others i n , the 'co-production' 
of cr ime control . The shift from welfare l ibe ra l i sm to neol iberal ism, 
w h i c h has accompanied globalisat ion requires a modificat ion i n 
govemmenta l aspirat ions, not only i n terms of wha t i t c an be expected 
to do by itself (hence the phenomenon of ' responsibi l isa t ion ' (Garland, 
1996)), but also i n terms of how i t does it . W i t h regard to how it acts, 
government has been affected by general c3Tiicism regarding its own 
capacity, typified i n the idea that 'nothing works ' , bu t also by concerns 
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i n relat ion to the l ack of accountabi l i ty of c r i m i n a l jus t ice agencies and 
wi th other problems, s u c h as, the abuse of powers a n d corrupt ion. In 
part, because of th is cyn ic i sm, there has been a shift i n the nature of 
cr ime control from react ion to proactivity, as par t of a new r i sk-
oriented approach to cr ime problems. The a ims of th i s r isk-oriented 
approach are less geared to the e l iminat ion or 'cure' of cr ime, and 
more geared to the effective management a n d containment of crime. 
A s m a n y commentators have noted (e.g. O'Malley, 1992), the 
emergence of cr ime prevention especially s i tuat ional cr ime prevention, 
but also cr ime reduct ion, can be seen very m u c h i n this light. 
A t this broad level, the modificat ion of govemmenta l business , 
perceived by some as more (late-modem) govemance t han (modem) 
govemment, is associated wi th , a n d frames, the rise of the par tnership 
approach to cr ime prevention. Yet s u c h a modificat ion is not 
unproblemat ic as government s tmggles w i t h its own modified 
ambit ions. Whi le i t acknowledges its l imi ta t ions , govemment 
s imul taneous ly recognises the importance of cr ime control to its 
sovereign author i ty a n d legit imacy a n d to the electoral fortunes of the 
pol i t ical party that leads it. Th i s creates a d i l emma G a r l a n d (2001) 
describes as a 'sovereignty predicament ' . The predicament is 
manifested i n contradictory pol icy developments, notably a 
s imul taneous preventive and puni t ive ' turn' . There m a y be more crime 
prevention, evidenced par t icular ly by the establ ishment of C D R P s and 
the widespread use of preventive technologies s u c h as C C T V , however, 
there is s imul taneous ly more penalty, evidenced par t icu lar ly by a 
growing p r i son popula t ion, bu t also by more punit ive measures s u c h 
as zero-tolerance pol ic ing (Stenson, 2000). 
Wha t does a l l of th is mean for par tnership work ing , or i n other words 
how does the macro frame the meso? Th i s d i lemma, i t w o u l d seem, 
creates ambigui ty i n government policy, as has been we l l summar i sed 
by Crawford (2001). A l though C D R P s were supposed to epitomise 
l o c a l solut ions for local problems' , they have been subjected to a n 
increasingly central ised and managerial ised agenda as government has 
sought to enhance its cr ime control credentials th rough the at tainment 
of var ious cr ime reduct ion targets. Fur thermore , a l though C D R P s 
were in i t ia l ly given free re in to develop hol is t ic approaches to the 
problem of cr ime, they have since been t ied down to a m u c h narrower 
conception of cr ime reduct ion w h i c h , as Chapter 2 d iscussed, is 
consistent w i t h more conventional police approaches to crime 
management. 
The ambigui ty govemment expresses i n its sovereignty predicament 
bears down upon , bu t is also replayed wi th in , the meso level. Agencies 
s u c h as the police p i ck u p mixed messages from government, s u c h as 
the in junct ion to establish C D R P s , a n d also a pol icy emphasis that 
stresses the police's 'core bus iness ' th rough var ious na t iona l pol ic ing 
plans that do not necessari ly take account of the police's contr ibut ion 
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to par tnerships . The police also have their own predicament i n the 
sense of a n expectation that they shou ld work i n par tnership wi th 
others, w h i c h is i n conflict against their own c la ims for professional 
competence expressed i n a relatively new-found confidence i n areas 
s u c h as cr ime management, endorsed by the recent in t roduct ion of the 
N I M a n d measures s u c h as zero-tolerance pol ic ing. Th i s ambigui ty 
then percolates down to practi t ioners, who m a y be uncer ta in about the 
priori ty w h i c h s h o u l d be accorded to par tnership work ing w h e n set 
against other developments a n d demands. 
The sovereignty predicament has other ramifications, w h i c h may help 
to make sense of some of the other empi r ica l findings of studies of 
C D R P s after 1998, a l though one shou ld not neglect the par t played 
s imply by b a d pol icy-making . The government's desire to be 'seen to 
be i n control of c r ime ' manifests i tself i n 'performance pressure ' on 
those to w h o m i t c an be applied (the responsible authorities), w i t h the 
pressure hav ing been intensified since the advent of cr ime reduct ion 
teams i n the govemment offices w i t h their capaci ty for a m u c h closer 
steer of C D R P business . Yet this m a y have h a d tiie effect of freezing 
out those beyond the responsible authori t ies, t hus he lp ing to explain 
the relatively m i n i m a l involvement of agencies from the private a n d 
voluntary sectors. The pressure has also been appl ied i n a way that 
squeezes t imescales. The first r o u n d of audi ts a n d strategies h a d to be 
completed before par tnerships h a d time to properly form a n d funding 
regimes, w h e n they d id emerge after 1999, in i t ia l ly only provided 
resources for one year's implementat ion. U n d e r s u c h time constraints, 
as G i l l i n g (2005) observes, i t was difficult for the key commodity of 
tms t , the m a i n lubr icator of par tnership work ing at the interpersonal 
level, to develop. 
A further compl ica t ion noted by G i l l i n g (2005), w h i c h does not at first 
sight fit Gar land ' s idea of a sovereignty predicament, i s caused by the 
intervention of other central govemment departments who have sought 
to shape the bus iness of C D R P s at this macro level. The actions of the 
Home Office might fit the aspi ra t ion to re-assert sovereign authori ty 
th rough the police as the gateway to the pena l system, however, the 
O D P M a n d now the D C L G w o u l d appear to offer a n older, welfare 
l iberal approach to cr ime prevention w h i c h locates the causes of crime 
i n factors s u c h as communi ty breakdown a n d economic decline. 
Thus , th rough the body of the L S P a n d the 'safer a n d stronger' s tream 
of the L A A , C D R P s are connected w i t h welfare l ibera l themes s u c h as 
c iv i l a n d neighbourhood renewal, w h i c h do not appear to belong to this 
concept of the re-assertion of state sovereignty. However, o n closer 
inspect ion, i f we look at how themes s u c h as c iv i l a n d neighbourhood 
renewal have played out, then i n practice m u c h of i t has been 
translated into a 'politics of behaviour ' w h i c h equates renewal w i t h the 
enforcement of s tandards of civil i ty, indus t ry , good parent ing a n d good 
behaviour u l t imate ly wi th back-up sanct ions s u c h as A S B O s and 
parent ing orders (Gill ing, 2007). C D R P s have been given an 
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ins t rumenta l role i n this poli t ics of behaviour, leaving the police to 
focus o n more serious cr ime a n d as s u c h a pol i t ics does, after a l l look 
more l ike the reassert ion of sovereignty that G a r l a n d sees as one part 
of the sovereignty predicament. 
The role of C D R P s i n this poli t ics of behaviour is , however, a 
controversial one. Some of the agencies w o r k i n g w i t h i n or alongside 
C D R P s , typical ly the more 'social ' ones, have reservations regarding 
wha t i s seen by some as the ' c r iminal isa t ion of socia l policy' , where the 
emphas is i s u p o n enforcement, not welfare. Th i s controversy is not 
d i s s imi la r to the ideological conflict seen to exist i n the 1980s' between 
advocates of social a n d s i tuat ional approaches to cr ime prevention. 
A t the meso level, the major problems the guidance li terature has 
tended to gloss over were originally conceived as those of incompatible 
organisat ional cul tures a n d power differences, w h i c h made 
par tnership relat ionships asymmetr ical . These problems have not 
necessari ly disappeared. Al though , as noted above, power differences 
rarely express themselves i n overt conflict a n d power relations may 
express themselves i n more subtle ways. It appears, for example, that 
the 'rules of the game' for C D R P s m a y be devised i n s u c h a way as to 
favour particTilar approaches to cr ime prevention, a n d thus , those 
agencies w i t h w h i c h they are associated. A s m a n y have recognised, 
a n d whether they w i s h i t or not, the police service's s tatus compr is ing 
its h is tor ica l mandate, i ts cus todianship of cr ime statistics and 
intelligence a n d its possess ion of mains t ream resources for analys ing 
a n d responding to loca l cr ime problems, pu ts i t i n a pos i t ion whereby 
other agencies m a y be inc l ined to accede authori ty to the police service 
as 'the expert ' w i t h loca l cr ime control being 'its bag'. 
Fu r the r to this , the t ime constraints under w h i c h C D R P s m u s t 
operate, the targets they m u s t work to a n d the da ta they m u s t use to 
identify priori t ies a n d measure performance m a y a l l serve to favour 
nar row cr ime reduct ion over communi ty safety as the core business of 
C D R P s (Gil l ing, 2005). Cr ime reduct ion falls more w i t h i n the domain 
of the police t han w i t h any other agency. Th i s is debatable, however, 
a n alternative perspective is provided by B jone a n d Pease (2003) who 
argue that C D R P s have tended to draw i n ' social ' agencies whose 
interests are more i n communi ty safety t han cr ime reduct ion and who 
tend to focus u p o n the remote causes of cr ime, generating measures 
w h i c h are jus t i f ied by their 'worthiness ' a n d 'reflected g lo iy ' rather 
than by any cr ime reductive outcomes. A s they say; 
"There is a danger of the cr ime reduct ion enterprise being shaped 
by the preferences a n d prejudices of those most eager to be 
engaged i n par tnership working." (2003: 296-7) 
The point that the power to shape C D R P agendas depends u p o n the 
const i tu t ion a n d dynamics of the ind iv idua l C D R P is a good one, w h i c h 
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counsels against any simple a s sumpt ion that the police perspective is 
necessari ly always the dominant one. 
In terms of organisat ional cul tures , i t i s s t i l l l ike ly to be the case that 
different organisat ions have different languages, different timescales, 
different ways of seeing a n d so forth. Whi le the guidance literature 
sometimes recognises these problems, its general orientat ion is to 
assume that s u c h problems may be overcome by greater familiarity, so 
that they are recognised as differences w h i c h c a n be accommodated, 
rather t han becoming barriers. To some extent th is is plausible , 
par t icu la r ly as s u c h differences are perhaps less t han they once were. 
G i l l i n g (2005) observes, as publ ic sector agencies have become 
increasingly managerial ised and , i n the process, de-professionalised so 
there has been a degree of pract ical , yet not necessar i ly funct ional 
i somorph i sm. Agencies are increasingly u sed to objective-setting, 
na t iona l priorit ies, audi t ing, inspect ions and the other paraphernal ia 
of manager ia l i sm, i nc lud ing the pressure to engage i n partnership 
w o r k i n g (HMIC 2000 , noted disapprovingly that some police forces 
u s e d the n u m b e r of par tnerships jo ined as a quantitative performance 
measure). T h u s , whatever the differences between agencies, they are 
b o u n d together by famil iar managerial is t repertoires, w h i c h make it 
relatively easy for them to 'go th rough the motions ' , thereby, p roducing 
'products ' s u c h as audi ts a n d strategies wi thout really having to 
confront their differences. Power's (1997) poin t regarding the tendency 
of 'the audi t cu l ture ' to colonise agency bus iness (cited by G i l l i n g a n d 
Bar ton , 2004) is relevant here, as i s Smi th ' s (2000) point i n relat ion to 
the ideology of uni ty , w h i c h encourages par tnerships to present 
themselves to the outside wor ld as un i t ed a n d consensua l . The 'show' 
of par tnership m a y be a par t of the compliance menta l i ty Crawford 
(2007) finds to be present amongst the loca l agencies mandated to 
work together i n C D R P s . However, i t m a y be more show than 
substance, as the Home Office's reform agenda impl ic i t ly recognises. 
B e h i n d the presentat ional side of C D R P s , the meso level differences 
m a y persist w h e n m a k i n g i t h a r d for them to work effectively w i t h one 
another. In a point demonstrat ing the importance of examin ing the 
interact ion of different levels of analysis w h e n consider ing par tnership 
working , Crawford (2007) emphasises that a con t inued problem for 
C D R P s has been the l ack of ' joined-up government ' at the central 
govemment level. Th i s has meant that, j u s t as loca l agencies have 
been pushed into par tnerships , so central govemment departments 
make different a n d potentially contradictory demands of loca l agencies 
w h i c h drive them back into their separate pol icy 'silos' . Crawford 
(2007) suggests that the Nat iona l C o m m u n i t y Safety P l a n (2004-2007) 
was a rather l imi ted attempt to address this persistent problem. 
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Chapter Summary 
The purpose of f i i i s chapter has been to examine the l i terature relat ing 
to par tnership w o r k i n g i n cr ime prevention. Some of th is literature 
has focused specifically u p o n developments i n par tnership work ing 
after the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act , w h i c h i s of par t icular relevance 
to the empi r ica l focus of this thesis. It has demonstrated that s u c h 
par tnership w o r k i n g has proven to be problematic for a number of 
different reasons, m a n y of w h i c h relate to difficulties i n the nature of 
government pol icy mak ing . 
In the second par t of the chapter, two different 'schools ' of literature 
regarding par tnership work ing were reviewed. The first school was the 
official, p rac t ica l l i terature w h i c h seeks to identify the 'cr i t ical success ' 
factors i n par tnership working . Th i s l i terature often has the purpose 
of guidance, seeking to encourage those involved i n par tnership 
work ing to adopt s u c h cr i t ica l success factors, though often there is a 
lack of clar i ty i n relat ion to precisely how these success factors can be 
replicated. The second school of l i terature was more cr i t ica l i n 
orientation, examin ing the way par tnership w o r k i n g is often hampered 
by inter-organisat ional a n d intra-organisat ional factors, as wel l as by 
environmental condit ions, w h i c h inc lude the context i n w h i c h 
govemment pol icy is made. Th is l i terature suggests any idea that 
par tnerships c a n be made to work s imply by emula t ing cer ta in cr i t ical 
success factors i s mis leading, as the capacity to emulate s u c h factors 
is const ra ined by the environmental , inter-organisat ional a n d in t ra-
organisat ional context i n w h i c h par tnerships m u s t operate. S u c h a 
point demonstrates the importance of first seeking to unders t and the 
context i n w h i c h par tnerships operate, thereby, informing the 
orientat ion of the empir ica l research a n d the methodological 
foundations, w h i c h w i l l be d iscussed i n more detai l i n the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4 - Methodology 
Introduction 
The m a i n purpose of this chapter is to describe, a n d justify, the 
research strategy. The research strategy is the means by w h i c h 
answers are sought to the research questions ra ised th rough the 
l i terature review a n d these questions, i n t u rn , relate to the general 
a ims of this research project, ar t iculated i n the Introduct ion. The 
research quest ions translate the a ims of the research project into a 
more specific set of relevant issues derived from exist ing knowledge i n 
relat ion to the chosen area of study, i n this case par tnership work ing 
i n cr ime prevention. B e i n g based u p o n exis t ing knowledge, and 
intended to b u i l d u p o n s u c h knowledge, these research questions 
provide the research project w i th a n 'evidence-based' orientation, 
w h i c h helps to just i fy the focus of the project. Pr ior to the ar t iculat ion 
of the research strategy, therefore, this chapter w i l l commence w i t h a 
statement of the research questions. 
The Research Questions 
The general a i m of this thesis is to explore the police service's 
accommodat ion of a mandate to engage i n par tnership work ing , as l a id 
down i m d e r the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act . The li terature review, 
conducted du r ing the last three chapters, has sought to 'unpack ' this 
general a i m through the examinat ion of relevant l i terature, a n d the 
subsequent themes a n d issues ra ised therein. Th i s examinat ion has 
enabled the author to be i n a pos i t ion to h ighl ight a number of 
research questions, to guide the research project, a n d to inform the 
research strategy set out i n the m a i n body of this chapter. 
The three chapters of the li terature review cover s imi la r g ro imd , albeit 
w i t h a different emphasis , or focus, w i t h i n each of them. 
Consequently, they touch u p o n a number of s imi la r themes and 
issues, thus , m a n y of the research questions set out below arise from 
issues covered i n different chapters, though some m a y relate more to 
issues ra ised only i n a single chapter. 
The background context to this thesis lies i n the much-documented 
observation that, pr ior to the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act , the 
par tnership approach to cr ime prevention failed to es tabl ish a strong 
foothold i n local practice, despite a l l the official suppor t w h i c h 
underp inned it , a n d despite the apparent en thus i a sm displayed for i t 
by m a n y practi t ioners. Consequently, a general research question, 
perhaps better seen as a clarif icat ion of the research a i m w h i c h then 
translates into a series of more specific questions, is 'whether 
par tnership work ing i n cr ime prevention now exists o n a firmer footing 
as a resul t of the implementat ion of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act ' . 
More specifically, given wha t is k n o w n about es tabl ished police 
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^barriers' s u c h as i so la t ionism, a cu l tu ra l preference for 'detectionism' 
a n d a n inc l ina t ion to regard the ca l l for par tnership w o r k i n g as part of 
the 'competitive threat ' w h i c h accompanies the shift to 'policing', 
something w h i c h challenges the police's sovereignty as the p r imary 
agency of loca l cr ime control , i t i s impor tant to es tabl ish 'whether 
par tnership work ing has occurred at a l l ' . The existence of C D R P s i n 
themselves shou ld not be mis taken as evidence for partnership 
work ing as C D R P s are ' ins t i tut ional structures ' , not necessari ly modes 
or phi losophies of w o r k i n g as such . 
A s s u m i n g , as a l l of the literature about the implementat ion of the 
1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t does, that par tnership work ing has 
occurred i n the wake of the 1998 Act , a number of more specific 
questions follow. These are l is ted as follows: 
1. 'Row is the police cont r ibut ion organised?' - considering 
evidence regarding the relative non-involvement a n d 'security 
ghettoisation' of police cr ime prevention departments and given 
the ambigui ty created by, inter a l ia , the shift to neighbourhood 
pol ic ing a n d the generalised adoption of cr ime management 
w i t h i n operat ional pol icing. 
2. 'To what extent does par tnership work ing through C D R P s 
reflect, a n d contribute, to the decentral isat ion of police service 
delivery th rough the body of police B C U s ? ' - par t icu lar ly given 
evidence that the pol icy of decentral isat ion is opposed by a 
police t radi t ion of corporate central isat ion? 
3. 'How far does the police service take cognisance of, or attempt to 
spread knowledge of, guidance on 'cr i t ical success factors' i n 
par tnership working? ' - i s sued by those s u c h as the Home Office 
a n d the A u d i t Commiss ion , par t icu lar ly i n relat ion to evidence 
that evaluations of par tnership w o r k i n g cont inue to identify 
l imi ta t ions i n loca l capacity? 
4. 'What posi t ion does the police service adopt w i t h i n the C D R P s ? ' -
evidence of police 'colonisat ion' or dominance of partnership 
agendas sits alongside evidence that the police service a n d local 
authori ty, by virtue of their responsible authori ty status, 
effectively act as 'joint leaders'. There i s also evidence other 
agencies do not participate i n par tnerships , either because they 
are diverted by their 'core business ' , or because they regard 
themselves as non-experts i n the field of cr ime prevention. 
5. F ina l ly , 'is the agenda of par tnerships local ly or nat ional ly set, 
a n d what is the consequence of this for par tnership working? ' -
given evidence that nat ional ly led performance management 
undermines the potential for local ly negotiated purpose? 
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Developing the Research Strategy 
Having establ ished the research questions the author is now i n a 
posi t ion to develop the research strategy, w h i c h is the means by w h i c h 
the research quest ions are to be answered. In developing s u c h a 
strategy, a range of considerations confronts the researcher a n d this 
chapter begins w i t h the pract ical a n d ethical considerations, w h i c h 
framed the research project. 
Practical Considerations 
A n y researcher i s l ike ly to be constrained by resource considerations. 
A researcher m a y wel l have a n idea regarding wha t they w o u l d l ike to 
do i n order to research their chosen topic, however, they m u s t also 
recognise the idea l needs to be squared w i t h the feasible. Th i s project 
is a n unfunded research project, w h i c h means the author is not i n a 
posi t ion to have others assist h i m w i t h the task of collecting, wr i t ing 
u p or ana lys ing the data. The author does have access to some 
organisat ional resources s u c h as the use of in te rna l e-mail or postal 
services, a n d l imi ted photocopying of things s u c h as official documents 
or questionnaires. However, these are str ict ly l imi ted a n d thus the 
p r inc ipa l resources at the author 's d isposal are h i s own self, a n d h is 
time. 
The fact the research has been conducted o n a part-t ime basis , fitted 
a round a full-t ime job, wh ich , i n practice, has often absorbed more 
hours than a full-t ime job conventionally, w o u l d do resul t ing i n l imi ted 
time available for the author to conduct the research. Th i s has placed 
considerable demands u p o n the author 's pa id leave, a n d has also 
required the research to be conducted over a m u c h longer period of 
time. In one sense this may be regarded as a weakness of the 
research, as d u r i n g the period covered by th is research the ' issues' 
under s tudy have rarely stood s t i l l due to intense legislative a n d policy 
activity, b r ing ing w i t h i t a host of changes to the role a n d funct ioning 
of C D R P s a n d indeed the police, w h i c h h a d a considerable bearing 
upon par tnership working . Fur thermore, the intensi ty of this policy 
activity made i t difficult for the author to decide exactly w h e n to leave 
the field, par t icu lar ly as part of the data collect ion (see below) involved 
drawing u p o n the autobiographical experiences of the au t i io r as a 
serving police officer, sometimes personal ly engaged w i t h the issues 
su r round ing par tnership work ing . However, s u c h experiences served 
as a constant check regarding the val id i ty of the data, collected at 
earlier points i n the research. 
F r o m another perspective, the enforced longi tud ina l nature of the 
research c o u l d be regarded as a strength as the context of constant 
adaptation to pol icy changes provided a more 'realistic ' backdrop for 
unders tanding the police's accommodat ion of the mandate to engage 
i n par tnership work ing , i n t u r n because s u c h pol icy change have been. 
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at least s ince the early 1990s, a recurrent feature of the police 
experience. A one-off 'snapshot ' of par tnership work ing w o u l d have 
r u n the r i s k of providing a n impress ion of coherence a n d solidity to the 
concept of par tnership work ing poss ibly more than , i n reality, i t 
actual ly meri ted. 
Another resource is the researcher's expertise, a n d there are two 
aspects to this . F i rs t ly , the author h a d previously obtained an 
undergraduate social science degree a n d a postgraduate degree i n 
social research, bo th obtained whi l s t s t i l l a serving police officer. The 
experience of obta in ing these degrees, wh i l s t s t i l l i n ful l t ime work, 
provided the author w i t h confidence that doctoral research was not 
beyond h is capabil i ty, both i n terms of fitting i t a round the 'day job' , 
and i n terms of endowing h i m w i t h the background knowledge and 
unders tand ing of var ious aspects of socia l science and socia l research. 
Presumably, l ike those who admit ted h i m to the Univers i ty of 
P lymou th to engage i n doctoral research, the author h a d some 
confidence i n h i s basic competence as a social science researcher. 
Fur thermore , s u c h competence was further developed through the 
background reading, w h i c h informed the l i terature review a n d allowed 
the development of more specific research questions, w h i c h helped to 
guide the author 's research endeavours. In effect, the questions 
served not only as questions, bu t also as 'clues ' regarding where to 
search for answers. The author's academic supervisor also provided a 
further 'reality check ' on the author 's developing knowledge. 
Secondly, the author is a serving police officer. O n the positive side, 
this provided h i m w i t h a n immers ion into the wor ld of pol ic ing, w h i c h 
gave h i m a certain ' insight ' a n d a n abi l i ty to unders t and partnership 
work ing from a police point of view. It also gave h i m easier access to 
the data, i n terms of h i s own relevant experiences, a n d i n terms of h i s 
abil i ty to make contact wi th , a n d obtain responses from, other police 
officers. E a c h of these positives, however, also br ings w i t h i t a 
potential negative. There is a possibi l i ty the ins ight gained from being 
a police officer cou ld lead to a 'police bias ' , w h i c h w o u l d undermine the 
objectivity a n d val idi ty of the research. 
The author was very conscious of the issue of possible bias , a l though, 
as seems inevitable i n social science, this issue is more complex than 
first appears to be the case. T h u s , whi le objectivity m a y be a worthy 
end to pursue , there is widespread agreement that pure objectivity and 
value-freedom is impossible i n social science and , not even necessari ly 
desirable, i f i t leads to a s i tuat ion where any c r i t i c i sm of the status 
quo is effectively muted (Gouldner, 1962). If the pu r su i t of objectivity 
is abandoned, however, the logical alternative of pure re la t ivism is 
certainly no more desirable, leading to a s i tua t ion where no account 
can be judged as being better t han any other. T h u s , for social 
research to be 'worth the effort', i t i s impor tant for the researcher to be 
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as open-minded a n d as detached as possible (Denscombe, 2002) and, 
i n th is regard, the author 's posi t ion as a serving police officer 
represents a potential problem. 
There is a danger, for example, of ' taking sides', par t icu lar ly i n a n 
organisat ion, w h i c h places s u c h cu l t u r a l importance on loyalty to 
colleagues a n d to the un i fo rm (Reiner, 2000). Th i s is exacerbated as a 
resul t of the author 's doctoral research fees be ing pa id by the police 
organisat ion, w h i c h may i ncu r a mora l obligation to pu t the police 
service i n a 'good light' , especially as the author 's interest i n obtaining 
a P h D is not entirely disconnected from aspirat ions for future career 
development. However throughout the project the author was 
conscious of Cresswell 's (1994: 153) in junct ion to the researcher to "be 
open to possibi l i t ies a n d see contrary or alternative explanat ion for the 
findings." 
In reality, there is no straightforward resolut ion to this problem. The 
researcher needs to acknowledge the 'possibil i ty ' of bias, w h i c h is 
exactly what the author has done at this point i n the thesis and the 
researcher needs to be self-critical i n re la t ion to h is value posi t ion i n 
this regard. The author drew u p o n the knowledge a n d experience of 
his academic supervisor to min imise the r i s k of bias creeping into his 
own unders tand ing of the da ta he collected a n d analysed. In addit ion, 
he also deliberately sought to view h imsel f as a n 'outsider ' (Schutz, 
1964), thereby treating the interpretations of h i s respondents as 
problematic a n d 'not taken-for-granted'. To some extent he was 
assisted i n adopt ing this role by the fact that, th rough m u c h of the 
period of the research, he he ld a posi t ion at police headquarters a n d 
thus to those o n the terri torial B C U s , who were the m a i n subjects of 
this research, he was to some extent indeed a n outsider. The author 
also decided to exclude from the research those officers w i t h w h o m he 
h a d previously served, and those who served on the B C U s where he 
h a d obtained most of h is operational experience of par tnership 
working . Whi le mit igat ing the issue i t certainly d i d not eliminate the 
problem of bias. 
The author i s aware, however, that the idea of a s ingular 'police' point 
of view is an over-simplification. More recent wri t ings on police 
cul ture , for example, show this cul ture i s not as monol i th ic as is 
soinetimes a s sumed (Foster, 2003). It c an vary by rank , gender, 
experience, specia l i sm and so on . The author recognises the 
possibi l i ty of bias, however, this m a y be less about h i m possessing a 
'police' point of view, a n d more about h i s en thus ia sm for the 
par tnership approach. A s noted i n the Introduct ion, the author 
genuinely believes that the police service can make a more effective 
contr ibut ion to pub l i c safety by work ing i n par tnership w i t h other 
agencies a n d he is mindfu l s u c h a viewpoint is by no means shared by 
a l l of h is colleagues. Consequently, a n d th is justif ies h i s exc lus ion of 
those ind iv idua ls a n d areas w i t h w h i c h he was most familiar, h is 
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concern was to be careful a n d not impose h i s normative support for 
par tnership w o r k i n g on others who m a y see matters rather differently. 
A s previously stated, there is no magica l so lu t ion to the potential 
problem of b ias i n socia l research, s temming from the imposs ib i l i ty of 
objectivity a n d value-freedom. The best that can be done is to 
recognise the possibi l i ty and to take s u c h steps as are possible to 
overcome it. O n balance the author believes that the possible benefits 
to be gained from h i s posi t ion as a serving police officer significantly 
outweigh the l ike ly dis-benefits w h i c h can , to some extent, be managed 
through careful a n d thoughtful research design a n d execution. 
Ethical Considerations 
"The w o r d 'ethics' often suggests a set of s tandards by w h i c h a 
par t icu lar group or communi ty decides to regulate i ts behaviour -
to d i s t ingu i sh what is legitimate or acceptable i n pu r su i t of their 
a ims from what i s not. Hence we ta lk of 'business ethics ' or 
'medical ethics'." (Flew 1984:112) 
Al though the author 's posi t ion as a serving police officer may place 
h i m i n a better posi t ion to access research par t ic ipants and to 
persuade them to participate i n h i s research, s u c h a fact does not 
render e thical considerations any less relevant. If anything, they 
become more enhanced. E th ic s i s largely a matter of pr inciple , 
however, i t is also a pract ical matter i n a sense that good ethical 
research helps to consolidate t rus t a n d receptiveness to future 
research projects. Therefore, ethics "arise w h e n we try to decide 
between one course of act ion a n d another not i n terms of expediency 
or efficiency bu t by reference to s tandards of wha t is mora l ly r ight or 
wrong." (Barnes 1979: 16) 
B y contrast, the reverse scenario of une th ica l research m a y produce 
bad experiences, w h i c h make part ic ipants far less l ike ly to want to 
participate i n future research projects. The researcher, therefore, has 
a duty to the socia l research communi ty to ma in t a in h igh ethical 
s tandards. 
The majority of e thical considerations relate to the way the researcher 
deals w i t h research part icipants , a n d the key pr inc ip le is , part icipant 's 
rights s h o u l d not be infringed and they s h o u l d suffer no h a r m as a 
result of the research process. Lee E l l i s (1994) notes, "If subjects are 
given only general, bu t s t i l l accurate, information about the purpose of 
the s tudy a n d there is no significant r i sk of emotional or phys ica l 
ha rm, the s tudy w o u l d not be considered une th ica l , especially i f 
subjects are de briefed at the end of th is par t ic ipat ion." (281) 
E th i c a l guidance is derived from codes of ethics i s sued by bodies s u c h 
as the B r i t i s h Sociological Associa t ion or the B r i t i s h Society of 
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Criminology. In addi t ion, the Univers i ty of P lymou th operates a policy 
of requ i r ing ethical clearance for research projects involving h u m a n 
par t ic ipants , d rawing u p o n the codes i s sued by s u c h bodies. A s 
Denscombe (2002) points out, these are "codes" a n d not "rules", 
h ighl ight ing pr inciples that shou ld normal ly be adhered to unless 
there are par t icu lar ly strong, justif iable grounds for not so doing. Th is 
research has embedded ethical pr inciples i n the following ways: 
Integrity 
The pr inc ip le of integrity requires that research par t ic ipants shou ld 
not be deceived regarding the purposes of the research a n d the 
researcher shou ld provide a n honest account of wha t the research is 
about. In a sense this i s acknowledged i n the work of Mack ie (1997) 
w h e n not ing the following: 
" E a c h person's special values w i l l help to determine h is moral i ty i n the 
broad sense; h i s actions w i l l be guided not s imply by wha t he wants 
bu t also, to some extent, by the endeavour to realise i n some degree 
whatever he sees as good." (151). 
In th is project, the author was able to clarify the purpose of the 
research i n a wri t ten preamble to the questionnaire (see below), a n d i n 
a verbal in t roduct ion to the semi-s t ructured interviews (see below). 
However, as is acknowledged, there are l imi ts to how far the purposes 
of the research c a n be communica ted to the more unwi t t ing 
par t ic ipants whose actions const i tuted a n d informed the authors own 
observed experiences from the 'field'. 
A t available opportunit ies the author let i t be k n o w n he was 
conduc t ing doctoral research, however, s u c h informat ion d id not 
necessari ly percolate through to everyone. The potential l imi ta t ion of 
this was offset by the relatively l i a r m l e s s ' nature of this research, by 
other e thical safeguards a round issues of anonymity and 
confidentiality (see below) a n d by the advantage that l imited 
informat ion about the research al lowed the au thor to research the 
police response to par tnership work ing i n i ts 'na tura l ' setting, w i th the 
researcher's presence caus ing m i n i m a l d i s rup t ion to actions w h i c h 
may otherwise be modified i n the researcher's more vis ible and 
manifest presence. Th is d id not make the research covert as such , bu t 
merely provided l imi ted information about i t and , as Denscombe 
(2002) observes, researchers rarely offer a clear account to part icipants 
of wha t they are 'really' looking for anyway for fear that s u c h absolute 
honesty m a y compromise the val idi ty of the da ta subsequent ly gained. 
Contidentiality and Anonymity 
A s noted above, one of the factors, w h i c h l imi t s the 'ha rm' of si tuations 
where respondents or subjects are not fully appr ised of the purposes of 
- 83 -
the research is confidentiality a n d anonymity. Init ial ly, then, this 
research endorses a basic premise identified by E l l i s (1994: 280): 
"Subjects who agree to participate i n a social science s tudy have a 
fundamental r ight to assume that they w i l l not be t r icked, humi l ia ted 
or emotionally traumatised". 
The assurance of confidentiality means ensur ing that da ta w i l l not 
l e a k out ' to others a n d this was an assurance the author felt i t 
necessary to robus t ly give, par t icular ly given h i s role as a serving 
police officer. In order to ascertain cand id responses the author 
needed to gain respondents trust, a n d there was a chance s u c h t rust 
w o u l d be denied i f i t was thought that the author w o u l d pass on 
information, w h i c h might damage par t ic ipants career prospects, 
whether they were senior or j u n i o r to the authors own rank . Wi thout 
trust , par t ic ipants m a y be more inc l ined to offer the 'par ly l ine ' on 
par tnership work ing , tel l ing the author what they t h i n k he ought to 
know, rather t han what they real ly th ink a n d do. A s s u r i n g 
par t ic ipants the da ta w o u l d only be u sed for the purpose of wr i t ing u p 
a thesis a n d that the data w o u l d be kept secure i n a locked fil ing 
cabinet to be destroyed on complet ion of the research was a way of 
t ry ing to ga in trust , bu t of course no guarantee of it. A further 
guarantee of anonymi ty was no ind iv idua l cou ld be identified from the 
wri t ten u p research due to the j ud i c ious use of pseudonyms, w h i c h 
m a y also have helped. The promise of anonymity comes at a cost, 
however, as i t reduces the opportuni ty for others to check the val idi ty 
of the research findings. 
In th is project, the importance at tr ibuted to anonjonity led the author 
to focus h i s da ta collection across a number of different geographical 
locations w i t h i n the police force area, thereby sacrif icing the depth 
w h i c h might have been achieved from exploring experiences of 
par tnership w o r k i n g i n a single B C U or distr ict area. Yet the approach 
adopted was thought to be a necessary sacrifice, as par t ic ipants i n a 
single B C U area w o u l d have been more easily identified, no matter how 
wel l i t was 'disguised ' through anonjonity. Thought was also given to 
anonymis ing the police force area, as many studies have previously 
done. However, due to the his tory of Devon a n d Cornwal l 
Constabulary , a n d its strong associat ion w i t h early developments i n 
communi ty pol ic ing, not to ment ion the author 's own emplo5niient 
w i t h i n the force a n d h i s use and analysis of documents (see below) 
w h i c h are i n the publ ic domain , the anonymisa t ion of the police force 
area was thought to be largely unnecessary for the purpose of this 
thesis. 
Informed Consent 
It i s one th ing to tel l par t ic ipants wha t the research is about, however, 
th is is not sufficient for achieving the pr inciple of informed consent, as 
Digwal l states, ". .ethical fieldwork tu rns on the mora l sense a n d 
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integrity of the researcher negotiating the social contract w h i c h leads 
h i s subject to expose their lives." (1980: 885). Th i s requires the 
par t ic ipant to recognise they have a r ight to refuse to participate, or to 
wi thdraw at any poin t shou ld they decide to do so. Th i s was even 
more cr i t ica l as the author is a r anked officer w i t h i n the Cons tabulary 
a n d as s u c h c o u l d be perceived as hav ing an organisat ional seniority 
over a large n u m b e r of the research subjects. 
In some cases par t ic ipants are asked to formally indicate their consent 
by s igning a document , however, this was considered unnecessary and 
even poss ibly counterproductive because i t provided a formal record of 
part icipant 's roles, w h i c h m a y represent a potential perceived threat to 
their anon5nnous par t ic ipat ion. Rather than provid ing a formal 
document, therefore, the author reminded par t ic ipants of their rights 
on the quest ionnaire (see below) a n d i n the semi-s t ructured interviews 
(see below), a n d the author provided them w i t h h i s contact details to 
unde rp in th is . In the event, nobody made use of th is opportuni ty to 
wi thdraw, though not everybody who was contacted agreed to 
participate i n the research. The robustness of th is approach was 
intended to negate threats to socia l research ar t iculated by Warwick ' s 
concems that "social research involving deception a n d man ipu la t ion 
ul t imately helps produce a society of C3niics, l iars a n d manipula tors 
and undermines the trust, w h i c h is essential to a j u s t socia l order." 
(1982: 58) 
Selecting the Research Methods 
There is a wide range of research methods i n the socia l sciences, 
w h i c h may be d ravm u p o n by the would-be researcher i n developing 
their research strategy. The choice of methods is par t ly dependent 
u p o n the sorts of prac t ica l a n d ethical considerat ions d i scussed above, 
however, i t i s also the case that there is , or shou ld be, a fit between 
problem a n d method. Th is i s to say some methods are better designed 
to fit par t icu lar k i n d s of research problems and research purposes. 
Al though some research has been conducted" into the nature of 
par tnership w o r k i n g i n the wake of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act , 
m u c h of th is was produced after the author started th is research 
project, a n d the author is not aware of research w h i c h has taken a n 
explici t 'police angle ' o n the issue. Consequent ly, whi le the author 
knew from the l i terature that par tnership work ing pr ior to the 1998 
Ac t was problematic , i t was not evident whether i t cont inued to be 
afterwards. The very different condit ions established by the A c t meant 
there was a s t rong exploratory orientat ion to the research. 
In addi t ion, the author was deal ing wi th a relatively intangible 
phenomenon, namely 'partnership working ' . A s the literature 
demonstrates, par tnership w o r k i n g c a n take very different forms, a n d 
it cannot easily be measured or even observed, par t icu lar ly as the 
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resul t of previously identified phenomena s u c h as 'conflict avoidance', 
w h i c h points to a gap between appearance a n d reali ty i.e. wha t on the 
surface c a n appear to be consensua l is not once one scratches beneath 
it. Crawford's (2007) point, h in ted at by others, i n relat ion to the 
compliance menta l i ty of C D R P s suggested moreover the need to go 
beyond surface appearance. W h i l s t C D R P s might exist as ins t i tu t ional 
s t ructures where agencies meet u p every so often a n d at tach their 
corporate identi ty, as a C D R P , to 'products ' s u c h as a n audi t or a 
strategy, these do not amount i n themselves to par tnership work ing 
beyond a superf icial level at w h i c h point compliance is about fulfill ing 
(minimally) the letter, and not necessari ly the spir i t of the law. A l l 
these things suggested the need to use methods, w h i c h were adaptive 
a n d flexible, capable of teasing out issues, w h i c h existed more at an 
informal level, rather than i n formal representations. 
W i t h specific regard to the research questions, the in tent ion i n seeking 
to es tabl ish whether par tnership w o r k i n g real ly happens at a l l is to go 
beyond manifest appearances, as i s the in tent ion to explore the 
posi t ion of the police service w i t h i n par tnerships , whether as a leader ' 
or genuine partner. The questions of how par tnership w o r k i n g fits the 
decentral isat ion of pol ic ing th rough B C U s , a n d whether par tnership 
work ing reflects loca l or na t iona l agendas, are both pol i t ica l , 'sensitive' 
questions w h i c h are un l ike ly to be amenable to more 'formal ' methods 
such- as quest ionnaires or s t ruc tured interviews, where the problem of 
social desirabi l i ty is most l ike ly to rear i ts head as part icipants 
respond w i t h wha t they t h ink they shou ld say, rather t h a n w i t h what 
they really th ink . O n the other hand , the quest ion of how the police 
cont r ibut ion to par tnership work ing is organised is more of a Tactual ' 
question, u n l i k e l y to be controversial , a n d more l ike ly to be open to 
explorat ion th rough more formal methods, as wel l as through the 
consul ta t ion of more factual sources s u c h as official documents . 
Therefore, the research is broadly of a n exploratory nature, oriented 
towards descr ibing the nature of par tnership w o r k i n g from the police 
service's posi t ion. Some of th is involves 'factual ' descr ipt ion, i n terms 
of who is involved, i n wha t capacity a n d i n wha t ways. Whi l s t some 
involves probing at the way the par tnership work ing mandate has been 
interpreted by the police, par t icular ly i n the context of other influences 
or pressures o n pol ic ing, i n the form of govemment pol icy a n d the 
decentral isat ion of police service delivery. It requires looking at the 
way par tnership work ing m a y be represented to the outside wor ld , bu t 
i t also means exploring what 'really' happens, informal ly a n d beneath 
the surface from the police perspective. Th i s need to 'unders tand ' 
par tnership work ing suggests a s trong interpretivist orientat ion to the 
research a n d thus the sui tabi l i ty of more ethnographic methods, 
i nc lud ing semi - s tmc tu red interviewing a n d observation. 
In view of this character isat ion of the research problem, the author 
selected the following research methods: 
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Firs t ly , the analys is of official documents per ta in ing to the police 
service's role i n cr ime prevention par tnerships , pay ing par t icular 
attention to the way that s u c h par tnership w o r k i n g is represented. 
Secondly, the use of semi-s t ructured interviews w i t h representatives of 
the police service w i t h vary ing experiences of par tnership work ing i n 
cr ime prevention a n d i n the wake of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t , 
w i t h a view to unders tand ing their interpretat ion of the par tnership 
mandate. Th i s method for accessing opin ion is a preferred opt ion over 
s t ruc tured interviews because "questions are normal ly specified, but 
the interviewer i s more free to probe beyond the answers i n a manner , 
w h i c h w o u l d appear prejudicia l to the a ims of s tandardisa t ion and 
comparabil i ty." (May, 19.97: 111) Thirdly , the use of personal 
observation i n the role of participant-as-observer (Gold, 1958), where 
the author h a d been i n a posi t ion to observe par tnership work ing , and 
police responses to i t at first h a n d i n the course of h i s occupat ional 
duties. Four th ly , the adminis t ra t ion of a questionnaire survey i n order 
to ascertain 'factual ' information regarding police officer involvement i n 
par tnership work ing , their preparat ion for i t a n d their attitudes 
towards it . 
However, this mul t i -method approach was not implemented 
concurrent ly. The documentary analysis was conducted in i t ia l ly , and 
sought to es tabl ish how par tnership work ing was represented by the 
police service, as we l l as es tabl ishing some factual details about police 
pol icy (on paper i f not i n practice) towards cr ime prevention 
par tnerships . The semi-s t ructured interviews provided a n opportuni ty 
to ask practi t ioners about their experiences a n d opinions of 
par tnership work ing , a n d was informed by issues identified i n the 
literature review a n d were conducted over the course of the project, 
w i t h those interviewed i n the latter stages receiving more probing and 
better-informed interviews than those interviewed at the beginning. 
The author 's own observations occurred both at the beginning and end 
of the period covered by the research, w h e n he was i n operational 
posi t ions i n terri torial B C U s , however, not w h e n serving at 
headquarters. The questionnaire survey, finally, was adminis tered i n 
the latter par t of the research project, informed by some of the issues 
uncovered by the earlier research methods, a n d u s e d to explore these 
issues across a sl ightly wider canvas. 
The use of research methods gives the researcher a n opportuni ty to 
collect data, the analysis of w h i c h w i l l assist i n the answer ing of the 
research questions. Th is ensures that the research w i l l be based u p o n 
more than j u s t anecdotal evidence or common sense, yet i n order for 
the research to have credibil i ty, the methods have to be u s e d w i t h due 
regard to cer ta in 'scientific' considerat ions or pr inciples . A s noted i n 
the Introduction, a n d above, the a i m of this research is one w h i c h 
lends itself most iy to a n interpretivist epistemology, par t icu lar ly as i t 
deals w i t h s u c h a n intangible phenomenon as 'partnership working ' , 
w h i c h does not exist as a n easily measurable ' thing out there'. 
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Al though , as also noted above, there are certain aspects to partnership 
v^^orking that is more Tactual ' a n d measurable . 
Interpret ivism is often presented as a n antidote to the scientific 
'pretensions' of pos i t iv ism, w h i c h perceives the wor ld as knowable and 
governable th rough theoretical laws, i n the same way that the na tu ra l 
wor ld is thought to be. Th i s m a y be taken to imp ly that research, 
w h i c h does not follow strict posit ivist ic l ines, does not need to be 
'scientific ' as such . However, l i i e benefits acc ru ing from this approach 
are that "categories emerge from informants , rather than [being] 
identified a p r io r i by the researcher. Th is emergence provides r i ch 
'text b o u n d ' informat ion leading to patterns or theories that help 
expla in phenomenon." (Cresswell, 1994: 156) 
However, s u c h a n impl ica t ion r i sks throwing out the (scientific) baby 
w i t h the (positivistic) ba th water. P u t another way, one does not have 
to be a posit ivist to acknowledge the importance of cer ta in scientific 
pr inciples , even i f s u c h pr inciples are sometimes h a r d to at tain. The 
scientific pr inciples of greatest importance are rel iabi l i ty, val id i ty and 
generalisabili ty. In wha t follows, considerat ion is given to the way 
s u c h pr inciples have been bu i l t i n to, or considered, by the research 
design a n d selection of research methods. 
ReliabUity 
A research method, or ins t rument , is reliable i f consistent a n d capable 
of p roduc ing the same resul ts w h e n measur ing the same phenomenon 
i n the same s i tuat ion. Self-evidently, rel iabi l i ty is a va lued qual i ty i n 
socia l research as, i n theory, another researcher s h o u l d be able to 
follow the same methods the author has u s e d i n th is s tudy, a n d arrive 
at the same results , a l l other things being equal . Rel iabi l i ty , however, 
is more represented as a qual i ty of quantitative methods of social 
research than that of qualitative methods, as quantitative methods 
tend to be formally set down, pre-determined a n d open to repl icat ion. 
Whereas qualitative approaches, typically, are less l ike ly to be clearly 
set down a n d are more adaptive following the bot tom-up approach, for 
example, grounded theory (Glaser a n d St rauss , 1967). Quanti tat ive 
methods, i n themselves, are less reliable requi r ing t h e m to be wel l 
designed as the research subject is not able to a sk for further 
clarif ication, a l though this may be somewhat mit igated th rough the 
appropriate wording of questions i n order they are unambiguous and 
incapable of being misinterpreted. Pi lo t ing obviously has a n important 
par t to p lay here. 
Pi lo t ing played a c ruc i a l role i n the development of the questionnaire 
for th i s project a n d a cross section of staff were selected to pi lot this 
da ta collecting tool to ensure the questions delivered the requisite 
c lar i ty and pert inent data cou ld be retrieved. Feedback i n this regard 
was positive. However, m a n y recipients i n the pi lot believed the 
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document was to long requir ing a significant t ime to complete. This , I 
was advised, w o u l d affect people's wi l l ingness to complete the 
questionnaire accurately. In addi t ion, the organisat ion at this time 
was consu l t ing on a significant range of issues a n d there was a danger 
of staff receiving th is being subject to survey overload. Fo r this reason 
the quest ionnaire length was reduced a n d some of the more qualitative 
sections removed. 
Two of the methods u t i l i sed i n th is mul t i -method design are more 
l ikely to be reliable t han the others. The documentary analysis , for 
example, entails a n examinat ion of official reports i n order to identify 
aspects where par tnership work ing is referred to, either through use of 
the te rm par tnership or through reference to statutory obligations 
incur red by the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act . It w o u l d not be difficult 
for another researcher to replicate this approach, though i t was not 
deemed necessary i n th is research to under take this i n s u c h a formal 
way that i t resul ted i n some formal, quantitative content analysis . The 
interest, rather, was i n how par tnership work ing was represented i n 
such documents , a n d this i s more open to interpretat ion, a n d thus 
somewhat less open to reliable repl icat ion. The survey questionnaire 
was pre-determined i n the sense that i t was test ing or explor ing issues 
w h i c h h a d been identified i n other parts of the research, a n d this 
made it more reliable as a method. 
However, re l iabi l i ty is not guaranteed i n the soc ia l wor ld due to the 
unpredic tabi l i ty of the social wor ld . It is one thing, for example, to 
weigh a piece of rock several t imes a n d arrive at the same weight each 
time, however, i t is quite another to ask a police officer about their 
t ra ining i n par tnership work ing e.g. they may grow bored of answering 
the same quest ion i n the same way. Al so , i t is quite unreal is t ic to 
expect, as the cr i ter ion of rel iabi l i ty generally does, that a measur ing 
ins t rument w i l l y ie ld the same measurement w h e n u s e d i n different 
but s imi la r contexts, as social contexts always vary. Th i s i s supported 
by M a y (1997: 130) when he suggests that "data derived from 
interviews are not s imply 'accurate' or 'distorted' pieces of information, 
but provide the researcher w i t h a means of ana lys ing the ways i n 
w h i c h people consider events a n d relat ionships a n d the reasons they 
offer for doing so." (130) 
In this research project, for example, i t was very apparent that the 
phenomenon unde r investigation, namely par tnership work ing , was 
constantly changing as the mandate was t ranslated into experience 
and as the mandate changed as the resul t of new pol icy developments. 
If one took 'snapshots ' of each of the dates w h e n three-year audits 
were produced, o n the first of A p r i l 1999, 2002 a n d 2005 , i n each 
instance the character of par tnership work ing was quite different a n d 
any measur ing ins t rument w o u l d have to deal w i t h s u c h difference, 
w h i c h w o u l d have h a d noth ing to do w i t h the rel iabil i ty, or otherwise, 
of the research ins t rument . Foster (2006) makes m u c h the same point 
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w h e n he says that possible checks o n reliabil i ty, s u c h as ethnographic 
re-studies of the same ins t i tu t ion under taken at a different t ime, are 
un l ike ly to be conclusive because of the l ike l ihood of changes having 
occurred i n some aspect of the inst i tut ion 's environment. 
The other two research ins t ruments , namely the semi-s t ructured 
interviews a n d observation, are not reliable i n the posi t ivis t ic sense. 
Another researcher observing the same contexts wou ld , doubtless,-
have identified different phenomena to the author, whi le the drift of a 
semi-s t ructured interview conversat ion w o u l d inevi tably have been 
different i f under t aken by a different researcher. However, this bias of 
personal interest is one, w h i c h m u s t be acknowledged whenever an 
' interpretation' of da ta is under taken a n d as B r y m a n et a l . (1994: 224) 
note; "The determining factor often seems to be the frequency wi th 
w h i c h something is observed or is sa id i n interviews and the 
fieldworker's conceptual elaboration of the phenomenon." 
The au thor was very aware of h i s own biases as a s t rong advocate of 
par tnership work ing , a phi losophy not necessari ly shared by a l l police 
officers. 
Acknowledgement of s u c h a bias led h i m to be extremely mindfu l w i th 
regard to the over i n c l u s i o n of observed data w i t h i n the f inal thesis. 
A s a serving police officer, the author was able to observe police 
officers under t ak ing or t a lk ing about par tnership w o r k i n g i n their day-
to-day w o r k i n g lives. M i n d f u l that he h imsel f was a n open advocate of 
par tnership work ing i t was impor tant that personal bias d id not affect 
observed behaviour or dialogue to fully exploit the opportuni ty of 
observing subjects i n a natural is t ic setting. Whi le ethical ly the author 
was comfortable w i t h accessing da ta v i a this method, i t was not over 
ut i l i sed. However, i t d id serve to provide a degree of confidence 
regarding data being d rawn from other da ta sources and the 
subsequent conclus ions . B y not i nc lud ing observed data, to a great 
degree, i n the thesis i t w o u l d be difficult to suggest personal 
observation da ta was skewed by any inherent belief systems of the 
author. 
The researcher, therefore, has to acknowledge s u c h methods, as they 
are relatively uns t ruc tured , are therefore less reliable, however, that 
does not necessari ly make t i i em of less use. 
Their use i s jus t i f ied by reference to the a ims a n d objectives of the 
intended research and , i n th is case, since a n u m b e r of these objectives 
necessitates the author seeking to identify the police's unders tandings 
of and , meanings at t r ibuted to, par tnership work ing . A s a resul t the 
selected methods m u s t be necessari ly uns t ruc tu red , a n d thus 
unrel iable , however, attempts can nevertiieless be made to maximise 
reliabil i ty. A s Denscombe (2002) points out, as the rel iabil i ty of 
uns t ruc tu red methods is threatened by the interpretative biases of the 
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researcher, researchers need to use what he cal ls "low inference 
indicators" w h e n descr ibing their data, so the da ta i s as faithfully 
reported as possible, w i t h the m i n i m u m amount of interpretation. In a 
s imi la r way, W i l s o n a n d Sapsford (2006) suggest those employing 
natural is t ic methods need to provide a reflexive account of the context 
i n w h i c h the research was conducted, a n d the procedures followed, 
though th is is as m u c h a n issue for val idi ty of w h i c h rel iabi l i ty is an 
aspect an jway (Foster, 2006). 
Validity 
Val id i ty is perhaps the most impor tant scientific cr i ter ion against 
w h i c h research is judged. V a l i d research is research, w h i c h is 
essentially true, descr ibing the subject matter of the research as i t is , 
rather than , as the researcher might prefer to see i t , or as i t might 
appear i n ' common sense'. Fo r interpretivists who subscr ibe to the 
view that reali ty is socially constructed, the idea of t ru th or val idi ty is 
problematic, however, as Denscombe (2002) points out, this does not 
necessitate the abandonment of the pr inciple . Rather, for 
interpretivists the t ask is to 'infer' val idi ty, rather t h a n ever to 'prove' 
it. There are elements of this research project, a l though not 
necessari ly a l l of it, w h i c h very m u c h fit this idea of inference rather 
t han absolute p roo f 
A start ing poin t i n the pu r su i t of val id i ty is the need to collect the 
correct indicators of the phenomena under investigation. Glaser and 
St rauss (1967) note that "one of the major goals of qualitative research 
is the generation of concepts that can form the bu i ld ing blocks of 
theory. Init ial ly, concepts are l ikely to be little more t h a n extensions of 
codes; at a later stage more abstract conceptual isat ion is l ike ly to be 
possible." 
In this research project, the m a i n phenomenon is par tnership working , 
w h i c h is not i n itself measurable as a ' thing'. The researcher, 
therefore, has to rely u p o n indirect indicators s u c h as police officer 
unders tandings a n d experiences of, a n d atti tudes towards, 
par tnership work ing a n d its wider impac t a n d significance. General ly 
speaking, research is more l ikely to be va l id i f phenomena are 
researched i n their na tu ra l setting yet, as noted above, there are 
obvious prac t ica l l imi t s to being able to access par tnership work ing i n 
i ts na tu ra l setting, even i f the researcher were to k n o w wha t that was. 
Par tnership work ing is often equated wi th inter-agency forums, 
however, as Crawford (1998) has made clear there is also a n informal 
element to par tnership work ing w h i c h makes i t very dangerous, 
conceptual ly speaking, to reduce par tnership w o r k i n g to the 
bureaucrat ic procedures of s u c h forums, par t icu lar ly when the same 
author therein identifies strategies of conflict avoidance suggesting 
that many of the 'true' aspects of par tnership work ing r ema in h idden 
from them. There are also ethical considerat ions, w h i c h as noted 
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above, make it unwise for the author as a serving police officer to 
research i n d i v i d u a l C D R P s i n specific detail . 
Researching par tnership work ing i n its na tu r a l sett ing is interpreted 
by the au thor as u s i n g natura l is t ic research methods, capable of 
penetrat ing the nuanced poli t ics of par tnership w o r k i n g w h i c h are 
un l ike ly to reveal themselves i n more formal, s t ruc tured methods 
where there is a h igh l ike l ihood of procedura l reactivity (Wilson a n d 
Sapsford, 2006) and , specifically, a l ike l ihood par t ic ipants may seek to 
conceal their ' true' unders tandings of par tnership work ing . Fo r the 
author, this meant u s i n g relatively loose, s emi - s tmc tu red interviews 
w h i c h , as far as possible, approximated conversations about 
par tnership w o r k i n g w h i c h the author, nevertheless, sought to control 
the direct ion of to ensure the issues covered by the li terature, and 
unde rp inn ing the var ious research questions, were to a greater or 
lesser extent covered i n the conversation. 
Whi le the au thor was mindfu l of the possible bias w h i c h cou ld exist 
because of h i s s tatus as a police officer, he was of the op in ion that h is 
status as a police officer was also a n advantage, as i t enhanced the 
na tu ra l i sm of the research context. A s M a y tells u s "quite s imply, i t 
m a y not be appropriate for a grey sui ted person more famil iar w i t h the 
deviants of the f inancia l wor ld to interview hel ls angels about their 
beliefs a n d actions." (1997: 115) The interviews were, from this point 
of view, conversations between colleagues i n famil iar work 
sur roundings , albeit ones where the par t ic ipants knew the author was 
s imul taneous ly act ing as a researcher. A l t h o u g h this was obviously 
more l ike ly to be the case w i t h the l imi ted par t ic ipant observation 
under taken towards the end of the research project, the author was to 
some extent able to 'blend into the background ' , thereby reducing (but 
certainly never eliminating) the amount of personal reactivity (Wilson 
a n d Sapsford, 2006) w h i c h tends to accompany less s tmc tu red 
natura l is t ic methods. 
For m u c h of wha t was sought for this research project, then, 
natural is t ic methods were believed to provide the most appropriate 
means of accessing the best indictors of the phenomena under 
investigation. F o r more 'factual ' elements, for example identifying the 
amount of t ra in ing par t ic ipants h a d received i n par tnership working, 
more s t m c t u r e d methods, specifically a quest ionnaire survey, were 
considered appropriate, a l though this carries the c o n c e m of 
procedural reactivity, for example 'survey fatigue' w h i c h m a y reduce, 
a n d thus bias, response rates as wel l as encouraging less 'honest' 
answers. 
The questionnaire survey element of this research was in t roduced i n 
order to es tabl ish the wider appl icabi l i ty of f indings emerging from the 
interview research, par t icu lar ly about the apparent l ack of t ra in ing for 
par tnership work ing disclosed by interview subjects. Whi le 
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acknowledging that this posit ivist approach m a y not be the most 
appropriate ine thod to gain ' in-depth ' data, i t d id provide a method to 
sample more factual data of this k i n d across a m u c h wider cross 
section of the police organisat ion. 
The quest ionnaire (see Append ix 1) was designed p r imar i ly as a 'tick-
box' style to try a n d negate recipient 'survey fatigue'. Fol lowing its 
cons t ruc t ion i t was piloted o n some colleagues, a n d following minor 
adjustments that reduced its overall length i t was then dis t r ibuted to a 
sample of officers. Dis t r ibu t ion was guided by a r a n d o m stratified 
sampl ing technique, w i th stratification by rank. U t i l i s i ng personnel 
staffing l is ts i t was possible to randomly select officers, a n d i n the end 
145 quest ionnaires were dis t r ibuted. It was somewhat gratifying to 
record a 5 5 % re tu rn rate of a round 80 completed papers. 
A l though a significant amount of the mater ia l from the questionnaire 
has not been displayed w i t h i n this thesis, the author believes that this 
is just if iable o n the grounds that the da ta strongly confirmed what was 
being ascer ta ined from the interview data. A s such , it. was felt 
recording 'supportive ' questionnaire da ta w i t h i n the thesis w o u l d not 
necessari ly add any more weight to the emerging findings. W h a t i t d id 
serve to achieve, however, was to enable the author to be far more 
confident about the validi ty a n d generalisabili ty of the interview data 
along w i t h the conclus ions d rawn from the final analys is . 
Another means of inferring da ta val id i ty is v i a t r iangula t ion (Denzin, 
1970), descr ibed by Denscombe (2002: 104) as "coming at the same 
th ing from a different angle". In this research project, a n element of 
method t r iangula t ion was in t roduced. For example, the interview data 
cou ld be compared wi th the observational da ta to es tabl ish whether 
the issues emanat ing from the interviews were be ing experienced by, 
or observed by, the author i n h i s own autobiographical observations. 
S imi lar ly , interview data regarding police t ra in ing a n d preparat ion for 
par tnership w o r k i n g cou ld be compared w i t h s imi la r da ta derived from 
the quest ionnaire survey. Where s imi la r findings emerge from the use 
of these different methods, one can be more confident i n relat ion to 
inferring val idi ty, a l though never cer ta in of do ing so, par t icu lar ly from 
a n interpretivist perspective. 
D a t a m a y also be considered more l ike ly to be va l i d i f regularit ies are 
identified, not only across different methods, bu t also w i t h i n methods. 
Thus , i f a proport ion of the 30 interview par t ic ipants make s imi la r 
points or observations regarding par tnership w o r k i n g then the data 
may be more va l id , a l though of course this cou ld be the consequence 
of the (unreliable) method. Relatively unprompted regularit ies from 
relatively uns t ruc tu red methods, however, give the researcher a 
certain 'proof a n d confidence i n relat ion to va l id data, even i f i t is not 
beyond dispute. 
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The identif ication of regularities i n research findings takes the 
researcher into the domain of data analysis . H o w does the researcher 
k n o w the analys is of the data is val id? Denscombe (2002) suggests a 
number of approaches. 'Cri ter ion val idi ty ' involves compar ing title data 
against external benchmarks , w h i c h p resumably inc ludes existing 
knowledge. Th i s may be less feasible for this research project as such 
knowledge of par tnership work ing i n the wake of the 1998 Cr ime and 
Disorder A c t is very l imi ted , a l though, i t m a y be that issues identified 
before 1998, s u c h as the idea of police colonisat ion m a y s t i l l be 
mapped onto the present context. M e m b e r val idi ty ' involves checking 
the da ta w i t h ' informed others', to check whether the findings square 
w i t h their own unders tanding of, i n this case, par tnership working. 
The author was able to infer member val idi ty by d i scuss ing his 
emergent research findings w i t h police colleagues who h a d some 
experience of par tnership working, yet, who were not themselves 
par t ic ipants i n the research a n d he found widespread agreement wi th 
h i s f indings i n s u c h discuss ions . Th i s k i n d of 'reality check ' was also 
a feature of the interview method, where the au thor was able to reflect 
back his unders tand ing of the par t ic ipants ' unders tandings of 
par tnership work ing , to ensure he h a d grasped the salient features. 
Generalisability 
It is conceivable for research findings to be va l id yet not generalisable. 
One may gain a va l id account of par tnership work ing , as i t relates to 
par t ic ipants i n this research project, however, i t may bare little 
relat ion to par tnership work ing as i t appertains to other police officers 
serving elsewhere w i t h i n the Devon a n d C o r n w a l l Constabulary , or 
elsewhere i n E n g l a n d and Wales, where the par tnership work ing 
requirements of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t apply. Yet i t 
remains h ighly desirable for research findings to be generalisable. One 
strong reason for under tak ing research is to obta in knowledge w h i c h 
cou ld be appl ied i n other contexts, to be able to say that the way 
par tnership work ing operates i n this research site is s imi la r to the way 
i t works elsewhere, a n d thus that one's theories are more widely 
applicable. 
The established way of seeking generalisabil i ty i s to ensure the 
research site is representative of the popula t ion to w h i c h one wou ld 
w i s h to generalise a n d this is largely a n issue of sampl ing . In this 
project, th is i ssue was complicated by the ambigui ty sur rounding , not 
only wha t the research site was, bu t also wha t the popula t ion was. 
This research project was not, s tr ict ly speaking, a case s tudy as 
responses were sought from police officers who h a d h a d par tnership 
work ing experience 'across a number ' of C D R P s w i t h i n the police force 
area and the idea of researching a single C D R P was explici t ly rejected 
for reasons already stated. However, i n so far as the research took 
place w i t h i n a single Cons tabulary area, the research cou ld be seen as 
a case s tudy of par tnership work ing from the police's point of view, the 
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case being the Devon a n d C o r n w a l l Constabulary . Yet the officers 
sought for the interviews were those w i t h experience of C D R P s , and 
they were accessed through the technique of snowbal l sampl ing. This 
sampl ing technique was employed w i t h a single premise i n m i n d , that 
being that i t was essential those interviewed were able to comment 
u p o n some of the key factors contained w i t h i n the project outl ine. 
These factors predominant ly related to an ind iv idua l w i t h experience, 
not only of par tnership working , bu t also a chronological perspective 
relat ing to how the police organisat ion has evolved i n this regard 
before a n d after the implementa t ion of the Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t 
1998. 
The characteris t ics of the popula t ion of police officers w i t h experience 
of par tnership work ing remain u n k n o w n , and this makes i t impossible 
to k n o w the representativeness of the sample interviewed for this 
project. It is possible they are not very representative, a n d therefore i t 
is problematic to seek to generalise from the findings of th is research 
project, either from the research part ic ipants to the Devon and 
Cornwa l l Cons tabulary , or from Devon a n d Cornwa l l Cons tabula ry to 
the police forces of E n g l a n d and Wales . 
A l though one cannot be certain that the par t ic ipants i n this research 
h a d the same characterist ics as the 'populat ion ' of police officers w i th 
experience of par tnership work ing , i t is reasonable to suggest, 
nonetheless, that they may be typical of them, a n d as Denscombe 
(2002) observes, the not ion of typical i ty i s a n alternative means of 
impu t ing generalisabili ty. There is no par t icu la r reason why 
part ic ipants i n this research shou ld be any different from other officers 
i n Devon a n d C o r n w a l l or further afield. 
Reflecting back to the 1980s, Devon a n d Cornwa l l Cons tabu la ry h a d a 
par t icular reputat ion for communi ty pol ic ing due to the en thus iasm 
demonstrated by its former Chief Constable J o h n Alderson , however, 
the en thus ia sm shown by J o h n Alde r son d id not necessar i ly extend to 
the rest of the Constabulary , nor survive h i s retirement. W i t h a degree 
of caut ion, therefore, i t is p lausible to suggest that, wi thout knowing 
the characterist ics of the popula t ion, there are s t i l l grounds for 
suggesting that the findings of this research project c a n be generalised 
to some extent. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has set out the research questions, derived from the 
general research a im, a n d informed by the li terature review conducted 
over the preceding three chapters. It then d i scussed the development 
of a research strategy to answer these questions, w i t h due regard to a 
range of pract ical , e thical a n d scientific considerations, w h i c h inform 
the choice of strategy a n d of par t icu lar research methods. The 
research strategy is of a mul t i -method design, involving; 
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1. A documentary analysis in tended to ascer ta in the police 
service's 'official pos i t ion ' on par tnership w o r k i n g i n crime 
prevention i n the wake of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act ; 
2. Semi-s t ruc tured interviews w i t h 30 police officers who have 
h a d experience of s u c h par tnership work ing , i n order to 
ascertain their unders tand ing of the mean ing of par tnership 
work ing a n d its impl ica t ions for pol ic ing; 
3. Autobiographica l observation of par tnership w o r k i n g i n crime 
prevention from the author 's o w n posi t ion i n a terr i torial B C U ; 
a n d 
4. A short questionnaire survey designed to elicit information 
regarding the extent of t ra in ing i n par tnership work ing , as wel l 
as general police attitudes towards it. 
Th i s research project combines a n interpretative orientat ion w i t h one 
w h i c h is more posit ivist ic, seeking background 'facts' that inform the 
context of par tnership work ing . In this sense i t i s pragmatic, 
concur r ing w i t h Denscombe's (2002: 23) point, "In practice, empir ica l 
socia l researchers have not been obsessed w i t h the pur i ty of their 
ontological or epistemological posi t ion." Soc ia l research, i t seems, is a 
complex enterprise. The difficulty inherent i n k n o w i n g the social wor ld 
requires the selection of methods w h i c h are far from perfect, a n 
acknowledgement that this is the case and recognit ion of the best 
means th rough w h i c h problems s u c h as reactivity a n d bias can be 
mitigated. W i t h this i n m i n d , i t is hoped that the author has provided 
a research study, w h i c h despite i ts l imitat ions is robus t enough for the 
task at hand . 
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Chapter 5: The Research Findings 
Introduction 
In th is chapter the a i m is to present the findings from the research. 
Al though the empir ica l research was informed by research questions 
set out i n the preceding chapter, inevitably the da ta collected d id not 
necessari ly fall easily w i th in the boundar ies established by these 
questions. Th i s i s to be expected from the interpretivist stance 
adopted a n d from the open structure of the qualitative method, w h i c h 
was ma in ly employed i n the research. Consequently, the findings are 
not organised directly a round answer ing the research questions. 
Rather, they are organised a round the relatively broad a n d loose 
themes, w h i c h emerged from the analysis of the da ta collected. 
Interview a n d other da ta was read a n d re-read, a n d emergent themes 
were identified informing subsequent interviews i n order to b u i l d a 
more comprehensive unders tanding of these themes. 
The da ta is organised a round a narrative, w h i c h sometimes draws 
u p o n the l i terature to clarify or demonstrate the relevance of a 
par t icular issue, however, i n the next, a n d final chapter, a more 
comprehensive effort i s made to relate the research to the m a i n issues 
addressed by the li terature, i n the context of the research questions. 
This chapter is extensive as there was no obvious way to establish a 
thematic divide, w h i c h wou ld make the research more digestible to the 
reader. 
Establishing the Formal Position on Partnership Working 
In order to set the scene for this research project i t is wor th 
ascertaining the police service's ' formal ' pos i t ion on par tnership 
work ing i n cr ime prevention as i t is set out i n official documents , s u c h 
as the Constabulary ' s a n n u a l reports, var ious pol icy a n d strategy 
documents a n d reports regarding the work of the Cons tabu la ry made 
by H M I C . The documentary analysis , w h i c h informed this part of the 
research project focused on the period from 1984 onwards. 1984 was 
chosen as ^ear zero' because i t was i n that year that the l andmark 
Home Office C i r c u l a r 8 / 8 4 was i ssued, as noted i n Chapter One. Th is 
does not mean par tnership work ing i n cr ime prevention was new to 
the Cons tabula ry pr ior to this t ime for, as w i l l become apparent below, 
the Cons tabula ry h a d a par t icular ' reputat ion ' for this k i n d of work, 
thanks especially to the pioneering communi ty pol ic ing phi losophy of 
the former Chie f Constable J o h n Alderson . 
The following sample of extracts is broadly representative of the way 
par tnership is represented i n s u c h documentat ion. It is important to 
note that the te rm 'partnership ' was u s e d more widely after its usage 
i n the 1990 Home Office C i r cu la r (44/90). Pr ior to th is time, the terms 
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' inter-agency' or 'mult i-agency' were more widely used . In the 1984 
A n n u a l Report Ch ie f Constable D o n a l d El l io t t wri tes as follows: 
"Al l ied to the need to b u i l d a closer unders tand ing w i t h the pub l i c 
is a clear requirement to b u i l d on the good re la t ionships w i t h other 
agencies; e.g. Soc ia l Services, Educa t ion , Probat ion Service. Here 
again I a m fortunate to find a good w o r k i n g re la t ionship already i n 
existence a n d I sha l l do a l l I c an to extend that good l ia i son ." (p7) 
In the same document , the Chief Constable 's terr i tor ial Div i s iona l 
Commanders added the following: 
"Our best endeavours to foster communi ty contact throughout the 
d iv is ion cont inue to bear fruit w i t h inter-agency co-operation a h igh 
priority." (Superintendent of West Devon) (p48) 
"Officers of a l l r anks cont inued to vis i t town a n d pa r i sh meetings, 
schools, y o u t h a n d senior c i t izen c lubs i n a n endeavour to further 
the pub l i c interest and ma in t a in their confidence a n d support." 
(Superintendent of Eas t Devon) (p40) 
"Distr ict , town a n d pa r i sh counci ls have been vis i ted by loca l police 
officers. Increasingly, the dialogue has become more open and 
constructive, benefiting the communi ty as a whole. Th i s communi ty 
contact pol icy w i l l continue." (Superintendent of Nor th Devon) (p43) 
In the 1990 A n n u a l Report the following was wri t ten: 
"Helping to teach the one hundred thousand ch i ld ren of p r imary 
school age i n Devon a n d Cornwa l l about elementary crime 
prevention are s ix P C Padlocks who now regular ly v is i t c lassrooms 
and playgrounds. Sponsored by Barc lays B a n k , 'PC Padlock ' [a 
puppet] has become a popula r figure at county shows a n d fetes. 
He is also proving a useful means of in t roduc ing the role of the 
police to younger chi ldren." (p53) 
The H M I C Pr imary Inspection report for 1995 noted that, "the police of 
Devon, Cornwa l l a n d titie Isles of Sci l l ies have always been recognised 
for a good mult i -agency approach to combat cr ime a n d other social 
problems." (pi8) 
The 1995 Five Year P l a n for the Cons tabu la ry i nc luded the following 
Foreword from the Chief Constable: 
" M y v i s ion of pol ic ing i n Devon, Cornwa l l a n d the Isles of Sci l l ies is 
of a service rooted i n the communi ty we serve, developing effective 
par tnerships w i t h the communi ty a n d other agencies i n our fight 
against crime." (p3) 
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The 2 0 0 1 / 0 2 Performance P lan , addressed to the pub l ic , set out the 
following: 
"Our v i s ion focuses on y o u r needs a n d aspirat ions to provide 
significant a n d las t ing improvements, recognising the contr ibut ions 
a n d suppor t received from others i n the pub l ic , private a n d 
vo lun ta ry sectors... O u r pol ic ing is based on; 
• Par tnership work ing 
• Reduc ing disorder, cr ime a n d the fear of cr ime 
• A par tnership style of problem solving, w i t h loca l solut ions to 
loca l problems 
• Cha l leng ing what we do to ensure best value; a n d 
• Improving the way we consul t y o u about our priori t ies and 
y o u r interests." (p7) 
The 2 0 0 2 / 0 3 Performance P l a n said: 
"Loca l pol ic ing is about work ing together to f ind loca l solut ions to 
loca l problems a n d par tnership is a key factor i n t ack l ing crime. 
There are m a n y causes of cr ime a n d ant i -socia l behaviour a n d i t 
m u s t be recognised that the police alone cannot tackle cr ime. We 
m u s t a l l work together to reduce cr ime a n d the fear of cr ime i n our 
communi t ies throughout Devon, Cornwa l l a n d the Isles of Scil l ies ." 
(P4) 
The 2 0 0 3 / 0 4 Pol ic ing P l a n says: 
"Our cont r ibu t ion to the staffing a n d resourc ing of par tnership 
teams means we can take a more hol is t ic approach to cr ime 
reduct ion by w o r k i n g together to reduce opportunit ies to commit 
cr ime a n d to combat c r imina l and ant i -socia l behaviour." (pi7) 
There are several things, w h i c h may be sa id about the way par tnership 
is represented i n th is official documentat ion, beyond recognising that 
this wri t ten representation does not necessari ly square w i t h the way 
par tnership work ing is represented ' i n rea l i ty? The first, most obvious 
point, is that par tnership is consistently portrayed i n a positive light. 
It is perceived to be a good th ing to do, or to make appeal to. This 
supports the poin t made by others (e.g. G i l l i n g , 1997; Crawford, 1998) 
that the par tnership approach is 'a good th ing ' possess ing its own 
pub l i c relations value. 
The appeal to par tnership work ing often conveys a sense that 'we are 
i n this together', thereby b ind ing the police both to other agencies, and 
to the communi ty at large as if, i n so doing, the legi t imacy of the police 
service i s enhanced. In th is regard, i t i s interest ing that references to 
par tnership work ing are often accompanied by references to the 
communi ty , a n d par tnership work ing is conceived i n the mid-1980s as 
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a form of ' communi ty contact'. A s w i t h the word partnership, 
c o m m u n i t y conveys a sense of sol idari ty a n d togetherness, w h i c h ties 
the police to the rest of society, rather t han leaving them on the 
outside. Controversial ly, one may argue that the importance of 
c o m m u n i t y a n d par tnership has come to be emphas ised at j u s t the 
poin t i n t ime w h e n the police service was i n danger of being left on the 
outside' , as a resul t of s u c h things as cor rupt ion scandals , however, 
especially wiHh regard to the negative imagery su r round ing heavy-
handed 'fire-brigade' or pub l i c order-style pol ic ing i n the early 1980s. 
It is this connect ion between par tnership a n d communi ty , a n d their 
use as legi t imacy-bui lding devices, w h i c h may make sense of the 
following, par t ly phi losophica l , extract for the 1993 A n n u a l Report: 
"We are also commit ted to a variety of communi ty initiatives 
designed to ensure we can work w i t h the communi ty i n enhancing 
the qual i ty of life for a l l our cit izens. It c an be seen, therefore, that 
the po l i ce /pub l i c par tnership m u s t surely be more t h a n s imply 
cr ime oriented. Indeed the par tnership approach to pol ic ing, w h i c h 
is a fundamental part of the Force ethos, under l in ing the premise 
that we are the police of the people not the State a n d must , 
therefore, funct ion w i t h the consent a n d co-operation of the publ ic 
we seek to serve." (p6) 
In th is quote, the par tnership approach is l i n k e d to the fundamental 
pr inciple of pol ic ing by consent, and i t is interest ing to note reference 
is made, not to the par tnership approach to cr ime prevention, bu t 
rather 'the par tnership approach to pol ic ing ' as i f par tnership has been 
appropriated to serve other purposes. Th is sjnnbolic sense of 
par tnership has potentially impor tant ramificat ions for the way the 
police service approaches par tnership 'working' , as w i l l be explored 
below. 
In addi t ion to being seen to enhance police legitimacy, however, 
positive references to par tnership i n these documents also serve to 
convey a message that the Cons tabu la ry is being responsive to Home 
Office policy. A s Weatherit t (1986) has pointed out, for example, 
a l though Home Office c i rculars are only supposed to be 'advisory' i n 
nature, thereby not unde rmin ing the t radi t ion of Cons tabula ry 
independence i n operational matters, i n practice they are responded to 
as i f they are pol icy directives. Consequently, for example, the very 
positive references to par tnership work ing i n the 1984 A n n u a l Report, 
a n d the s imi la r comments made by the different Div i s iona l 
Superintendents , cou ld be regeirded as positive responses to C i r cu la r 
8 / 8 4 . Tha t c i rcu la r says to the police ^ o u need to work i n par tnership 
w i t h other agencies' and, i n effect, the 1984 a n n u a l report effectively 
says 'we are'. 
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A Structure for Partnership Working 
In addi t ion to the 'fine words ' w h i c h indicate the Constabulary 's 
support for par tnership work ing , there were a n u m b e r of s t ruc tura l 
and organisat ional changes made both before a n d du r ing the period of 
this research, w h i c h cou ld be seen as evidence of loca l commitment to 
par tnership work ing . However, especially i n terms of their t iming 
providing 'evidence' of compliance to pol icy directives emanat ing from 
the Home Office. 
A s noted above, Devon a n d Cornwa l l has a recent his tory of 
par tnership work ing , s temming ma in ly from the pioneering communi ty 
pol ic ing approach of J o h n Alderson i n the late-1970s, w h i c h prompted 
the establishment, albeit only i n one par t of the force area, of the 
Exeter C r ime Prevention Suppor t U n i t (CPSU). 
Pol icy changes, w h i c h took place i n 1984, entailed the establ ishment 
of a new C o m m u n i t y Services Depar tment (note the use of the word 
' communi ty ' again) at headquarters unde r the leadership of a 
Superintendent who h a d been ins t rumenta l ly involved i n the Exeter 
C P S U , something w h i c h cou ld be seen as a na tu r a l evolut ion of this . 
The new department was given responsibi l i ty for developing you th 
crime prevention, thereby repl icat ing the m a i n focus of the C P S U , 
however, i n addi t ion i t was made responsible for developing, among 
other things, cr ime prevention panels a n d ne ighbourhood watch , both 
of w h i c h were being promoted central ly at th is t ime (GiUing, 1997). 
W h e n taken together w i t h the quotes from Div i s iona l Superintendents 
cited above, this m a y provide evidence of a 'desire' by Force senior 
managers to be seen i n a positive l ight by the centre, complying wi th 
the spiri t , i f not necessari ly the letter, of Home Office C i r c u l a r 8 /84 . 
Th is s t ructure remained u n t i l the beginning of the 1990s, when 
further changes were made regarding the organisat ional response to 
cr ime prevention par tnership work ing , following the appointment of a 
new Chie f Constable , S i r J o h n Evans i n 1988. In 1991, there was a 
significant shift, w h i c h pu l l ed the responsibi l i ty for the par tnership 
approach more obviously beyond headquarters, embedding i t further 
w i th in the terr i torial divis ions. Th is entailed the establ ishment of 
Cr ime Prevention Management Fo rums i n each of the dis t r ic t counc i l 
areas of Devon a n d Cornwal l , involving officers from the police service, 
the dis tr ic t loca l authorit ies a n d the probat ion service who were 
charged w i t h a specific responsibi l i ty to develop strategic responses to 
cr ime prevention w i t h i n each locality. The establ ishment of these 
forums, i n theory, replaced more 'ad hoc ' arrangements, whereby the 
presence of formal par tnership responses depended u p o n whether 
crime prevention panels existed. They d id so only i n the m a i n towns, 
and m a n y lacked m u c h i n the way of vital i ty, as was the case 
nat ional ly (Gil l ing, 1997). 
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Given the organisat ional s t ructure of the Cons tabu la ry at this point i n 
t ime, w i t h 6 divis ions a n d a total of 20 sub-divis ions , i t is h ighly l ikely 
that m a n y of these Fo rums w o u l d have struggled w i t h the l ack of co-
terminosi ty a n d w i t h the funct ional spl i t between county a n d distr ict 
loca l authorit ies, w h i c h made i t difficult for county-level services, s u c h 
as educat ion, y o u t h and social services, to engage w i t h the process. 
The forums cou ld be seen as further evidence of the Constabulary 's 
con t inu ing commitment to par tnership w o r k i n g i n cr ime prevention, 
equally i t is impor tant to recognise that their es tabl ishment ties i n 
closely w i t h the i s su ing of Home Office C i r c u l a r 4 4 / 9 0 . U n l i k e Home 
Office C i r cu l a r 8 / 8 4 , this C i r cu l a r cal led u p o n the police a n d local 
authori t ies to inform the Home Office wha t response they h a d made to 
i t a n d the Home Office h a d made some attempt to m o u l d this response 
by sending out, at the same time as the C i r cu la r , a booklet entitled 
T*artnership i n Cr ime Prevention' , w h i c h conta ined models of good 
practice, that loca l areas were invi ted to follow. The forums were not 
u n l i k e these models of good practice, albeit w i t h the problems noted 
above. 
These forums were not i n place for very m a n y years before the next 
organisat ional change arr ived i n 1995. The first relevant change was a 
reorganisation, w h i c h resulted i n the abol i t ion of sub-divis ions and a n 
increase i n the number of police divis ions, from s ix to n ine . Three of 
these were made co-terminous wi th the major popula t ion centres of 
P lymouth , Torbay and Exeter. One reason for the reorganisat ion may 
have been a pre-emptive response to the loca l govemment 
reorganisations, w h i c h occurred i n 1996 bu t were foreshadowed some 
t ime before. P lymou th a n d Torbay acquired un i t a ry status i n these 
reorganisations, however, to the surpr ise of m a n y Exeter d id not, 
though the police reorganisat ion took litt le notice of th is . The other s ix 
police divis ions were s t i l l co- terminous w i t h loca l authori ty 
boundaries , some conta ining u p to three dis tr ic t counc i l areas w i t h i n 
their boundaries . Another possible reason for th is reorganisat ion may 
be found i n the growing pressure p laced u p o n the police service to 
decentralise service provis ion and , i n th is regard, the n ine new 
divis ions were able to operate more effectively t h a n the sub-div is ional 
s tmc tu re that h a d existed hitherto. 
A s wel l as the Force reorganisation, i n 1995 the Cr ime Prevention 
Management F o m m s were transformed into C o m m u n i t y Safety 
Strategy Groups (CSSGs), based on the same dis tr ic t counc i l 
boundaries occupied by their foremnners , the Cr ime Prevention 
Management F o m m s . This t ime, there appears no evidence to suggest 
that the Cons tabu la ry was responding to governmental 'directives'. No 
relevant c i rculars were i s sued a n d there was no other pressure 
specifically emanat ing from the Home Office, w h i c h at th is time h a d 
lost some of its en thus iasm for the par tnership approach following its 
non-response to the 1991 Morgan Report (Gil l ing, 1997). However, 
whi le there m a y have not been pressure from the Home Office, i t may 
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wel l have been the case that par tnership w o r k i n g was looked u p o n 
favourably by H M I C , w h i c h i n its 1995 Pr imary Inspection report 
commented approvingly u p o n the Constabulary ' s "active support for 
the inter-agency approach involving heal th authori t ies, the probat ion 
service, and , i n par t icular , the educat ion service."(p2) H M I C ' s 
approval for par tnership work ing , however, does not explain the 
specific es tabl ishment of C S S G s i n 1995. In interviews for this 
research, one par t ic ipant (Interview 014) suggested that the 
Cons tabu la ry was "ahead of the game" by vir tue of hav ing recrui ted a 
n u m b e r of senior managers from outside the force, m a n y of w h o m 
appeared to have a positive, progressive "take" on par tnership work ing . 
Another par t ic ipant thought that the d iv is iona l Ch ie f Superintendent 
i n P l y m o u t h at the t ime was a par t icular progressive w i t h regard to 
communi ty safety, a n d that Pl jmiouth m a y have been adopted as a 
good practice mode l across the Constabulary . (Plymouth's status as a 
' trailblazer ' was considerably aided by its hav ing been identified as one 
of tlie ten 'phase 2 ' Safer Cit ies locations, i n receipt of centra l funding 
for three years from 1 February 1994, some of w h i c h was u sed to fund 
a new C o m m u n i t y Safety U n i t i n the city). The replacement of the 
phrase 'Cr ime Prevention Management F o r U m ' by the phrase 
'Communi ty Safety Strategy G r o u p ' is suggestive of the sort of 
progressive upda t ing proposed i n the Morgan Report, w h i c h even 
prompted A C P O ' s Cr ime Prevention Sub-commit tee to consider a name 
change. 
The idea of the Cons tabu la ry being 'ahead of the game' i s given further 
support i n the Chie f Constable 's in t roduct ion to the Constabulary 's 
Five Year P l a n i n 1996, i n w h i c h he notes; 
" M y v i s ion of pol ic ing i n Devon, C o r n w a l l a n d the Isles of Sci l l ies is 
of a service rooted i n the communi ty we serve, developing effective 
par tnerships w i t h that communi ty a n d other agencies i n our fight 
against cr ime. A s we move towards the year 2001 , i t i s becoming 
increasingly clear that the nature a n d role of po l ic ing w i l l cont inue 
to undergo major change." (p3) 
Coincidental ly , i n terms of the pr ior i ty i t accords to par tnership, this 
v i s ion corresponds w i t h the v i s ion of A C P O , as set out i n the 1996 
policy document of its cr ime prevention sub-committee, entit led 
Towards 2000' . Arguably , this document anticipates a change of 
govemment, a n d shows the police service s tak ing a c l a im to the 
leadership of cr ime prevention par tnerships , w h i c h the New Labour 
opposi t ion h a d made clear they intended to legislate for u p o n tak ing 
office. Arguably , therefore, title Ch ie f Constable 's v i s ion i n 1996 
demonstrates a s imi la r strategic awareness, a n d this m a y i n part 
account for the change that resul ted i n the es tabl ishment of C S S G s . 
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In 1996, following the establ ishment of the C S S G s , the Community-
Services Depar tment was transformed into the C o m m u n i t y Affairs 
Department . The name change is not especially significant, however, 
the reason for the change is . In the previous year, H M I C ' s Pr imary 
Inspect ion Report h a d made note of the following: 
"Her Majesty's Inspector was pleased by the recognit ion of the value 
of co-ordinat ing their communi ty work w i t h i n one department 
under the c o m m a n d of a superintendent. A n appointed 
commander is now developing a strategy w h i c h , hopefully, -will be 
inc luded i n the strategic p l a n for 1996-2001. M u c h work is being 
done th rough the crime prevention work ing group under the crime 
strategy, w h i c h Her Majesty's Inspector supports , bu t he is of the 
view that there shou ld be a communi ty affairs strategy as wel l 
w h i c h pu l l s together a l l the var ious s t rands of their work, i n the 
Force a n d th rough mult i -agency activities, into a cohesive policy. 
He w o u l d also encourage wider in ternal consul ta t ions , to receive 
the m a x i m u m degree of o-wnership for the outcome." (pi8) 
In effect, th is quote suggests that H M I C was cr i t ica l of the fact that 
whi le the Cons tabu la ry h a d a headquarters-based department for co­
ordinat ing ' communi ty work' , at that point s u c h , work was not 
integrated into the -wider operating cul ture nor the cr ime strategy. In 
other words, a l though it is not pu t i n s u c h s t rong terms, there is a 
sense here of ' communi ty work ' being ghettoised -within the 
Constabulary , i n m u c h the same way, for example, that Weatherit t 
(1986) wrote of cr ime prevention officers r emain ing i n a 'security 
ghetto', not wel l integrated w i t h other elements of operat ional pol icing. 
The final comment i n the quote, regarding encouraging wider 
'ownership' , further supports this point . Th i s i s a n i s sue that w i l l be 
explored i n greater detail below. 
The establ ishment of the C o m m u n i t y Affairs Depar tment i n 1996 
represents the Constabulary ' s active response to this c r i t i c i sm. The 
department 's brief, as set out i n the Five Year P l an , i s wor th quot ing at 
length: 
"Communi ty Affairs 
Wha t are we t ry ing to achieve? 
• E n h a n c e d publ ic safety i n order to reduce the fear of cr ime 
• To make cr ime more difficult to commit a n d detection more 
l ike ly 
• To cont inue to improve our excellent p o l i c e / c o m m i m i t y 
relations 
• A reduct ion i n the n u m b e r of young people who are offenders 
or -victims of cr ime 
• A cl imate of t rus t between police and y o u n g people 
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H o w are we going to do it? 
• B y developing a cr ime prevention a n d communi ty safety 
strategy, w h i c h meets the pub l i c needs 
• B y consol idat ing our exist ing communi ty po l ic ing policies 
• B y ful l par t ic ipat ion th rough our chief officers i n the 
formulat ion a n d implementat ion of mul t i -agency strategies 
(e.g. D r u g misuse a n d referral; y o u t h issues; men ta l health) 
• Th rough inter-agency co-operation (e.g. The development of 
d rug act ion teams a n d reference groups), a n d the development 
of strategic init iat ives a imed at reducing cr ime a n d the fear of 
cr ime 
• B y ensur ing that communi ty safety a n d crime prevention 
projects are inc luded i n our future bids for funding from the 
single regeneration budget 
• B y provid ing addi t ional archi tectura l l i a i son expertise i n the 
l ight of increas ing commitments Force wide 
• B y developing the use of, a n d ensur ing proper control of, C C T V 
• B y progressing the work of our C o m m u n i t y Safety Strategy 
Groups , emphas i s ing that cr ime reduct ion is the responsibi l i ty 
of the communi ty as a whole a n d co-ordinat ing agencies i n 
support of communi ty act ion 
• B y developing init iat ives to counter repeat v ic t imisa t ion i n our 
Force area 
• . T h r o u g h communi ty contact i n a l l i ts m a n y forms, a n d by the 
efficient a n d effective use of watch schemes." (pl9-20) 
The remit of the C o m m u n i t y Affairs Depar tment was evidently 
intended to demonstrate better integration of ' commimi ty work ' w i th 
other aspects of operat ional pol ic ing and , to some extent, s u c h 
integrat ion entailed re-formulat ing s u c h work away from its 
legi t imacy-bui ld ing purpose (see above) a n d more i n the ins t rumenta l 
direct ion of enhanc ing effectiveness. Evidence of th is m a y be found, 
for example, i n a l locat ing a role to the department i n m a k i n g 'detection 
more l ikely ' , by l i n k i n g i t to communi ty po l ic ing a n d by l i n k i n g i t to the 
work of C S S G s , w h i c h this document now characterises as being 
about 'crime reduct ion ' not cr ime prevention, nor communi ty safety. 
A s d iscussed i n Chapter 2, cr ime reduct ion was conceived at the time, 
a n d promoted by the A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n as, a n a r m of 'crime 
management ' . Thus , cr ime management affords a n opportuni ty to 
integrate ' communi ty work ' w i t h i n mains t ream operat ional pol ic ing 
a n d this cr ime management model , coincidental ly, features centre 
stage i n the 1996 Five Year P l an , foreshadowing the m u c h later ro l l ­
out of the Nat iona l Intelligence Mode l (NIM) a n d demonstrat ing, once 
again, the extent to w h i c h the Cons tabulary was 'ahead of the game' i n 
terms of na t iona l policy. The significance of integrat ing the work of the 
C o m m u n i t y Affairs Department, a n d thus impl ic i t ly the work of 
partnerships, w i l l be re turned to below. For now, i t i s wor th not ing 
that a s imi la r integrat ion is evidenced i n the A C P O pol icy document 
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Towards 2 0 0 0 ' (ACPO, 1996), w h i c h describes cr ime prevention as 
having three m a i n components, namely 
"Counteract ion - w h i c h is achieved i n a par t ly measurable way by 
the appl ica t ion of knowledge a n d sk i l l s to anticipate, identify, then 
remove or reduce the causes of a n d opportunit ies for cr ime. 
Intervention - w h i c h is achieved to a significant quantifiable extent 
by operat ional pol ic ing methods designed to impede, disrupt , and , 
ul t imately, cu r t a i l c r imina l activity. 
Deterrence - w h i c h is achieved to a n u n k n o v m , a n d probably 
unknowable , degree by the very existence of a professional police 
service a n d the day-to-day activities of a l l i ts members , work ing i n 
suppor t of a n establ ished C r i m i n a l Jus t i ce System." 
This same A C P O pol icy document notes that "Several agencies have 
come to share responsibi l i ty for cr ime prevention a n d communi ty 
safety i n recent years. The police service cont inues to occupy the most 
prominent place w i t h i n this par tnership framework." It i s possible to 
argue that the Constabulary ' s Five Year P l a n offers a v i s ion that is 
consistent vrith this , w i t h i ts reference to ".. 'our' C o m m u n i t y Safety 
Strategy Groups" (my emphasis), a n d its impl ic i t view of the police "co­
ordinat ing agencies i n support of communi ty action". Whi le there is 
acknowledgement here of the par tnership approach, i t is a n approach 
w h i c h is led, or steered, very m u c h by the police. Th i s i s also a n issue 
to w h i c h we s h a l l re tu rn below. 
The Constabulary ' s response to H M I C ' s c r i t i c i sm evidently found 
favour w i t h H M I C , whose Pr imary Inspection report for 1997 /98 noted 
that 
"There i s clear evidence that the cr ime strategy, a n d i n par t icular 
the cr ime management model , has made a dramat ic impac t on the 
targeting a n d co-ordinat ing of resources i n the fight against cr ime, 
heightening the awareness of operat ional officers as to the value of 
intelligence." (p2) 
W i t h s u c h a positive assessment, i t was very u n l i k e l y that the 
Cons tabu la ry was going to drop the pr ior i ty i t afforded to crime 
management, w h i c h , a l though integrating cr ime detection w i t h crime 
reduct ion, tended i n practice to priorit ise detection, thereby, according 
w i t h the 'detectionist mental i ty ' w h i c h is a dominan t par t of the police 
occupat ional cul ture . More recently, m u c h the same point has been 
made about the N I M wh ich , whi l s t i n theory integrates different 
approaches to cr ime control , i n practice places the greatest emphasis 
u p o n detection. The impl ica t ion of this , then, i s that the integration of 
'crime reduct ion ' w i t h i n cr ime managenient does not necessari ly raise 
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the profile of the par tnership approach w i t h i n operat ional pol ic ing 
strategies. 
The next impor tant change to accommodate par tnership work ing came 
i n the shape of another boundary reorganisat ion i n 1999. Th i s was 
perhaps the most significant of the boundary reorganisations as i t 
represented a decisive shift i n the direct ion of decentral isat ion. The 
reorganisat ion was clearly prompted by the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder 
A c t wh ich , as noted above, placed a duty on responsible authorit ies to 
es tabl ish a C D R P i n each dis tr ic t authori ty area. The police, or more 
specifically, "every chief officer of police any par t of whose police area 
lies w i t h i n the area" were one of the responsible authori t ies . The 
word ing left open to interpretation the quest ion of exactly who wi th in 
the police service was the 'responsible authority ' , a n d the 
Cons tabulary decided to establ ish 16 police B C U s , referred to as 
'policing dis t r ic ts ' w h i c h exactly matched the 16 loca l authori ty areas 
across the Constabulary ' s geographical area. The ^District 
Commander ' who, depending u p o n the size of the B C U , was to be 
either a Chie f Inspector or a Superintendent (except Pljonouth), then 
became the 'de facto' responsible authori ty as far as the police service 
was concemed. Th i s was the person from the police side, responsible 
for es tabl ishing C D R P s i n each of the 16 areas. A n interview 
par t ic ipant who was made a Dis t r ic t Commander at this t ime recalls, 
"there was a requirement placed upon each district commander to 
ensure that their CDRPs were set up and running as soon aspossible." 
(Interviewee 20). 
Si t t ing at a tier above the dis tr ic t B C U s were 4 Areas , headed by senior 
managers designated 'area co-ordinators ' , who he ld the r a n k of Chief 
Superintendent , a n d whose areas provided suppor t a n d co-ordinat ion 
to the distr icts operating beneath them. Th i s decentral isat ion to 16 
B C U s made the two C D R P 'responsible authori t ies ' completely 
coterminous, thereby overcoming one of the barriers , w h i c h h a d 
previously h indered par tnership work ing . It also represented 
compliance w i t h a decentralised model of pol ic ing, very m u c h favoured 
by the A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n a n d by H M I C , both of whose influence over 
matters of operat ional pol ic ing was increas ing d u r i n g th is period. The 
reorganisation, therefore, was very welcoming of the 1998 Cr ime a n d 
Disorder Act , a n d suggestive of a Cons tabu la ry favourably inc l ined 
towards par tnership work ing as far as senior management was 
concerned. Fur the r evidence of this c an be found i n the decision 
taken to allocate a n a n n u a l budget of £20,000 for each Dis t r ic t 
Commander to spend on CDRP-re la ted bus iness (it w i l l be remembered 
that the 1998 A c t inc luded no addi t ional funding for the establ ishment 
of CDRPs) . Th is is another example of the Cons tabu la ry being 'ahead 
of the game', since s u c h funding preceded the centra l al location, v i a 
regional government offices, of the B C U F u n d , w h i c h first because 
available i n the 2 0 0 3 / 0 4 f inancial year. The only problem, perhaps, 
was that the Force reorganisat ion occurred i n 1999, at a point when 
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the first r o u n d of cr ime audi ts a n d strategies were to be produced, 
thereby, b r ing ing some ' turbulence ' to this process at a time when 
cont inui ty i n personnel m a y have been advantageous. Indeed, the 
police service's hab i t of m a k i n g personnel changes at short notice is 
something other agencies have often voiced their frustrat ion about and 
i t is regarded by m a n y as a p r imary barr ier to par tnership working , i n 
so far as i t h inders the formation of t rus t ing relations w h i c h depend, to 
some extent, on a degree of interpersonal familiari ty. In the case of 
th is par t icu lar reorganisation, however, this was not due to a l ack of 
formal commitment on the police service's part. 
Since they covered the same geographical areas, the C S S G s effectively 
migrated into the roles of the new C D R P s . Some of the C S S G s were 
based on former police divis ions already coterminous w i t h local 
authori ty areas, a n d here personnel changes were m i n i m a l or n o n ­
existent. Some of the former police divis ions, however, h a d been 
servicing u p to three C S S G s , and change here was more apparent. 
Th is m a y help to expla in one part icipant 's observation that; 
"the areas that had worked historically well together in the past 
quickly fell into place but other areas, predominantly rural, had 
difficulty in relation to membership and commitment" (Interviewee 
20). 
The formerly coterminous police divis ions (Plymouth, Torbay a n d 
Exeter), however, were also the areas w i t h i n the Cons tabu la ry w h i c h 
evidenced the most severe crime-related problems, by some distance, 
a n d the same par t ic ipant also observes that, "where there is a real 
need to adopt a partnership approach it works better than a process 
that is hoisted on us to adopt, merely to be nationally compliant." 
The police cont r ibut ion to the C D R P areas qu ick ly became fairly 
s tandardised, i n part, because i n each of the four Areas one of the 
Superintendents was designated a 'partnership Superintendent ' to 
oversee the C D R P s i n their area, a n d they took a consistent approach 
w h i c h was set out by the terr i tor ial Ass i s t an t Ch ie f Constable to w h o m 
they were answerable, v i a the A r e a Co-ordinator . E a c h B C U h a d a 
cr ime prevention sergeant, who, perhaps significantly (given the 
preceding d i scuss ion about cr ime management), was re-designated, 
across the Constabulary , as a Cr ime 'Reduct ion ' Sergeant. The Cr ime 
Reduc t ion Sergeant was tasked w i t h w o r k i n g w i t h the other 
responsible authori t ies on the product ion of the audi t a n d strategy, i n 
practice, this meant work ing wi th communi ty safety officers. It d id , 
however, take some time for some loca l authori t ies to appoint s u c h 
officers, a n d i n some areas a communi ty safety responsibi l i ty was 
'bolted on ' to other roles u n t i l s u c h t ime as the loca l author i ty was i n a 
posi t ion to appoint a communi ty safety officer, w h i c h for m a n y was not 
u n t i l central funding was more forthcoming. The C D R P then 
effectively consisted of b imonth ly or quarterly formal meetings of the 
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Dis t r ic t Commanders a n d the loca l authori ty Ch ie f Execut ives , and 
other agencies who cou ld be lorought on board' , serviced by the crime 
reduct ion sergeants a n d those w i t h a designated communi ty safety 
responsibi l i ty, who drafted the audi ts a n d strategies w h i c h the senior 
officers eventually signed u p to. 
A s noted i n the l i terature review chapters, C D R P s started off w i t h a 
very local mandate and their es tabl ishment was par t ly just i f ied 
th rough a n appeal to the idea of local solut ions for loca l problems. 
However, the extent of s u c h loca l i sm was questionable for two reasons. 
Fi rs t ly , a n official 'expectation' was that C D R P strategies w o u l d fit i n 
w i t h the p lans a n d strategies of their const i tuent agencies. In the case 
of the police, that meant fitting i n w i t h the key na t iona l objectives and 
local plans , w h i c h h a d been imposed u p o n the police since the 
enactment of the 1994 Police a n d Magistrates ' Cour t s Ac t . Secondly, 
as noted i n the li terature review, once central government began to 
impose a performance management regime u p o n C D R P s , pressure was 
placed u p o n them to respond to na t ional , rather t h a n local , priori ty 
concerns. 
Th is performance management regime arr ived along w i t h the Cr ime 
Reduct ion Strategy i n A p r i l 2000 when C D R P s were asked to provide 
a n n u a l progress reports, a n d prospective p lans for the year ahead, to 
the Cr ime Reduct ion Directorates i n the govemment offices, whi l s t 
s imul taneous ly being handed down a set of five year cr ime reduct ion 
targets for burglary, vehicle cr ime a n d robbery. These targets came 
complete w i t h a set of Bes t V a l u e Performance Indicators (BVPIs) that 
wou ld be u sed to measure progress towards these targets, w i t h s u c h 
progress being made visible th rough the pubficat ion of the 
performance indicators at B C U level, i n the form of 'family' league 
tables capable of p i c k i n g out the best a n d worst performers. These two 
issues w i l l be explored below. 
CDRPs: The Question of Police Dominance and the Imposition of a 
National Agenda 
Fol lowing the implementa t ion of the 1994 Police a n d Magistrates ' 
Cour t s Act , local pol ic ing was subjected to a central ly imposed regime 
of na t ional key objectives. The expectation was that loca l p lans wou ld 
fit these na t iona l key objectives, a n d i n the Cons tabu la ry th is was 
indeed the case, as the following extract from the 1 9 9 5 / 9 6 A n n u a l 
Report demonstrates: 
"[National Key Objectives:] 
1. To ma in t a in and , i f possible, increase the n u m b e r of 
detections for violent cr ime. 
2. To increase the number of detections for burglar ies from 
people's homes. 
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3. To target a n d prevent cr imes w h i c h are par t icu lar ly loca l 
problems, i n c l u d i n g drug-related cr iminal i ty , i n par tnership 
w i t h the pub l i c a n d loca l agencies. 
4. To provide h igh vis ib i l i ty pol ic ing so as to reassure the pub l i c 
5. To respond prompt ly to emergency calls from the publ ic . 
[Local Plan:] 
1. C r ime - to tackle effectively, i n par t icular drug-related cr ime 
a n d pub l i c disorder, wherever possible w i t h the co-operation of 
other ind iv idua ls , groups or agencies, whether statutory or 
voluntary. 
• 2. Drugs - to reduce abuse of controlled drugs a n d associated 
cr ime 
3. Opera t ional pol ic ing - to provide a n appropriate a n d effective 
response to demands from the publ ic for police assistance. 
4. Personnel - to optimise the use of a l l our staff to meet the 
requirements of pol ic ing 
5. Consu l t a t ion - to enhance the publ ic ' s unders tandi i ig .of policing., 
i ssues a n d to create ownership of a shared v i s ion and 
commi tment to agreed strategies." ( p i 5 of the stat ist ical 
appendices) 
This response is interest ing for a number of reasons. Init ially, the 
local p l a n gives presentat ional priori ty to the local , ment ioning 
par t icu lar ly the drug-related cr iminal i ty the na t iona l objectives cite i n 
a local context, however, also c r imina l damage. Th i s presentation 
makes the loca l p l a n look different from the na t iona l objectives. 
Secondly, however, o n closer inspect ion i t i s difficult to see m u c h i n 
the way of var ia t ion between the loca l a n d the na t iona l - even i f i t does 
not use the words, the loca l is set broadly enough to encompass the 
nat ional . Th i rd ly , this provides further evidence of the broad 
'compliance ' of the Cons tabula ry to na t iona l pol icy direction, 
previously d i scussed above. Indeed, pressure for more specific 
compliance was evident from H M I C ' s response to the 1 9 9 7 / 9 8 local 
p lan . Tha t Cons tabu la ry p l a n was cr i t ic ised by H M I C i n i ts 1997 /98 
Pr imary Inspect ion Report: 
"In setting its targets for 1 9 9 7 / 9 8 the Au tho r i t y has switched the 
emphasis i n relat ion to assaul ts away from detections for a l l violent 
cr ime, as specified i n the Nat iona l Key Objective, to reduc ing the 
number of assaul ts i n pub l i c places, since th is category has seen a 
significant rise i n recent years (49% w h e n compar ing 1996 to 
1993). Her Majesty's Inspectors unders t and the t h i n k i n g beh ind 
this a n d accept the content of the p l a n is a matter for the 
Author i ty ; they nevertheless register their concern that the focus of 
this target s h o u l d not detract from efforts to combat violent crime, 
a n d especially domestic violence w h i c h i n practice is a n operat ional 
priori ty, w i t h recorded incidents a n d arrests increas ing steadily 
over the last three years." (p8) 
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This c r i t i c i sm can be seen as a n organisat ional 'slap on the wrist ' , and 
one c a n see how s u c h comments might encourage closer observance i n 
future years, since any c r i t i c i sm from a n Inspectorate is clearly 
unwelcome. 
The significant th ing about the Nat iona l Key Objectives is they 
con t inued to be i n existence beyond the implementa t ion of the 1998 
Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t , a poin t w h i c h led m a n y cri t ics to wonder to 
wha t extent the A c t really cou ld deliver loca l solut ions to local 
problems. The pressures 'against ' l oca l i sm were recognised by a 
n u m b e r of par t ic ipants i n this research, as the following quotes 
demonstrate: 
"There was some conflict between central and local priorities, an 
example being where local problems arose demanding attention 
which did not figure on the large radar system. Again, 
predominantly ASB activity." (Interviewee 20) 
"Sector inspectors are under a lot of pressure with their targets and 
the bottom line is that I can talk to them [other agencies] 'til the cows 
come home about what we are going to do about criminal damage, 
but they [force management] are saying I have to worry about vehicle 
crime and the rest of it. Yes, you can't argue with that because they 
are going to get beaten up if their figures are not coming up to 
scratch." (Interviewee 3) 
One quest ion this research sought to provide a n answer to was how 
the tens ion between the na t ional and the loca l was managed by the 
C D R P s . D i d they, l ike the Constabulary , show compliance, or were 
they more l ike ly to be resistant? A quotat ion from a C o r n i s h C D R P 
strategy document produced i n 1999 provides one possible answer: 
"It is impor tant that this cr ime reduct ion strategy a r i s ing from the 
cr ime audi t is l i nked to a n d is consistent w i t h the a ims of the 
a n n u a l po l ic ing p lan . If the two diverge, there is l ike ly to be a 
b lu r r i ng of the strategic priorit ies and , as a result , a reduct ion i n 
effectiveness." (p33 - Penwith) 
Th i s suggests a s trong pressure on the C D R P s to comply w i t h the 
police's p lan . Some part ic ipants i n this research suggested that the 
pressure appl ied to C D R P s was rather more 'indirect ' . Th is 
part icipant , for example, disclosed a police tactic u s e d i n publ ic 
consul ta t ion meetings: 
"If you ask the question 'is burglary an issue of concem for you?' 
don't be too surprised by the response. With an enforcement agency 
like the police leading the charge, of course that will feature as a 
priority. Similarly, speeding, litter and dog fouling are a public 
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concem [but] where the police are strong leaders these tend not to 
appear as priorities." (Interviewee 14) 
In essence, then, provided that the police h a d the leadership, they 
cou ld manipula te 1±ie agenda i n a way w h i c h ensured police priorities 
became, i n this case pub l i c priorit ies. Th i s par t ic ipant , however, used 
a s imi la r approach w i t h the C D R P : 
"In fairness the way we are going we would be quite cute in 
influencing down here the way that CDRP priorities are very much 
according to our priorities and that came out of the. matrix I did." 
(Interviewee 12) 
Another interviewee recollects that there was some space for loca l i sm 
at the outset, bu t s u c h space was relatively qu ick ly closed up : 
"The crime and disorder audits did not interfere too much with those 
priorities already set by ourselves. I think that the force did try to 
influence CDRP activity towards govemment priorities but again this 
was after 18 months or so where it really started to have an effect 
In the early stages the priorities set locally by the CDRP were far 
more meaningful to the local communities." (Interviewee 20) 
It is possible that the stronger 'steer' after 18 months i s at tr ibutable to 
the effect of the Nat iona l Cr ime Reduc t ion Strategy, announced i n 
2000 . Th i s strategy imposed the Home Office's Pub l i c Service 
Agreements (PSAs) onto the C D R P s , w h i c h t ranslated into five-year 
targets for the reduct ion of vehicle crime, domestic burglary a n d street 
robbery. The impos i t ion of the strategy was par t ly just i f ied by a 
c r i t i c i sm of the first r o u n d of C D R P strategies, w h i c h h a d shown wide 
variat ions i n target-setting - some C D R P s h a d set no targets at a l l , 
whi l s t others h a d set targets w h i c h were wi ld ly ambi t ious and 
unat ta inable . 
The increase i n Home Office 'pressure' provides a par t ia l explanat ion 
for the way C D R P s were d rawn into a police agenda, as the Home 
Office's performance management agendas for the police a n d for 
C D R P s started to merge. Police 'manipu la t ion ' of loca l agendas 
provides another par t ia l explanat ion, however, the research also 
identified other forces at work. To begin wi th , there was a widespread 
view amongst the police that they shou ld be ' i n charge' of 
par tnerships . Th i s view was 'tested' i n the survey stage of this 
research, w i t h 67 .2% (43) of the survey respondents either strongly 
agreeing or agreeing w i t h the statement that, "the police shou ld have 
lead responsibi l i ty for managing cr ime a n d disorder i n local 
communit ies ." Th is is not to say that they disagree that other agencies 
shou ld be involved - 62 .5% (40) of the respondents also agreed or 
strongly agreed w i t h the statement that, "it i s essent ial that the police 
service pushes more of a responsibi l i ty for the management of cr ime 
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a n d disorder onto other partner agencies." There i s no contradict ion 
here i n so m u c h the police recognise that there are th ings that other 
agencies can do to influence local cr ime a n d disorder patterns, 
however, they tend to t h i n k that s u c h activities shou ld be directed by, 
or at least responsive to, police concems . 
The idea that the police shou ld be i n a lead posi t ion w i t h regard to 
C D R P s is consistent w i t h the findings of other research w h i c h 
identifies a dominan t role for the police i n par tnerships . W h y then do 
the police feel the need to lead par tnerships? Clear ly , there is a 
his tory to police leadership i n local cr ime control . Pr ior to the 
emergence of the par tnership approach they were the m a i n , i f not the 
only, loca l cr ime control agency, albeit serving as a gateway to other 
parts of the c r i m i n a l jus t ice system. A s s u c h their professional 
identi ty has been crafted out of their sense of expertise as a crime 
control agency. However, how does this expertise actual ly manifest 
itself? 
S3nnbolic interactionists sometimes make use of the concept of 'the 
looking glass s e l f to make sense of how identit ies are shaped out of 
the way others see u s . Th i s concept enables u s to make sense of one 
way i n w h i c h the police leadership role manifests itself, s imply because 
other agencies 'expected' the police to take the lead i n dr iv ing forward 
par tnership bus iness either actively, i n the sense of 'bowing' to police 
expertise, or passively, i n the sense of not seeing i t as 'their bus iness ' 
a n d thus fail ing to get sufficiently involved. Th i s was a very strong 
theme i n the research, evidenced from the following quotes by 
par t ic ipants i n the interviews: 
"Initially I saw and felt there was a strong emphasis on the police to 
take the lead in meeting the new requirements and it was still very 
much still crime and disorder and very much seen as police 
business." (Interviewee 5) 
"We as a police service we are a driver as we need to work in 
partnership the problem is not that of the police alone. We need to 
work with other people and we need to look at long term solutions to 
solving problems. Whether our partner agencies always see that at 
the same time I am not so sure." (Interviewee 3) 
"I think the fact is and it's still recognised I think that they [other 
agencies] don't see it as their core business. I mean policing and 
crime is core business and it's actually getting it over to them that it 
has an effect on their organisation ... If there's no broken windows 
around it's good for business trade, increases shops, increases 
employment and it gives them more revenue. I mean it's actually 
making those links." (Interviewee 23) 
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"We have all got our targets, ours the police is obviously crime-
related, reduction of crime, detection of crime. Our partners, whilst 
that might feature somewhere within their targets, I am not sure 
that's their key targets. Whether they have actually got the energy 
the police have got towards that I am not so sure and that probably 
depends on, like, everybody else. Partners have their own targets 
and I don't necessarily know that their targets are to do with crime 
reduction in the same way as ours. So probably their energy is not 
quite the same as the police are in getting these solutions." 
(Interviewee 3) (Since 2000 other agencies - the loca l authori ty at 
least - Tiave' h a d the same cr ime reduct ion targets as the police, so 
this part icipant 's comments indicate that the targets are not the 
same because they are not pr ior i t ised i n the same way.) 
"We started feeling a bit sorry for other organisations who couldn't 
keep up to pace with crime and disorder and how on earth are they 
going to understand our business." (Interviewee 14) 
"We believed this was about other organisations getting into tune 
with crime and disorder. It wasn't about us. We already had this. It 
was our day job." (Interviewee 14) 
"They [other agencies] thought of us as an organisation who were 
very much results-based and we were taking the lead a lot and other 
agencies were dragging their feet. We sort of felt 'great, we have to 
work with other agencies and they are dragging their feet'. And it 
was more of a nuisance the sort of thing I felt when I joined [the 
CDRP]." [Interviewee 1) 
'1 think the police still take a major role - the lead role - in 
partnership initiatives, particularly locally, and we are forever 
badgering our partner agencies to come on board as much as we are 
involved. I think that's been from the outset and not just [this 
constabulary]. The police are still the main lead role as other partner 
agencies don't see crime and disorder as one of their main functions. 
Again I suppose in their way it is cynicism. They didn't set out to do 
their particular... they didn't see crime and disorder as a major part 
of their employment terms." (Interviewee 11) 
"You could almost say the name it has been given [crime and 
disorder reduction] is a barrier to it because the local council may 
say 'well it's crime and that's the police's job!'" (Interviewee 6) 
"The problem has been trying to get other agencies to just take that 
leap and see what they are doing on a day-to-day basis affects us." 
(Interviewee 7) 
"I think a lot of other particularly key partners - local authorities -
have been tardy in their responses and their commitment to 
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partnership working and have therefore not fully realised the full 
benefits." [Interviewee 13) 
"In our area the police have taken so much of it on, and I do 
sometimes wonder whether we should have perhaps held out and 
been slightly more robust, perhaps forcing one or two others to pick 
up their end." (Interviewee 8) 
"Look at local authorities. Actually analyse what they really do and 
have legal responsibility for, particularly principal authorities, and 
wonder how they actually can find resources to commit to what is 
not mainstream for them. Harsh words, but I think you will find over 
500 Acts of Parliament giving direct and indirect measurable 
responsibility for something or other to local authorities." (Interviewee 
16) 
"The police tend to take the lead and if we pull back from taking the 
lead and trying to drive things forward I don't know if there is 
anyone to step into that void." (Interviewee 3) 
Th i s last quote is perhaps indicative of the way the police can 
internalise the sense of leadership and' responsibi l i ty for C D R P 
bus iness , reasoning o n the basis of s u c h a n in t ema l i sa t ion that things 
m a y we l l fall apart i n their absence. In one response, a par t ic ipant 
suggested whi le other agencies might have made some resource 
commitment to par tnership work ing , i t was not enough to demonstrate 
true commitment . T h u s , for example, p lac ing responsibi l i ty i n the 
hands of a relatively l o w l y ' communi ty safety officer was not good 
enough a n d the l ack of senior management involvement imp l i ed a l ack 
of 'ownership' : 
"My concem is sometimes by resourcing partnership individuals 
[community safety officers] it lets off the organisation to embed 
further. I have a view about how we stmcture in terms of locally the 
BCU commander ... is the person who sits on the strategic 
partnership. When you sit down with the local authority chief 
executive that is the person who holds the purse strings and knows 
that organisation inside out and can make those decisions and can 
see the strategic way through." (Interviewee 14) 
If m i n i m a l commitment from others prompted the police to steer local 
par tnerships , so too d i d the Home Office's haste to have C D R P s u p 
a n d runn ing , even i f the police were not as 'ready' as they cou ld have 
been: 
"This was the first 'biggy' from a new administration. This was the 
flagship for the Labour Party and it did send out a message about 
the way the Labour Party was going to work and I remember this 
quite clearly at the time, thinking 'bugger, they really do want to 
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push this through quickly'... Our organisation was not prepared ... 
[but] what was quite successful in terms of sending this boat out 
with half its sails up and hoping somehow there was going to be 
some people on board who knew how to put the sails up and who 
will be able to steer it. And that sort of happened." (Interviewee 14) 
The haste beh ind the establishment of C D R P s effectively played into 
the hands of a police occupat ional cu l tu ra l inc l ina t ion to get on wi th 
the job , whether prepared or not. Th is cu l tu ra l inc l ina t ion is wel l set 
out i n the following quote from a neighbourhood team leader, a l though 
his specific point applies more to par tnership w o r k i n g i n beat 
management rather t han w i t h C D R P s : 
"I guess it's a matter of priority and where the job sees it in the list of 
priorities and a lot of work I do I would say is common sense and 
you are pretty au fait because of the job you do. If you don't know 
you ask but I think the job relies on that a lot They will make do 
and get on with it." (Interviewee 1) 
"I don't think the organisation as a body ... knew [how to work in 
partnership] ... That is the problem. The organisation has ...as a 
body it hasn't got a grip of this thing about partnership working with 
the Crime and Disorder [Act] because it moves at a speed at the coal 
face. ...It deals with the Act when it comes in." (Interviewee 14) 
The above quote also al ludes to the issue of organisat ional support for 
partnership work ing , w h i c h is addressed i n further detai l below. 
It was not j u s t the responses of other agencies, or the haste beh ind the 
Act 's implementat ion, w h i c h shaped the police's general sense of 
leadership. Police c la ims regarding their dominan t expertise i n local 
crime control were underp inned , to a considerable extent, by the crime 
management model the Cons tabulary h a d developed since the m i d -
1990s, as previously noted. The effect of the cr ime management model 
is wel l set out by this part icipant: 
"The crime management model was an interesting innovation. In 
many ways it was a forerunner of the awful NIM. Anyway, like the 
NM it started to make every aspect of crime into recordable and 
manageable processes. Whilst on the face of it that was fine, what 
no one could foresee was the beginning of the end for community 
engagement." {Interviewee 16) 
A s d iscussed i n Chapter 2, crime management provided the police 
service w i t h a n opportuni ty to re-assert their competence, and 
ownership of the cr ime problem, required as research evidence 
regarding the ineffectiveness of pol ic ing a n d pol icy developments 
before the early 1990s was effectively taking, or threatening to take, 
this away from them. It gave them the confidence to 'own' crime as a 
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problem, w h i c h they cou ld do something about by themselves. In 
par t icular , cr ime management also entailed the integrat ion of different 
aspects of pol ic ing , evidenced i n this Cons tabu la ry by the 
establ ishment of mul t i - funct ional D i v i s i o n a l Suppor t Teams ' to 
facilitate the pu r su i t of cr ime management at the B C U level. Th is 
inc luded cr ime reduct ion, a n d it effectively brought the police crime 
prevention specia l i sm, w h i c h as noted above was re-named crime 
reduct ion, ' i n from the cold ' . Where the cr ime prevention specia l ism 
h a d been a 'security ghetto' i n Weatheritt 's (1986) words, the crime 
reduct ion spec ia l i sm was, i n theory at least, brought back into the 
fold, as a n integral part of cr ime management. However, the 
implementa t ion of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t , a n d i n par t icular 
the ar r iva l of C D R P s , d id no th ing to d is turb the balance. C D R P 
bus iness was cr ime reduct ion, and it made sense, therefore, for cr ime 
reduct ion sergeants to be given a prominent role i n work ing at the 
operational end of C D R P s , work ing w i t h the p resumpt ion that other 
agencies cou ld be cajoled into doing things to help the police realise 
their objectives, j u s t as cr ime prevention officers saw their roles as 
encouraging others, s u c h as members of the pub l i c a n d private 
businesses, to take sensible securi ty measures . C r ime management 
d id not afford space for a n alternative view, especially where C D R P s 
might be involved i n the negotiation of shared purpose. Cr ime 
management prompted the quest ion V h a t cou ld C D R P s do for the 
police?' , not 'what cou ld the police do for C D R P s ? ' . To some extent 
this c an be evidenced from the guidance that the Cons tabulary 
produced i n 1996 to accompany the rol l -out of the Cr ime Management 
Model : 
"Crime Reduc t ion - cr ime prevention, y o u t h affairs, l icensing, drugs 
l ia ison, a n d cr ime alert, are pro-active functions, w i t h up-to-date 
intelligence being u s e d to tackle current pol ic ing problems. The 
involvement of these functions w i t h i n the d iv is iona l suppor t teams 
ensures a co-ordinated response a n d a l i n k w i t h other specialists. 
Cr ime Prevention - cr ime prevention officers benefit from being u p -
to-date w i t h the latest intelligence a n d cur ren t cr ime trends, 
u t i l i s ing the C I R R a S analyt ical work, a n d m a k i n g ful l use of 
intelligence i n l i a i s ing w i t h communi ty safety groups a n d statutory 
or voluntary groups or agencies. They are a focal point i n divis ional 
responses to repeat v ic t imisat ion, a n d suppor ted by up-to-date 
intelligence to produce a range of options a n d p lans for tackl ing 
specific identified loca l pol ic ing problems." (p22) 
It is wor th no t ing that at the time this guidance was produced, key 
na t ional objectives were geared very strongly towards cr ime detection 
as a performance measurement, thereby, consoHdating the 
'detectionist' mental i ty, w h i c h underp inned t i ie cr ime management 
model the adopt ion of w h i c h earned the Cons tabu la ry considerable 
praise from H M I C i n its 1997 /98 Pr imary Inspect ion Report. 
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If anyth ing , s u c h praise further entrenched this detectionist mentali ty. 
However, after the 1998 Act , there was a per iod of time when, 
according to one par t ic ipant "you w o u l d have got arrested for ta lk ing 
about detections" (Interviewee 14), this per iod was relatively short­
l ived, a n d m a y have reflected more of a cosmetic, t h a n a real change -
a case of the service being 'polit ically correct ' for a whi le , especially as 
the P S A targets were increasingly expressed i n terms of crime 
reduct ion rather t han crime detection. However, i n more recent years, 
par t icu lar ly w i t h the advent of the N I M w h i c h i n th is Cons tabula ry has 
been accompanied by a m u c h stronger senior management emphasis 
u p o n 'performance', this detectionism has once again been provided 
freer re in . 
The re la t ionship between crime management a n d C D R P s is a difficult 
and ambiguous one. The point being made i n th is sect ion is that the 
adopt ion of cr ime management, before the es tabl ishment of C D R P s , 
effectively prompted a dominant view that, i f they were of any use at 
a l l , C D R P s cou ld be 'used' by the police to further purposes identified 
th rough the cr ime management process, and pu r sued by the crime 
reduct ion sergeants through their l i n k s w i t h C D R P s . Th i s involved 
strategic a n d tact ical ' tasking and co-ordinat ion groups ' (TCGs), w h i c h 
i n t u r n related to Key Nat ional Objectives (for the strategic TCGs) a n d 
local problems 'guided by ' the K N O s (for the operat ional T C G s ) . 
One problem, however, was that the t imescale adopted by the C D R P s 
d id not fit the t imescales to w h i c h the T C G s operated: three-yearly 
audi ts made C D R P s the 'tortoises' i n compar i son to the T C G 'hares'. 
Another was that the T C G s were whol ly police bodies geared to the 
col lat ion a n d analysis of intelligence, w h i c h was very m u c h offender-
focused, thereby suppor t ing a detectionist mental i ty. S imul taneously , 
therefore, cr ime management placed C D R P s i n a potent ial role of 
'serving' police purposes, bu t then identified these purposes i n 
detectionist terms, geared ul t imately towards enforcement, w h i c h the 
police c o u l d do largely by themselves wi thou t any par t icular 
cont r ibut ion from partner agencies, other t han ass i s t ing the process of 
intell igence-gathering (which d i d not necessari ly require the formation 
of C D R P s ) . 
Metaphor ica l ly then, C D R P s were sucked i n a n d spat out by crime 
management. In practice, they remained marg ina l as they d id not fit 
the puzzle of loca l cr ime management. Th i s is a p rob lem that the 2006 
review of C D R P s sought to address, proposing the abol i t ion of 3-yearly 
audi ts a n d their replacement by s ix-monthly strategic reviews, w h i c h 
cou ld be dovetailed w i t h the police's deployment of the N I M through 
the strategic T C G s . The review also proposed that par tner agencies 
shou ld be d r awn more into these T C G s , a l though th is is something 
that, at the t ime this research came to a n end, the Cons tabula ry was 
only beginning to consider, w i th some reticence. 
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In this Cons tabulary , the police cont inue to 'contribute ' to C D R P 
par tnership w o r k i n g as i t is clearly a Home Office pol icy requirement, 
and because to do otherwise wou ld be to go against the compliance 
approach described elsewhere i n th is chapter. Yet C D R P agendas, l ike 
local po l ic ing agendas, are set nat ional ly th rough Home Office PSAs , to 
w h i c h they have been subjected since 2000 . T h u s , whi le they are 
expected to contribute, the terms of their contr ibut ions are largely set 
outside the C D R P s , i n ways w h i c h c a n be met wi thout any significant 
contr ibut ion to C D R P s , or accommodat ion to alternative agendas 
because these terms can be met through a N I M process wh ich , as 
others have shown (Maguire, 2003), is police-owned, police-led a n d 
detectionist i n orientation. 
Evidence of a genuine 'organisational ' commitment to partnership 
work ing therefore remains scant. F r o m 2000 there was 'some' 
evidence of this as the new Chief Constable sought to drive the 
Cons tabula ry down a neighbourhood pol ic ing path: another example of 
the Cons tabu la ry being ahead of the game, since neighbourhood 
pol ic ing was not fully rol led out nat ional ly u n t i l 2 0 0 3 / 4 . The intent ion 
was to es tabl ish neighbourhood pol ic ing teams w i t h dedicated 
'problem-solvers ' to analyse very loca l cr ime problems and develop 
solutions, m a n y of w h i c h w o u l d be mult i -agency i n nature. However, 
not only d i d this rub u p against the cr ime management philosophy, 
w h i c h kept problem-solving very m u c h ' i n house ' w i t h i n the police 
service, i t was also very resource-intensive, w h i c h probably made i t 
unsus ta inable . The more recent, a n d perhaps inevitable, retreat from 
neighbourhood pol ic ing has left gaps w h i c h have been plugged by the 
new Police C o m m u n i t y Suppor t Officers (PCSOs). Those regular 
officers now i n post have been given a rather different mandate: 
"My idea of neighbourhood policing is arresting the bad guys making 
the streets safer to live. The drive from SMT is to reduce the number 
of partnership meetings that the beat managers go to and 
concentrate more on crime reduction, but in particular on crime 
detection, and also increasing the flow of information and 
intelligence." (Interviewee 3) 
S u c h a view does not necessarily find favour w i t h serving 
neighbourhood beat managers: 
"I believed that I would get a say in the management of my own 
patch and that beat managers manage their own area and do 
initiatives. That really doesn't happen. I am still really led by my 
sergeant and inspector and what the SMT want, and don't really get 
to manage very much." (Interviewee 1) 
"We've been told that unless it's specifically linked with the detection 
of crime then we shouldn't be giving any time to it. ... 'I want you out 
on the streets. I want you in people" faces. I want you doing 
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warrants and annoying people. Getting in their face. Disrupting 
them'. That's great, but I would say not by the beat manager. " 
(Interviewee 1) 
"If you are going to have a beat manager, the beat manager should 
manage his own beat, without so much interference from SMT. And it 
does work with the partnerships." (Interviewee 2) 
"I have got concems at SMT level, because they are driven by crime 
stats and they have got their targets to meet and I think they are 
overriding the partnership work or the community side." (Interviewee 
2) 
Th i s retreat from a more 'partnership-friendly' model of neighbourhood 
pol ic ing was exacerbated by the recent review of police forces wi th a 
view to merging those deemed too sma l l to operate as 'strategic forces'. 
W i t h i n th is Constabulary , considerable effort was expended on seeking 
to demonstrate its capacity i n terms of 'protective services', 
par t icu lar ly w i t h regard to functions s u c h as intelligence-gathering 
a n d enforcement. Some part ic ipants acknowledged that th is h a d h a d 
k n o c k - o n effects for par tnership work ing , effectively diverting 
resources away from it: 
"The review of strategic forces and delivery of protective services to 
the national level highlights a step too far away from'.:, partnership 
working and neighbourhood policing. There is this constant trying to 
find and maintain the right balance, and now we are going to find 
that perversely whilst we are talking about delivering neighbourhood 
policing in terms of swom staff we may well move back slightly 
towards protective services." (Interviewee 8) 
In so far as this shift towards strengthening 'protective services' 
requires par tnership work ing , i t also requires a par t icu la r var iant of it, 
as this par t ic ipant revealed: 
"We need an uplift in performance. We need to be involving partners 
to do things better, and protective services which is the hard stuff. 
But we need to work with partners as well. Not necessarily 
community partners, but criminal justice partners." (Interviewee 12) 
W o r k w i t h ' c r imina l jus t ice partners ' inc ludes , for example, pub l ic 
protection work w i t h the probat ion service w h i c h , l ike detectionism, 
retains a s t rong offender orientation, whereas work w i t h ' communi ty 
partners ' - more the province of the C D R P - w o u l d appear to ho ld 
m u c h less appeal , at least for this part icipant . Others regretted s u c h a 
viewpoint a n d they regarded it as being representative of the current 
senior management perspective: 
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"It is really the undervalued side to policing and as individuals we 
all have to try and influence and inform others around us within the 
organisation of the value of working in partnership, to sell the vision 
to them and to attempt to free up sufficient resources to be able to 
significantly make a difference." (Interviewee 5) 
"I think they [senior management] see beat managers as a wasted 
resource, and I think [senior management think] I am a lost patrol 
officer rather than an engaged beat manager unfortunately. I think 
that's the way we are viewed." (Interviewee 1). 
Whi l s t the above focuses u p o n par tnership w o r k i n g i n the context of 
neighbourhood pol ic ing, i t is important to stress that there is .a l i n k 
between this a n d the more strategic focus of C D R P s , i n so far as the 
bus iness of C D R P s , ideally, is to provide the condi t ions w h i c h 
maximise opportunit ies for operational par tnership work ing at the 
neighbourhood level. The evidence considered i n this sect ion suggests 
that while the police have occupied a lead role i n C D R P s they have 
generally u s e d th is lead role to ensure C D R P s keep 'on side ' w i th the 
police's own strategic priorit ies, w h i c h are set down from the centre 
th rough the performance management framework. Cr ime management 
provides a process for b r ing ing C D R P s 'into service' i n pu r su i t of the 
police's priorit ies, however, they are not necessari ly needed as this can 
be achieved by the police alone, operating w i t h their dominant 
detectionist mentali ty. Despite earlier moves i n the direct ion of a 
'partnership-friendly' model of ne ighbourhood pol icing, the 
Cons tabu la ry has since retreated to a posi t ion, w h i c h requires its 
resources to be more focused on intelligence a n d detection, a n d this 
has further reduced scope for productive par tnership work ing , though 
the police cont inue to p lay their part i n C D R P s , as they are expected to 
do so by the Home Office. 
A l though the police organisat ion has operated i n m a n y ways to stifle 
the potential of the par tnership approach, there are nevertheless m a n y 
officers who have worked w i t h C D R P s and who have seen the potential 
of par tnership work ing . The next section w i l l consider the extent to 
w h i c h they have been supported i n their endeavours by the police 
organisat ion a n d cul ture . 
Organisational Support for Partnership Working 
W h e n the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t was implemented i t was 
accompanied by a range of guidance materials , s u c h as the 'Statutory 
Guidance ' (Home Office, 1998), the prac t ica l 'manua l ' 'Getting the 
Grease to the Squeak ' (Hough and Til ley, 1998) a n d 'Beat ing Cr ime ' 
(HMIC, 1998). However, i t is not u sua l l y the case, that police officers 
rout inely access s u c h guidance themselves. A l though , i t wou ld be 
reasonable to expect the Cons tabula ry to have some role to play, as a 
condui t for s u c h advice a n d guidance. The performance of s u c h a role 
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w o u l d b r ing the necessary support to those officers charged wi th a 
responsibi l i ty for delivering the new statutory duty for par tnership 
work ing . It i s reasonable to th ink , moreover, that there might be a role 
i n this for those w i t h a responsibi l i ty for police t ra in ing i n this regard. 
In its 1996 Five Year P lan , the Cons tabula ry made clear i ts intentions; 
"To optimise the use of a l l staff to meet the requirements of 
pol ic ing. . . To develop the sk i l l s , knowledge a n d experience of our 
staff to the highest s tandards i n order to meet the po l ic ing needs of 
our communi t ies ." (p23) 
A s previously noted, the same p l a n identified one of these 'policing 
needs' as par tnership work ing w i t h other agencies, a n d i n its 1997 
Pr imary Inspect ion Report H M I C noted that "The t ra in ing and 
development strategy was being drafted at the t ime of the Inspection 
a n d a ims to provide the t ra in ing necessary to meet the loca l pol ic ing 
p l a n objectives." (p25) 
The quest ion posed is , has the existence of s u c h a ims a n d intentions 
resul ted i n the provis ion of t ra in ing suppor t to those engaged i n 
par tnership work ing? Evidence suggests that the Constabulary 's 
intentions, i n reality, have not extended to the provis ion of s u c h 
t ra ining. Th i s was the posi t ion as some new recrui ts experienced it: 
"The police training at the time was all about learning the law and 
the application offeree. There was nothing in that training at all 
about building and maintaining relationships which I think is 
actually more important than knowing the law. That's the way 
police training was then, and that was the way it was expressed in 
my tutorship and on the streets." (Interviewee 7) 
"Back then very very different training regime. But it was all about 
going out catching villains." (Interviewee 10) 
The posi t ion was not greatly different for those officers more central ly 
involved i n es tabl ishing the new partnerships: 
"There were a lot of messages and bits and pieces but there was 
nothing saying this is how we are going to go about it, and this is 
what it actually means. We still get it now - 'as from this date this 
will happen' - and I think as a service we need to look at how we 
circulate and advertise stuff and actually put it across." (Interviewee 
9) 
"It wasn't until I had the post that I personally had to start picking 
up community safety issues and I received no training in this at all. I 
think I booked myself onto one course at Bramshill which was 
around the strategic development of community safety partnerships 
or something of that nature." (Interviewee 8) 
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"I had gone as a district commander to chair a CDRP. ... I was 
educated by that parinership." (Interviewee 14) 
"What we've picked up [has been] from our own personal 
experiences without any suppori in that area." (Interviewee 23) 
In order to ga in a broader sense of the extent of t r a in ing i n partnership 
work ing one of the survey questions asked respondents whether they 
had received any mult i -agency t ra ining, or ins t ruc t ion regarding how 
to under take mult i -agency par tnership work ing . 71.4% (45) of 
respondents sa id they h a d received no s u c h t ra in ing. Of those who 
h a d received s u c h t ra ining, the majority noted i t h a d been problem-
solving t ra in ing for neighbourhood pol ic ing (which was l i nked to the 
rol lout of neighbourhood pol ic ing i n the Constabulary) , or jo in t 
t ra in ing a r o u n d specific specialist issues , for example, ch i ld 
protection. The following interview response from a middle manager i n 
police t ra in ing supports the survey findings: 
"Parinership training within the force does not exist as a stand-alone 
module. However, if we scratch below the surface there are some 
significant training initiatives that occur, but these tend to be focused 
upon specific areas of business rather than as a generic 'how to do 
parinership' package." (Interviewee 19) 
A n analys is of the most recent (2007/08) suite of t ra in ing courses 
provided by the Cons tabula ry supports , to a very l imi ted degree, this 
part icipant 's point , a l though out of 570 i nd iv idua l courses only 15 
appeared to have a mult i -agency element to them, a n d i n only one d id 
the word 'partnership ' feature i n the course title. Of these 15, most 
were i n special is t areas s u c h as ch i l d protect ion or domestic violence. 
There are a n u m b e r of possible explanations for the l a ck of t ra in ing 
provis ion i n par tnership work ing w i t h i n the Cons tabulary . One simple 
explanat ion might be the assumpt ion that s u c h t ra in ing shou ld be 
provided outside the Force area. There is some jus t i f ica t ion for s u c h 
an a s sumpt ion due to the existence at that t ime of the Nat ional Cr ime 
Prevention Tra in ing Centre at Eas ingwold . Th i s has now closed down, 
w i t h elements of s u c h t ra in ing being moved to B r a m s h i l l . However, i t 
was certainly i n existence at the t ime of the first implementa t ion of the 
1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t , yet, as others have identified, this 
t ra in ing was overwhelmingly of a pract ical , s i tua t ional k i n d , confined 
to crime prevention officers, for w h o m it was considered most relevant. 
In addi t ion to Eas ingwold , as ment ioned by one of the interviewees 
above, there was t ra in ing provis ion at B r a m s h i l l , a n d some of this d id 
focus u p o n par tnership working . The Nat iona l Po l ic ing Improvement 
Agency (NPIA) has established two programmes, one i n Core 
Leadership Development, a n d the other i n Senior Leadership 
Development, bo th of w h i c h incorporate par tnership work ing w i t h i n 
their module syl labi . The problem w i t h s u c h provis ion, however, is 
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that i t is l imi ted to those more ambi t ious ind iv idua l s pu r su ing their 
professional development, a n d thus , this approach runs the r i sk of 
par tnership w o r k i n g being perceived as a 'specialist ' s k i l l rather than a 
generic element of police t ra in ing a n d competence. Evidence for the 
existence of s u c h a perception may be found i n the following comment 
from one of the interviewees: 
"[Partnership working is relevant] from inspector upwards at 
management team level, but in reality there is still a large percentage 
of our constables and sergeants who even now still do not get 
involved or do not see the significance of partnership working." 
(Interviewee 5) 
W i t h regard to the j u n i o r r anks one par t ic ipant sa id 
"It doesn't affect them because it doesn't fall within their role and I 
don't think the organisation has ever stopped and taken stock of 
where they are about the Crime and Disorder Act. 'Hang on we've 
missed a trick here' or 'we haven't engaged as much as we could' or 
'our understanding of it was quite simplistic or quite naive." 
(Interviewee 14) 
In the previous section the point was made that for many , partnership 
work ing was j u s t something that they were expected 'to get on wi th ' . 
Th i s expectation attests to the existence of a pragmatic 'no nonsense ' 
attitude, w h i c h cou ld be regarded as a feature of the police 
organisat ional cul ture - i t is action-oriented, rather than 
contemplative, even i f that act ion is not always wel l informed. Officers 
are expected to follow orders and to be decisive rather t han hesitant. 
S u c h a n approach affords little space for quest ioning 'the whys and 
wherefores' of par tnership work ing , or to reveal 1±ie existence of 
uncertainty. One might explain the l ack of t ra in ing provis ion i n s u c h 
terms i.e. i t was j u s t something to get on wi th . 
However, th is does not really explain the l ack of t r a in ing provis ion i n 
par tnership work ing , relative to the provis ion of t r a in ing i n other areas 
of 'pol icing need', s u c h as diversity or hea l th a n d safety. Th i s is not to 
suggest that these areas are unimpor tant , bu t rather to suggest that 
there is a selection process i n determining w h i c h pol ic ing needs 
require t ra in ing support , a n d w h i c h do not. Perhaps there is a view 
that par tnership work ing does not require t r a in ing suppor t because i t 
i s ' common sense', rather t han something that c a n be taught. If s u c h 
a view does exist i t is mis taken , a n d the consis tency of research 
findings regarding the problematic nature of par tnership work ing 
suggests the folly of s u c h a viewpoint. Alternatively, i t is possible that 
par tnership work ing s imply lacks priori ty: i t i s not deemed important 
enough to just ify bespoke t ra in ing provis ion. In the previous section, 
the d i scuss ion demonstrates that i n the Constabulary ' s 'big p u s h ' i n 
the direct ion of cr ime management, par tnership w o r k i n g was to some 
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extent overlooked, marginal i sed a n d made 'excess to requirement' . It 
was also suggested at the beginning of the chapter that par tnership 
work ing was conceptual ly tied to ' communi ty work' , w h i c h is often 
seen as hav ing less to do w i t h operat ional pol ic ing, a n d more to do 
wi th enhanc ing the legit imacy of the police service, through good 
publ ic relations. If par tnership work ing , then, is seen as little more 
than 'flag flying' , i t w o u l d follow that there i s little need for substant ia l 
t ra in ing support . 
Partnership and Police Culture 
Tra in ing is one way i n w h i c h organisat ional suppor t for par tnership 
work ing c a n be provided. Another form of organisat ion support is 
' cu l tura l ' support : to wha t extent does the police cul ture make space 
for, or accommodate, par tnership working? Th i s i ssue of cu l tu ra l 
support was a s t rong theme i n the interviews, w h i c h lends support to 
Crawford's (1997) point that those s tudying par tnership work ing 
shou ld devote as m u c h attention to ' intra'-agency factors as to 'inter'-
agency ones. 
W h e n asked whether they got m u c h i n the way of support for their 
par tnership work ing from the police organisat ion, the majority of 
part icipants were clear that they d id not. One par t ic ipant noted that 
"there's been very little central support in my view to tell us how, as 
district commanders, to do the job." (Interviewee 23). Lower down the 
hierarchy, meanwhile , a sergeant sa id the following: 
"Sergeants tend to get things done, which is great, and I guess that 
is what was needed in the early stages, but certainly senior 
involvement in the early audits was almost negligible. ... Senior 
officers in all organisations, not just the police, didn't see or 
understand what section 17 was all about." (Interviewee 7). 
"The difference between the tiers is probably the ideology is perfectly 
acceptable with what they want us to do and what they want to see, 
but they don't put the ground work into base level. I mean for 
someone like me there should be courses to go on. There should be 
time to go to meetings with the authority. We get nothing given to us 
to try and get these ideas implemented. ... The philosophy of the 
national model is we should be working in partnership but if I don't 
get a phone call or make a phone call it doesn't happen." 
(Interviewee 9) 
"That's where a lot of policing is let down. It looks good on the 
paperwork disseminating posters, but the nucleus at the bottom -
nothing gets done with it. There are public pronouncements 
regarding community work, but it doesn't seem to come down to 
basic level and actually do it. ... We say we are doing all this but we 
are not really." (Interviewee 9) 
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"It's like everything else. It puts it out and expects it to be done. What 
it actually doesn't check up on is to see if it is being done? I don't 
think it happens. It's almost like there is an assumption from HQ 
that people are doing what they should be doing and because its 
working and the force is where it is that it actually must be 
happening. Apart from one senior officer I have not had one person 
ask me what I am doing and what partnerships I am going to. They 
have not actually asked what I've done towards partnership since I 
have got here, what I have done to enable partnership working." 
(Interviewee 10) 
"Personally I think it is something that they spout about but not 
something they actually do as a force, and its only down to certain 
individuals with the way they want to push it and what they get out 
of it and see the way forward and what can be achieved as to some 
people doing it and some not." (Interviewee 8) 
"I don't see the constabulary has it (partnership working] as part of 
its core business, and I think that is reflected in the limited resource 
that is put into it, and to a degree of Up service that is put to it." 
(Interviewee 5) 
"The force vision for several years has been of working in 
partnership with the problem-solving style. In reality this has not 
been achieved to a great degree." (Interviewee 5) 
Tak ing these views to be broadly representative, the quest ion has to be 
asked, w h y there is a l ack of cu l tu ra l support for par tnership work ing 
w i t h i n the police? Perhaps reflecting a senior management point of 
view, one par t ic ipant suggested that extensive support was not 
necessary, a l though this view was not widely shared by other 
par t ic ipants who thought the Cons tabulary cou ld be doing a lot more: 
"Does it matter that I don't know how a PCT or a trust authority 
works? [No] Does it matter I get my shoulder repaired? Yes it does, 
and I think that's almost true of a lot of partnership stuff. The reality 
was you don't have to put an awful lot of resources in to make 
partnership working right. A few intense specialised resources can 
make it work." (Interviewee 14) 
This par t ic ipant was imp ly ing that wha t was impor tant was the 
delivery side of things, rather than the strategy, a l though this does 
raise the quest ion of wha t can be delivered from l imi ted resource 
commitments . 
Some part ic ipants ta lked about the way poli t ics got i n the way of the 
k i n d of strategic t h i n k i n g the establ ishment of C D R P s were supposed 
to encourage: 
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"No matter what political party is in, whether at a local level or 
national, there will always he an influence on what we do 
operationally. ... That's not to say that we shouldn't be doing things 
but I am wary of making plans too far ahead because I really don't 
think they will come to fruition because of the changing nature of the 
landscape." (Interviewee 7) 
"There is plenty of literature saying strategic planning in the public 
sector is a complete waste of time anyway because strategic 
planning only lasts as long as the next election, and the difference 
between public and private sector management is that in the private 
sector you know where you are going to be. If you are McDonalds 
you need to sell more burgers and you are still going to need to sell 
more burgers in five or ten years' time. But we are under political 
control and I don't have a problem with that but it comes with an 
understanding that political masters can change their minds and 
they can be changed by circumstances and they can be voted out or 
voted in." [Interviewee 17) 
This poli t ics , therefore, engenders a degree of cyn ic i sm, a sense that i t 
i s not wor th m a k i n g strategic decisions because they are always 
vulnerable to change somewhere down the l ine. The C3niicism is 
directed not so m u c h at par tnership work ing as the strategic th ink ing 
that s u c h work ing is supposed to encapsulate. To some extent s u c h 
cyn ic i sm was just i f ied, given that C D R P strategies were soon rendered 
'out-of-date' by the (late) ar r ival of the Cr ime Reduc t ion Programme i n 
1999, a n d again i n 2002 by the (late) ar r iva l of the Safer Communi t i e s 
F u n d (Gil l ing, 2007), w i t h both funding streams becoming available 
only after C D R P s h a d been required to p u b l i s h their three-year 
strategies. It i s also just i f ied by the perpetual pol icy changes, effected 
by the Labour government, and referred to by others as a case of 
' init iativit is ' . 
It is not j u s t the pol i t ica l context, w h i c h generates a cyn ica l view of the 
k i n d of strategic t h i n k i n g that the es tabl ishment of C D R P s was 
supposed to encourage. Rather, i t is also the cu l t u r a l unders tanding 
of the nature of pol ic ing itself, w h i c h is perceived to be involved very 
m u c h wi th the 'here a n d now'. Th is was wel l expressed by the 
following part icipant: 
"Operational policing is the here and now issues which the command 
team don't come into contact with. [They] look at a more strategic 
level at reducing [crime] this year, next year, five years down the 
line, whereas operationally as a sector inspector I am looking at 
reducing crime now because everything is very short term and when 
I go to tactical tasking I am not being assessed on how I have done 
over 12 months or two years. I am being assessed on what is 
happening in the last month and what has happened in the last 
week." (Interviewee 3) 
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If pressure for pol ic ing i n t i ie l i e re a n d now' does not come from the 
crime management process, i t comes from pub l i c expectations, a n d 
'public expectations' may be used as a rhetor ical device to justify the 
lack of organisat ional commitment to par tnership work ing : 
"What is difficult to evidence and quantify are the gains that are 
made through partnership working, and you are trying to meet 
massive public expectations which surround the response element." 
(Interviewee 5) 
"We have proven time and time again that if we can free officers up 
to be proactive and preventive then we can actually achieve 
significant gains but as an organisation we continue to try and meet 
a public expectation for a certain level of response." (Interviewee 5) 
"There is inevitably cynicism and it will take a long time actually to 
sort itself out. You know and I know it's about response, response, 
response. I don't even like the word. You know that? It's a dirty 
word, but that's the perception. It's job to job and get through the 
working day." (Interviewee 03) 
"The emphasis of crime and disorder is very much police core 
business. The subtle changes have been around community safety, 
and visibility of senior people, the role of a CDRP ... [but] that is not 
connected into the public psyche in any way." (Interviewee 13) 
The above par t ic ipants recognise the value of par tnership working, 
however, see themselves as fighting a los ing battle. Publ ic 
expectations m a y be one reason for them losing, b u t another reason is 
highlighted w i t h i n the nature of police cul ture: 
"You have got a massive and then majority of the organisation that 
still works in a response mode well outside any of the influences or 
impact of partnership working and still do not see it as their 
mainstream core business." (Interviewee 5) 
"We were heavily influenced by detections and not at any cost but at 
any value so administrative detections and whatever it was that 
determined what we did. Again that was something we were 
responsible for and didn't look to our partners. If we were looking for 
crime and disorder reduction I suppose we would have squared the 
circle by having crime reduction officers in place and they kinda did 
something that we didn't worry our pretty little heads about too 
much. But they looked after that. The rest of us were supporting a 
CID charge towards detections." (Interviewee 14) 
"I chaired a meeting last Friday around international workers, and 
we're considering a criminal market and there are a lot of resources 
in support of that. We're talking about crime and there's a whole 
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host happening in the partnership world around support of the 
victim. I'm looking at the process and building the two together, [but] 
I have field intelligence officers and senior investigating officers 
looking at me and saying 'I don't want to be involved with Job 
Centre Plus or 'are we getting the right allowances' and all that 
stuff." [Interviewee 12) 
"The trouble with the police is there are so many different officers 
like NBMs and response, and they get into their own little niche. 
Your response officer doesn't have the time or inclination to go and 
get developed into partnership and why should they? Because they 
are doing a specific job. They see that ... if a job comes up which 
needs a social worker, the local authority or an ASBO starting off it 
goes to someone who has the time to deal with that." (Interviewee 
10) 
"There's a culture that we respond and that is what we do and are 
good at, and going beyond that when people are progressing in 
service they are either going to go up the promotion chain or they will 
specialise into CID for example, and there is a culture that develops 
in CID that they deal with the hard-edged side of offending and 
partnership then does not affect them." (Interviewee 5) 
"There is still a certain amount of cynicism towards it. I am not 
trying to stereotype but persons with more service harp back to the 
good old days, and they're not too willing to embrace the change and 
see the benefits, and if they are they are not too outward-speaking in 
relation to that." (Interviewee 11) 
"I don't think that sergeants and constables and probably the bulk of 
response or CID officers see it as their core business, partnership 
working, even now. I think there is a culture of officers coming in 
and dealing with what is in front of their noses, what they are 
tasked with while they are on duty. And a lot of them still do not 
work with a problem-solving ethos." (Interviewee 5) 
"There is a reluctance outside beat managers. Like response looking 
up saying 'why are we doing that? It's a load of crap!' You do get 
that a lot and I think it's hard for them to see the benefits of what 
we're doing. For example, I don't think people realise ... if you go for 
an ASBO the amount of work required to get that. They think it's a 
pink and fluffy way of doing that. So I still think there is a certain 
amount of reluctance from certain quarters." (Interviewee 11) 
The cu l tu ra l disinterest i n , a n d negative evaluat ion of, par tnership 
work ing is u n l i k e l y to make the task any easier to perforrn: rather l ike 
the 'security ghetto' that Weatheritt (1986) identified as the home of 
cr ime prevention officers, these officers f ind themselves i n a 
'partnership ghetto', not wel l appreciated by their colleagues: 
-129 -
"When I came out the Act had kicked in and we had crime reduction 
sergeants. I was a patrol sergeant, and the crime reduction sergeant 
was described by the rank and file and some of the inspectors as a 
bit 'airy fairy'. 'That bloke's always up at the council, et cetera'." 
(Interviewee 7) 
This par t icu lar part icipant , however, d id not subscr ibe to s u c h a view, 
and went o n to say "But I had a few chats with the individual and 
quickly saw the benefits of being able to get things done together." 
Indeed, m a n y of the part icipants i n this research were aware of the 
fact they were going against the grain a n d even h a d some commitment 
to so doing, recognising wi thout them there was the danger of a 
reversion to type: 
"Although we've had it on all our strategic documentation for a long 
time I think if it was left it would revert back to old police culture 
quite quickly, and in a couple of years we would be back to doing 
what we did. It needs that constant pressure to say partnership is a 
way of working, and we have to keep that going." (Interviewee 7) 
Others believed that there were signs of things getting better, w i th the 
value of par tnership work ing being recognised more w i t h i n operational 
pol icing: 
"GCIs [geographical chief inspectors] to be honest have been much 
more savvy about what the benefits are likely to be and I think 
sometimes it is driven by the view that we are going to get something 
for nothing here, which is fine because at the end of the day we all 
want to achieve something. But the level of awareness I have 
noticed certainly among sector inspectors has grown immensely over 
the last three years. They talk much more these days around 'can 
the CDRP do this, can the CDRP do that?'." (Interviewee 6) 
"Policing culture has changed, there are no two ways about it. Prior 
to '98 individuals worked in partnership but it really wasn't an 
organisational thing. It's now required, and there is an expectation 
that we work in partnership. But that has been a long haul. That's 
about putting that partnership word in our strategic vision for a long 
time. So I think people accept it is there but I really don't think we 
have convinced everybody yet." (Interviewee 7) 
"I certainly think there's an awareness now with most officers, that 
perhaps I didn't have, as to how to call in and direct other agencies 
to issues. ... [There is] a greater embeddedness of partnership 
working to the extent now where on BCU we have strategic partners 
at strategic assessments. We are at a level now where we have 
come an awful long way." (Interviewee 8) 
This same part icipant , however, was not naive. He acknowledged that; 
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"the cultural change perhaps hasn't occurred and ... you could argue 
that perhaps there should have been more mandating of some of the 
requirements." 
Another par t ic ipant thought that the Tiere a n d now' nature of pol ic ing 
w o u l d always l imi t the capacity of par tnership w o r k i n g to penetrate 
the work ing cul ture: 
"We have so many jobs coming. People still come to us and say we 
need your help, and we still haven't got that right at all. So, that 
demand management stuff, that's still our priority and what the 
public expects us to do. The other bits and pieces are icing on the 
• cake. In my view the issue around partnership working is that it's 
long term. You are talking millions of pounds and years of 
investment to change some social issues. And while that's, going on, 
we still have the day job." (Interviewee 12) 
Whi l s t i t might have been thought that support was a major issue for 
those embark ing into the u n k n o w n wor ld of mandatory par tnership 
work ing , i n reali ty this is not necessari ly how those work ing i n 
par tnership saw it. A s one par t ic ipant observed: 
"I think the pace of district development and working in partnership 
was moving so fast that the centre couldn't keep up with it. I mean 
we've direct links with Home Office websites, we've got internet in 
district. We're getting documents straight off the web and starting to 
work on them before we get a steer, if we need a steer, from the 
centre on anything." (Interviewee 23) 
Another noted s imply that "we were pretty well autonomous." 
(Interviewee 14). It m a y be that this acquired au tonomy was a na tu ra l 
corollary of the move towards decentral isat ion to B C U s , w h i c h the 
Home Office h a d been encouraging since the mid-1990s , along wi th 
the technological changes identified above that provided alternative 
sources of support a n d guidance from the centre. A s d iscussed earlier 
i n th is chapter, the Cons tabulary h a d shown, th rough its 1999 
reorganisation, a compliance wi th this w i s h for more decentral isat ion 
a n d some par t ic ipants stressed the important role p layed by some far-
sighted senior managers i n this process: 
"It was heavily dependent upon key individuals. In my experience 
we did have those key individuals." (Interviewee 14) 
"Shorily after 1998 the force recruited some new chief officers and 
there was one in pariicular who was very well read and versed in 
the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act and problem-solving 
policing, and I was involved in a reorganisation which took us 
towards much greater emphasis and integration with partners [and 
a] problem-solving style of policing. ... But that was very much a top-
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down [initiative] and down to one individual that then led to a 
number of changes underpinned by the Crime and Disorder Act and 
its requirements." [Interviewee 13) 
"We had transferees into the force at senior ranks and they brought 
things into the force as well, and the agenda certainly built and it 
was all about working together plus the mandatory element of 
certainly local authorities. They had to start engaging with us and 
they were looking for it and they soon latched on that we were a 
model organisation." (Interviewee 12) 
"We got the momentum going. The command team at the time 
realised this is the way to go and actually were up for it and that 
was one of the reasons we then got into district commands." 
(Interviewee 12) 
The interview par t ic ipants offered different views i n relat ion to what 
the new Dis t r ic t Commanders were able to do w i t h their 'new-found' 
autonomy. One suggested that the career interests of the Dis t r ic t 
Commanders got i n the way, s topping them from operating too 
independently: 
"The culture in the force equalled a feeling of imposed direction and 
compliance [to] the centre. This led to an unwillingness among 
commanders to be creative, innovative, or to make decisions that 
hadn't either been made before or that were recorded in the million or 
so pages of useless policy and working practice that we have." 
(Interviewee 18) 
The same par t ic ipant added that "The controlling nature of the centre 
made it impossible for me to vary crime recording, deployment, and 
screening policies locally, and this meant that the centre actually cost 
me performance." He suggested, moreover, that th is pressure extended 
to a l l other distr ict commands as wel l : 
"Senior officers identified the potential in the district structures to 
significantly improve performance, but with sixteen of us it was 
difficult to manage and I believe HQ needed to control commanders, 
which was at that time more important than the desire for radical 
performance uplift." 
Evident ly this caused tensions w i t h i n the police organisat ion: 
"In relation to the police area/district (note: in the reorganised 
structure areas set above districts) relationship, there was a 
particular challenge in [one area]. A compliant chief superintendent 
with no ounce of pro-activity or innovation, and a number of keen 
district commanders who just wanted to get on and rebuild the 
world. This was unmanageable and caused a lot of stress for the 
- 132-
chief superintendent who was the wrong personality to control the 
district commanders on behalf of HQ." 
Another par t ic ipant confirmed this picture: 
"Direct funding streams arrived, autonomous resourcing, et cetera. It 
gave the new district commanders power that was not liked upstairs. 
In fairness that concem was justified as, still, most of the legislation 
put accountability directly on chief constables, but they were losing 
the ability to direct and influence. That is why the areas had to come 
back to force the district commanders into line and, later on, one of 
the reasons why areas actually became the new basic command 
units." [Interviewee 16) 
"I remember [the chief constable] getting very irate at district 
commanders who he perceived as having 'gone native'. He used to 
say things like 'they are my officers, working for me, towards my 
authority's targets." (Interviewee 16) 
The perceived problem, of headquarters l o s i n g contro l ' of autonomous 
distr icts , was not necessari ly down to the threat of C D R P s 'going their 
own way ' because, as d iscussed previously, police representatives 
generally sought to 'steer' C D R P s , w i t h greater or lesser degrees of 
subtlety, to ensure that C D R P strategies were consistent w i t h pol ic ing 
priorit ies, as imposed u p o n headquarters from the Home Office. One 
part icipant , however, d id suggest that the threat came from C D R P s as 
m u c h as from the ind iv idua l distr ict commanders : 
"The force was right to be concemed. I think the force looked at it 
and was saying 'OK, we have given up too much here' to de facto 
parinership working within the CDRPs, probably in equal measure to 
just the fact we have people of chief inspector rank who were district 
commanders who had autonomy or this illusion of autonomy. They 
thought 'why are we putting all our trust into these individuals, and 
why is this individual talking with such confidence and autonomy?'." 
(Interviewee 14) 
"[There was] a bit of conflict between the BCU and the organisation 
and our CDRP and how that worked. Maybe that is another reason 
the force didn't give us any suppori because it acknowledged this 
was the govemment pushing out this to the local community." 
(Interviewee 14) 
The then Ch ie f Constable, who was then serving a t e rm of office as 
President of A C P O , perhaps indicated h is views of the s i tua t ion dur ing 
h is in t roduct ion to A C P O ' s A n n u a l Report i n 2000 w h i c h said: 
"We fully accept the r ight of the G o v e m m e n t to set the overall 
strategy for the Service a n d then have a voice i n W H A T we do, but 
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the danger inherent i n this shift to cent ra l i sm is the involvement i n 
H O W we do it." (p3) 
The impos i t ion of Bes t V a l u e Performance Indicators i n 2000 could be 
seen as the V h a t ' , whi l s t the p u s h towards decentral isat ion, through 
B C U s work ing closely w i t h C D R P s , cou ld be seen as the 'how' a n d the 
par t of government pol icy to w h i c h A C P O most strongly objected, not 
least as i t was perceived to undermine the Chie f Constable 's t radi t ional 
operat ional independence. It w i l l be remembered, i n th is regard, that 
the 2002 Police Reform Act ' s redefinition of operat ional ' independence' 
as operat ional ' responsibili ty ' , s ignal led the government's intent to 
'take on ' A C P O over th is issue. 
It i s conceivable, however on balance doubtful , that C D R P s were 
perceived as the major threat to Cons tabu la ry independence. More 
l ikely, the shift towards h ighly decentralised B C U s h a d pu t greater 
'distance' between them a n d headquarters, wh i l s t s imul taneously 
pu t t ing the B C U s i n closer contact w i t h alternative sources of 
influence. The C D R P s m a y have been one s u c h influence, bu t more 
impor tant ly was the Home Office, operating th rough its regional 
presence i n the government offices. 
Pr ior to the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Act , w h e n the Cons tabu la ry and 
its partners establ ished C S S G s , the possibi l i ty of loca l variat ions i n 
priorit ies was recognised, as the H M I C P r i m a r y Inspect ion report of 
1 9 9 7 / 9 8 witnessed: 
"To ensure uni formi ty of presentation, a l l d iv is iona l and 
departmental p lans are drafted a round a template devised by 
headquarters. Terr i tor ia l divis ions set their own targets for each of 
the objectives i n the a n n u a l pol ic ing p lan , w h i c h are reviewed by 
corporate p l ann ing to ensure the aggregated effort is sufficient to 
meet the overall targets. Commanders have the flexibili ty to 
introduce their own specific targets to address loca l problems and , 
through their involvement i n the a n n u a l senior officers p l ann ing 
conference, have the opportuni ty to influence the choice of key 
pol ic ing priori t ies." (p9) 
F r o m the author 's own experience as a n area inspector, this typical ly 
involved ba lanc ing attempts to achieve corporate objectives, based on 
reduct ions a n d detections i n headline cr imes, w i t h attempts to address 
local c o m m u n i t y concems , typical ly about low-level ant i -socia l 
behaviour a n d c r i m i n a l damage. The idea, then, that C D R P s might 
introduce a s imi la r amount of local flexibility w h e n they were 
established, w o u l d not have been a shock to headquarters and , as we 
have seen, the approach adopted w i t h C D R P s was one w h i c h w o u l d 
have contained loca l demands h a d they diverted marked ly from 
Cons tabula ry priori t ies. A s i t was, as previously d iscussed, other 
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agencies largely acceded to the 'expertise' and 'authority ' of the police 
an3rway. 
However, perhaps a defining moment arr ived w i t h the announcement 
of the government's C r ime Reduct ion Strategy i n mid -2000 , after the 
first r o u n d of C D R P strategies h a d been devised. The document w h i c h 
in t roduced the Cr ime Reduct ion Strategy stated the following: 
"Alongside the performance p lans for police authori t ies a n d loca l 
counci l s we w i l l be a sk ing each par tnership i n A p r i l 2000 to submi t 
a progress report on i t achievements du r ing their first year of 
operation, to indicate what act ion is proposed for 2 0 0 0 / 0 1 , and 
wha t quantif ied cr ime reduct ion targets they w i l l be setting 
themselves for that year. These reports w i l l be scru t in ised by 
regional cr ime reduct ion teams who w i l l provide the central 
perspective on the direct ion of the par tnerships a n d identify those 
par tnership areas i n w h i c h further suppor t or assistance may be 
needed." (pi2) 
The pub l ica t ion of CDRP- leve l (and thus , i n this Constabulary ' s case, 
also BCU-level) cr ime statistics further enhanced the message that 
scru t iny w o u l d be directed at this level, as d id the announcement i n 
the above document of H M I C a n d A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n inspect ions where 
there was clear in tent ion "to see how far police a n d par tnerships have 
adopted the lessons of those key reports" [Beating Crime a n d Safety in 
Numbers]. 
One ind ica t ion of how wel l this s ign of stronger centra l in tervent ionism 
was being received c a n be su rmised from the following comment from 
this part ic ipant : 
"Another challenge was the growing role of GOSW [Govemment 
Office South West] who would communicate directly either with the 
police district, the district local authority or the CDRP itself. I can 
remember responding to GOSW on one occasion and then about four 
weeks later being asked by HQ to submit a draft response to be 
censored/modified by HQ before going back to GOSW. I remember 
the deputy chief constable being horrified that I had dared to 
communicate without going through HQ. From a performance 
perspective I considered the district CDRP performance as my main 
priority and this was sometimes in conflict with force priorities." 
(Interviewee 18) 
In retrospect, the Constabulary 's response to th is u n h a p p y state of 
affairs was perhaps predictable and i t under took yet another terri torial 
reorganisation. A l though the sixteen distr icts s t i l l remained i n 
structure, B C U status was removed from them a n d transferred instead 
to four geographic Areas . Dis t r ic ts were subsequent iy headed by Chief 
Inspectors (although i n Pl3miouth, w h i c h was also a n area, a n d thus a 
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B C U , a Chie f Super intendent remained), a n d they were designated as 
l o c a l pol ic ing area chief inspector ' . The te rm Commander , quite 
deliberately, was transferred to area-level, a n d so A r e a 'Co-ordinators ' 
became Area , then B C U 'Commanders ' . The reorganisat ion therefore 
represented a clear attempt by headquarters to wrestle control back 
from the distr icts , not so m u c h because the distr icts were out-of-
control , bu t rather because the distr icts were more vulnerable to the 
outside influence of the government office and , th rough them, the 
Home Office. 
W h a t was the impac t of this u p o n C D R P s ? The reorganisat ion sent 
out a clear message that distr ict lead officers l acked autonomy, 
thereby strengthening s t i l l further the idea that C D R P s h a d to 'fit i n ' 
w i t h local pol ic ing priori t ies. However, the impos i t ion of the Bes t 
V a l u e performance management regime, w h i c h appl ied the same 
performance indicators to C D R P s as to the police, therefore brought 
both w i t h i n the ambi t of Home Office P S A s , effectively doing this 
anyway. S5anbolically, w i t h the police l e ads ' unde r no i l l u s ion that 
they now lacked autonomy, a n d w i t h them often possess ing a level of 
authori ty less t h a n that of their par tner agencies (chief inspectors are 
not the equivalent of dis tr ic t counc i l chief executives, for example), a 
sense of C D R P loca l i sm was lost. Inter-agency relations, moreover, 
were d is turbed as the reorganisat ion was accompanied i n some places 
by personnel changes, w i t h the police being 'guilty ' of act ions w h i c h on 
other previous occasions h a d attracted c r i t i c i sm from other agencies 
for unde rmin ing the t rus t ing relations that h a d been bu i l t out of 
representative cont inui ty . 
W h e n C D R P s were first established, the indi rec t threat they posed to 
Cons tabula ry independence was not recognised i n part perhaps 
because, as noted earlier i n this chapter, C D R P s were categorised w i t h 
other forms of ' communi ty work ' w h i c h l acked massive operational 
relevance, a n d i n par t because the Home Office h a d not ' shown its 
hand ' , w i th regard to its intent to 'steer' loca l pol ic ing by exerting 
regional influence over C D R P s . Subsequent to th is reorganisation, 
however, C D R P s were taken seriously i n the sense their operational 
significance was t aken more into account. V iewed i n a n operational 
light, however, C D R P s h a d to demonstrate their cont r ibut ion to what 
the Cons tabula ry refers to as 'performance uplift ' . In other words, 
resources devoted to the C D R P s m u s t be jus t i f ied i n terms of their 
l ike ly measurable re turns . Since contr ibut ions to C D R P s are not 
directly measurable i n terms of their cont r ibu t ion to the l i e re a n d 
now', however, this has current ly led to a 'cooling off of par tnership 
activity. One par t ic ipant expressed the issue as follows (once again 
u s i n g 'publ ic demand ' as a rhetor ical device to just i fy the police 
position): 
"One of the important things for the public is delivering the here and 
now, and it depends whether we have put the resources into it. 
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Because if we put all our resources into partnership there here and 
now will suffer. If we put all our resources into the here and now the 
partnership will suffer. So ifs getting the balance, but it's also 
keeping the drive on to keep the partners on board and keep them 
engaged." (Interviewee 3) 
Since par tnership work ing does not so clearly or evidentially 
contr ibute to the 'here a n d now' performance requirement, i t i s more 
difficult to just i fy suppor t ing it. Th is has led, i n the Constabulary , to 
the wi thdrawal of the Par tnership Super intendent role, w h i c h had 
been based at the B C U level. It has also led to the wi thdrawal of 
dedicated funding that the Cons tabula ry h a d al located to support 
C D R P activity: 
"Where are we going to make our 3% cashable savings? There was 
an attempt by me to protect the partnership budget but the problem 
was we couldn't save cash anywhere else so the partnership budget 
we just gave out to CDRPs to say 'do what you will locally' has all 
been pulled back into the centre." (Interviewee 7) 
Th i s par t ic ipant was aware, however, that unde rp inn ing resourcing 
quest ions were deeper questions about power a n d about the 
reluctance of the police service to give i t up : 
"When you go into partnership you always give up a little bit of 
power. The end product may be greater than the sum of the parts, 
but it is actually difficult to see that sometimes, and each little 
partner when they go into the partnership has to give up a little bit of 
control. For our organisation control is a big issue, rooted in our 
culture. It is what we do. We are the social control agency for the 
state, so to give up power is actually quite difficult." (Interviewee 7) 
The i rony beh ind this statement is that the control that the police were 
re luctant to give u p was being c la imed not so m u c h by other agencies, 
for reasons previously cited, bu t rather by the centre, operating 
th rough the body of the govemment office a n d the influence that it was 
perceived to be t ry ing to exert over C D R P s . E v e n more i ronic was the 
fact that the reorganisation, w h i c h both reflected a n d prompted a more 
hard-nosed 'business case' attitude towards C D R P s , once again 
showed the Cons tabula ry being 'ahead of the game' w i t h regard to 
na t iona l developments. The establ ishment of Loca l Strategic 
Par tnerships (LSPs) i n 2000, logically, suggested the relocation of 
cr ime a n d disorder reduct ion bus iness to p r inc ipa l authori t ies , based 
on county or un i t a ry authori ty boundaries . L S P s were s low to get off 
the ground, however, the advent a n d incept ion of Loca l Area 
Agreements (LAAs) as their delivery a rms breathed life into them, and 
these changes u l t imate ly informed the 2006 Review of the Cr ime and 
Disorder A c t leading to the proposed reform of C D R P s , whereby, their 
strategic business w o u l d be transferred (in the case of two-tier areas) 
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to p r inc ipa l authori t ies, leaving distr ict-based C D R P s as operational, 
delivery-oriented bodies. 
The Cons tabu la ry reorganisat ion had , however, largely pre-empted 
s u c h a change, as one of the four B C U ' s was coterminous w i t h the 
un i t a ry author i ty of P lymouth , a n d one was coterminous w i t h 
Cornwal l . The other two areas do not fit the boundar ies of 'new Devon ' 
L S P a n d Torbay L S P , a n d i n this regard remain somewhat problematic. 
Subsequently, the whole of Devon (except Plymouth) i s current ly being 
re-organised to represent a single B C U structure, leaving Devon a n d 
C o r n w a l l Cons tabu la ry w i t h j u s t three B C U ' s . 
A New Structure and a New Cynicism? 
Given wha t has been d iscussed thus far, the prospects for effective 
par tnership w o r k i n g look bleak. Accord ing to par t ic ipants i n this 
research there seems a general unwi l l ingness to real ly make C D R P s 
work. Th i s unwi l l ingness is b o m of a n over-dominant detectionist 
mental i ty and a n organisat ional perspective w h i c h regards partnership 
work ing as a n add-on to 'real ' pol ic ing a n d one w h i c h prompts an 
inc l ina t ion to regard par tnership work ing rather disdainful ly as a n 
aspect of ' communi ty work' . It is also b o m of a performance 
management regime that undermines loca l i sm and , w i t h other aspects 
of pol ic ing pol icy unwi t t ingly ends u p suppor t ing a n d reinforcing the 
detectionist mental i ty. The presence of s u c h organisat ional 
unwi l l ingness , a l though not necessari ly exhibi ted by most 
part ic ipants , does raise the question of wha t c a n C D R P s really do? 
P u r s u i n g this issue w i t h the research par t ic ipants , i t became clear 
that C D R P s started to be viewed i n a rather cyn ica l , mercenary light. 
The following comments offer a flavour of this; 
"The big thing that changed is was this govemment, when they came 
to power and developed a criteria of starting to have to chase pots of 
money." [Interviewee 12) 
"We then realised that there were extemal agencies who had access 
to money so that's when the concept of looking at dmgs ... The idea 
of use giving them needles was not on the agenda. They were all 
druggies. They were criminals." (Interviewee 15) 
"They turn round and say there is £X million available from the 
centre to deal with an issue. Neighbourhood renewal will be a classic 
example. ... So what they do is people get together and say 'let's 
build up something'. There is funding for three years, say, to go into 
a post and we'll go chasing that until the money runs out. ... 7 was 
very much into that culture, and the beauty about that in my view 
was there was a lot of knee-jerking going on at the national level 
about trying to get to grips about what all the issues were." 
(Interviewee 12) 
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In other words, the police saw C D R P s as vehicles th rough w h i c h they 
cou ld obtain addi t ional funds. The existence of C D R P s worked i n 
m u c h the same way as the condit ions, w h i c h h a d previously been 
at tached to Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) funding under the 
Conservatives. To qualify for S R B funding one h a d to demonstrate 
par tnership work ing , a n d to qualify for these new 'pots' of money one 
h a d to apply as a par tnership, namely the C D R P . O n the positive side, 
this poss ibly pushed agencies to develop init iat ives they might not 
otherwise have considered - the above example about a needle 
exchange is a case i n point . O n the negative side, however as the last 
quote suggests, th is prompted a n a d hoc Imee-jerking ' approach to 
local communi ty safety pol icy development. Another part icipant 
recognised this problem: 
"[With short-term project funding] there is a danger that you secure 
an artificial partnership engagement purely for what you can bring to 
the table. I would prefer to use money in a pooled manner ... so we 
can properly prioritise that spend." (Interviewee 5) 
A n d another par t ic ipant was aware that 'chasing the money ' resulted 
i n local spending that was either not necessary, not effective, or 
poss ibly both: 
"A lot of the funding streams funded posts and people, but some of it 
was a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy in a sense. The money 
generated, it was delivered in a bidding way and with community 
safety partnerships employing people who would then in turn find 
projects to fund or sometimes just to justify their own existence. So I 
don't think in hindsight that a lot of the money was spent very 
wisely. Nor in fact was the money spent in a way that you could say 
'that's improved community safety'." (Interviewee 8) 
Some part ic ipants suggested that the presence of short- term project 
funding from centra l govemment co rmpted loca l par tnership working, 
i n two senses. A s th is par t ic ipant suggests, the short- term funding 
prompted short- term commitment: 
"For some councils it's been peripheral business because the funding 
streams have been temporary. ... Partnership is kind of considered 
discretionary activity by some of the statutory agencies." 
(Interviewee 8) 
The short- term funding also hampered the development of genuine, 
strategic par tnership work ing ; 
"There was more focus on working smarter back then [before the 
Crime and Disorder Act], because there were no pots of money. ... 
Since then we have been pot-chasing which has led us into more a 
knee-jerk type of reaction." (Interviewee 12) 
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"For me it would have been more successful if there hadn't been any 
cash with it. For me the most effective partnerships aren't the ones 
which work out how to spend some funding stream. The successful 
ones are the ones when people around the table commit to deploying 
their mainstream resources in a co-ordinated way to address 
community issues." (Interviewee 8) 
It is conceivable, also, that the presence of short- term project funding 
encouraged another aspect of 'grantsmanship ' , i n that s u c h funding 
cou ld be u sed to support service provis ion w h i c h m a y otherwise' have 
been funded from mains t ream sources. It was previously noted, for 
example, that the Cons tabu la ry 're-branded' some of i ts resources to 
support C D R P s - notably the cr ime reduct ion sergeants, and the 
creation of 'par tnership ' Superintendents , who h a d previously been 
designated as 'operational support ' Superintendents . It is conceivable 
that the resourc ing of some of these posts was temporar i ly subst i tuted 
as a resul t of addi t iona l funding made available i n r u r a l areas from the 
r u r a l pol ic ing fund. Accoun t ing for its spend from this fund, the 
Cons tabu la ry noted, for example, that i n 2 0 0 0 / 0 1 £195,000 was spent 
on 'partnership working ' , w i t h this figure r i s ing to £216,000 i n 
2 0 0 1 / 0 2 . 
The in t roduct ion of var ious short- term project funding streams from 
2001 onwards, therefore, has not necessari ly been of great benefit to 
the C D R P s covered by this research. The funding m a y have been 
intended to encourage par tnership work ing , yet, i t m a y have served, 
i ronical ly , to undermine it, or at least to undermine par tnership 
work ing w h i c h is not geared to the C3niical pu r su i t of central funding 
steams, not necessar i ly corresponding w i t h loca l priori t ies. However, 
the ar r iva l of L A A s has served to alter this s i tua t ion , w i t h central 
funding now being directed i n themed policy streams to L S P s , w h i c h 
have greater discret ion over how the funds shou ld be deployed. A s one 
par t ic ipant said: 
"We're beginning to move away from that notion [of extemal project 
funding] ... to this commissioning model where it is about co­
ordinating delivery of mainstream services, or the joint 
commissioning of discretionary services." (Interviewee 8) 
In theory, then, the advent of the L A A facilitates less Imee-jerking ' and 
more corporate, strategic par tnership working . A l t h o u g h the extent of 
loca l i sm is l imi ted because L S P s are s t i l l 'guided' by central 
government's performance management regirne a n d because i n two-
tier areas strategic par tnership work ing w i l l be 'scaled u p ' to the 
county leveL 
The advent of L A A s was welcomed by some par t ic ipants : 
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"I can see why the govemment are saying that money must sit at a 
county level because there is enough money to do something 
worthwhile as opposed to the piecemeal approach across the 
county." (Interviewee 7) 
"I personally think that that is probably a better and more effective 
model than some of those partnerships where you are squabbling 
around often quite small sums of cash." (Interviewee 8) 
"What it allows us to do is punch above our weight. You think we sit 
at tables now at an LAA with a budget of £38 million and 1000 
employees, and the chief executive of the county council has 19,000 
employees, so if the BCU commander says things they will happen. 
It does allow us an influence around that so that is important. In 
terms of it being clawed, I think we have to be signed up and it isn't 
just us to go with it. That suits our case because it is a means for us 
to manage demand. We just can't deal with it all." (Interviewee 12) 
There was some concem, though, that now the strategic funding 
decisions bypassed C D R P s i n two-tier areas they h a d even less of a 
role: 
"All the money is going through the LAA process to the county LSP so 
that local solutions ethos which blossomed in 1999-2002 is dying off 
slightly because some of the CDRPs are too small to do things 
effectively and they are not joining up as the idea originally was. So 
delivery at a county level or unitary leaves the CDRPs in an 
interesting position because they are no longer particularly strategic 
as that role has been taken off them. So what do they actually do?" 
(Interviewee 12) 
There was also a recognit ion that whi le the bigger budgets might pu t 
L S P s i n a better pos i t ion to be 'strategic', this d i d not necessari ly mean 
they w o u l d operate more l ike partnerships. The same par t ic ipant said: 
"We have had massive battles because they didn't want us to be 
chair of the new county strategic safety group, and we kicked up to 
get it because we know that's where the influence is going to be. 
We've put a lot of thought into making sure we get what we need to 
get. Now is that partnership working? It's probably not. It's looking 
after our own interests and that's the world we have gotten into 
now." 
To be balanced, i f the police are looking after their own interests, so 
too are other agencies. The author 's own experience of th is foUowed a 
Home Office decis ion to cut the core funding of the communi ty safety 
budget by 13%. Proposals were pu t forward w i t h i n the L S P to make 
good this shortfall by divert ing funds from other thematic streams, 
however, s u c h proposals were met, perhaps unsurpr i s ing ly , w i th 
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resistance a n d unwi l l ingness from those other agencies present, 
concerned regarding potential reduct ions i n their own resource 
streams or power base. 
T h u s , a l though the funding has shifted upwards to the L S P s , the same 
cynica l view remains of par tnership bodies being u s e d pr imar i ly as 
access points to funding streams. The part icipant , quoted immediately 
above, was of the view that L S P s are largely undemocra t ic bodies, 
however, i t was impor tant nonetheless to ensure that the police were 
i n a good strategic posi t ion w i th in them because "that i s where the 
influence is going to be." There has been long-s tanding concern about 
the problems par tnerships pose for democratic control , relat ing for 
example to the difficulty of control l ing informal dec is ion-making that 
takes place outside par tnership forums (Crawford, 1997), or to the 
absence of democrat ical ly elected members from s u c h forums (Liddle 
a n d Gelsthorpe, 1994a). In this research, problerns of control were 
exacerbated for C D R P s by the relative au tonomy that police distr icts 
enjoyed from police headquarters and , ul t imately, the Police Author i ty , 
a l though this body's democrat ic credentials are m u c h less t han they 
once were, as a resul t of changes i n membersh ip following the 1994 
Police a n d Magistrates ' Cour t s Ac t . 
In theory, L S P s were supposed to enhance democrat ic control , by 
m i x i n g the representative democratic element of loca l government w i t h 
the direct democracy of communi ty engagement, however, i t may be 
that s u c h a m i x is not work ing . In the case of the police, the advent of 
L S P s once again raises the issue of the relative au tonomy of the B C U s 
from headquarters, a l though this t ime the B C U s are scaled u p from 16 
to 3. It m a y be that police headquarters finds i t easier to control a n d 
influence this smal ler n u m b e r of B C U Commanders , however, some of 
the part icipants i n this research wondered whether there might be a 
more rad ica l scenario i n the future: 
"/ can see the delivery of local policing being part and parcel of local 
govemment and chief officers of police, as in many American 
jurisdictions, are very much part and parcel of the local govemment 
sector." (Interviewee 8) 
"When you see at the top level the coming together of the Home Office 
and the ODPM, and the national policing plan which cuts across so 
many different departments, there is a clear recognition that each is 
a very important part of the overall picture. I think it will be driven 
nationally. I think the funding requirements and outcomes will 
probably define the shape of local partnerships, be they LSPs or 
CDRPs. And there is a possibility I suppose that you might have a 
police commander that is managed by a chief executive, if there are 
some really strong messages that need to be drawn in that way." 
(Interviewee 13) 
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"The only way that would happen [greater agency integration] is if 
we became part of the local authority and you would become one 
authority." (Interviewee 7) 
These par t ic ipants , then, c a n envisage a s i tua t ion where pol ic ing 
becomes more embedded w i t h i n local government, as a logical 
outcome of the p u s h to more strategic par tnership work ing , and 
perhaps as a resolut ion to some of the tensions of par tnership 
work ing , i n c l u d i n g those related to democratic accountabi l i ty , since 
the logic of a more integrated organisat ion 'a l s t ructure i s that i t w o u l d 
be more clearly dr iven from the top. Interestingly, however, one 
par t ic ipant was quite aware that this w o u l d not necessari ly lead to 
greater clar i ty of v i s ion : 
"If that happened [greater agency integration] you could say in 
theory we would all be working for the same boss in terms of where 
the money comes from and where the chief executive sits. But, even 
within that, every department like education has its own culture, 
social benefit has its own, social services and police would have their 
own culture." (Interviewee 7) 
So, greater integrat ion w o u l d not necessar i ly overcome cu l tu ra l 
differences; they w o u l d j u s t re-appear i n the guise of departmental ism. 
In the case of the police, p resumably that w o u l d m e a n the persistence 
of the detectionist mental i ty w h i c h mitigates against partnership 
work ing , or at least mitigates against w o r k i n g w i t h those that the 
police do not see as he lp ing them to achieve a 'performance uplift ' . A s 
one par t ic ipant pointed out, referring for example to work the police do 
w i t h the probat ion service w i t h regard to prolific offenders, or to closer 
work ing relations w i t h the C r o w n Prosecut ion Service: 
"We need to be involving partners to do things better, and protective 
services, which i s the hard stuff. But we need to work with partners 
as well. Not necessarily community partners, but criminal justice 
partners." {Interviewee 12) 
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Chapter 6: Summary and Concluding Discussion 
Introduction 
There are two dis t inc t purposes to this relatively br ief f inal chapter, 
pu r sued i n two following sections. Init ial ly, the research findings are 
summar i sed , so i n the course of the summary , the research questions 
are answered a n d the most significant points to emerge from the 
research clearly set out. Secondly, hav ing completed this , these 
findings are reflected upon , i n terms of their re la t ionship to the key 
issues ra ised by the l i terature review and , i n par t icular , i n terms of 
their pol icy a n d theoretical significance. The in tent ion is not to come 
up w i t h a l i s t of pol icy recommendations as the orientation of the 
research, whi le par t ly applied, was also more interpretative: more 
about unders tand ing policy than recommending changes to it. Rather, 
the in tent ion is to use the interpretive knowledge of how the police 
have accommodated par tnership work ing to make sense of the 
establ ished problems of s u c h work ing , w h i c h have been wel l 
documented by previous research, as wel l as by the present research. 
These problems also need to be placed into theoretical context, and 
par t icular ly , i n the context of the paradigmatic shift i n w h i c h some 
authors argue are being evidenced by developments s u c h as crime 
prevention par tnerships . 
Summarising the Research Findings 
The research questions were set out at the beginning of Chapter Four , 
the methodology chapter. To remind the reader, they were derived 
from the issues ra ised i n the literature review sect ion of this thesis, 
and they are as follows: 
1. H a s par tnership work ing occurred i n the wake of the 1998 
Cr ime a n d Disorder Act? 
2. H o w is the police cont r ibut ion to par tnership work ing 
organised? 
3. To what extent does par tnership w o r k i n g th rough C D R P s 
reflect, a n d contribute, to the decentral isat ion of police 
service delivery through the body of police B C U s ? 
4. H o w far does the police service take cognisance of, or attempt 
to spread knowledge of, guidance on 'cr i t ical success factors' 
i n par tnership working? 
5. W h a t pos i t ion does the police service adopt w i t h i n the 
C D R P s ? 
6. Is the agenda of par tnerships local ly or na t ional ly set, a n d 
wha t i s the consequence of th is for par tnership working? 
Whi le i t i s possible to provide relatively brief answers to these 
questions, s u c h answers w o u l d not i n themselves capture the r ichness 
or depth of the da ta collected i n this research project. Therefore, i t is 
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proposed these answers shou ld be provided i n a rather less direct way, 
a l lowing the r ichness of the da ta greater expression a n d enabl ing s u c h 
data to draw attention to other issues, w h i c h have emerged from the 
s tudy a n d were perhaps less ant icipated by the above research 
questions. It is acknowledged that this approach is more faithful to 
the interpretivist orientat ion of m u c h of the research. 
It is apparent that the police Constabulary, w h i c h forms the subject of 
this research, does indeed contribute to the par tnership requirements 
of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t . It provides police managers to 
attend par tnership meetings and i t provides cr ime reduct ion staff to 
service those par tnerships , often work ing closely w i t h loca l authority 
officers vidth a designated responsibi l i ty for c o m m u n i t y safety. In 
addi t ion, they have often p laying a major role i n the product ion of 
audi ts a n d strategies, a l though, the requirements for these have now 
altered i n the l ight of the 2006 Police a n d Jus t i ce Ac t . Fo r a period of 
time, the Cons tabu la ry also provided dedicated resources to local 
C D R P s , i n c l u d i n g financial contr ibut ions a n d it has also provided 
other forms of support , for example office space, use of analyst time 
etc, not covered by this research. However, i n relat ion to this 
commitment of police resources to C D R P s i t does not necessari ly tel l 
u s very m u c h about the ac tua l character of the police contr ibut ion. 
Init ially, the police cont r ibut ion appeared to be shaped by two m a i n 
influences. The first was a n ins t i tu t ional 'compliance reflex'. W h e n 
the police service is told, i n this case by legislat ion, to do something, i t 
responds accordingly a n d appropriately. It contr ibutes to C D R P s 
because of a n ins t i tu t iona l assumpt ion that th is i s wha t i t i s required 
to do. Th i s 'compliance reflex', w h i c h does not necessar i ly require the 
s t imulus of legislat ion, was demonstrated o n a n u m b e r of occasions 
through, for example, the establishment of par tnership bodies (crime 
prevention management forums) i n response to Home Office C i rcu la r 
4 4 / 9 0 ; the creat ion of a new 'communi ty services u n i t ' i n response to 
Home Office C i r c u l a r 8 /84 ; the development of a ' communi ty affairs' 
strategy i n response to H M I C c r i t i c i sm a n d the re-drawing of divis ional 
or B C U boundaries to accommodate the need for coterminosity, 
creating from 1999 16 pol ic ing distr icts across the Force area. 
Whi l s t the Cons tabu la ry complies w i t h 'the letter of the law', i t does 
not necessar i ly comply w i t h its spiri t . Thus , whi le the Home Office's 
interest i n es tabl ishing C D R P s , at least at i ts adminis t ra t ive (rather 
than political) level, lay i n the putative role of C D R P s i n developing a 
h ighly ins t rumenta l , problem-oriented approach to cr ime prevention, 
the Constabulary ' s view was somewhat different. Th i s view was not 
par t icu lar ly shared by m a n y of the respondents i n the research, who 
i n general demonstrated quite a commitment for par tnership working. 
However, i t nevertheless he ld m u c h currency, expressed i n par t icular 
through official pol icy documents w h i c h placed cr ime prevention 
par tnerships i n the category of ' communi ty work' , along wi th 
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phenomena s u c h as communi ty consul ta t ion a n d pub l i c relations 
work, for example, attendance at county shows, v is i t ing schools and so 
forth. Accord ing to s u c h a view, ' communi ty work ' i s not a part of the 
ins t rumenta l side of pol ic ing but rather a par t of i ts symbolic side, 
useful for furthering and main ta in ing a ' t radi t ion ' of pol ic ing by 
consent. 
'Communi ty work' , therefore, becomes a n end i n itself, rather than a 
means to a n end, a n d the presence of s u c h a mental i ty does not 
suggest that the police contr ibut ion to C D R P s needs to amount to very 
m u c h i n terms of prac t ica l outputs or outcomes. A l t h o u g h i t needs to 
be stressed again, this is no t necessari ly how those part icipants who 
represented the police service on C D R P s saw their roles. 
Those who d id represent the Cons tabula ry o n C D R P s inevitably saw 
beyond the s3rmbolic funct ion of cr ime prevent ion partnerships, 
however, they were also either acutely aware of a number of 
constraints operating u p o n the police collaborative role, or they 
demonstrated other constraints i n their cu l t u r a l expectations or 
attitudes. They were aware that C D R P strategies needed to fit i n w i th 
local pol ic ing p lans , a n d i n some cases they made this constraint 
manifest, as evidenced i n the words accompanying at least one C D R P 
strategy analysed. Whi l s t i n other cases they brought this constraint 
to bare i n more subtle ways, effectively man ipu la t ing the strategy-
setting process, or as one par t ic ipant pu t it, p lay ing 'cute', to ensure 
that C D R P priori t ies fitted loca l police ones. Arguably , there may have 
been no need to p lay 'cute', as par t ic ipants indicate that there was a 
general expectation, amongst other agencies, that the police wou ld 
l e a d ' the par tnerships , because cr ime a n d disorder was the police's 
par t icular areas of expertise after a l l . To some extent this was a 
concession to police expertise, though some par t ic ipants were aware 
that s u c h a concession also concealed a l a ck of interest amongst some 
partner agencies. 
Th is concession to police expertise, a n d authori ty, was not unwelcome 
to the police w i t h m a n y part icipants shar ing a view, also m u c h i n 
evidence w i t h i n official documentat ion, i n essence, endorsing the 
police ' should be' i n the leadership role. Th i s was due to the fact they 
broadly agreed w i t h those other agencies who saw the police as the 
na tu ra l source of expertise o n matters of cr ime a n d disorder. S u c h a 
view is part of the police's 'professional identity' . Yet there were also a 
number of prac t ica l drivers, w h i c h further encouraged this sense of 
police leadership. There was, for example, considerable haste i n the 
implementat ion of the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t resul t ing i n the 
product ion of l imi ted t ime for par tnerships to meet, let alone to 
produce audi ts a n d strategies i n t ime for A p r i l 1999. Therefore, i t 
made sense to pu t lead responsibi l i ty i n the hands of the police, 
supported by the police's cu l tu ra l tendency to 'get things done', or to 
deal w i t h the l i e r e a n d now'. It made little sense to wai t for others 
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who lacked the interest, commitment or the action-orientation (local 
authori t ies are notor iously slow i n their decision-making), to get on 
board. 
Fur thermore , pr ior to the implementat ion of the 1998 Cr ime and 
Disorder A c t the Cons tabu la ry h a d in t roduced a comprehensive model 
of cr ime management w h i c h , as one par t ic ipant was moved to suggest, 
spelt 'the beginning of the end for communi ty engagement'. A l though 
there was a place for cr ime reduct ion w i t h i n cr ime management, i t was 
a relatively lowly place i n compar ison to detect ionism and the crime 
management model operated i n s u c h a way as to maximise the police's 
sense of ownership of loca l cr ime a n d disorder problems, as wel l as its 
solut ion. It is tel l ing, perhaps, that no effort was rriade to modify the 
cr ime management model to incorporate the new C D R P s , a l though as 
experience w i t h the more recent N I M suggests, whi l s t there is 
supposed to be some par tnership i npu t into the T C G s , i n practice this 
i n p u t either does not exist or is not significant i n nature . In addit ion, 
the demand of s u c h a police t ask ing process i s focussed on the very 
short t e rm (3-4 weeks), a demand w h i c h does not necessari ly accord 
wi th the operating dynamic of par tnership work ing . In addit ion, its 
processes are relatively retrospective, the analogy being shut t ing the 
stable door w h e n the horse has already been stolen. 
Police leadership of C D R P business is further encouraged by two other 
factors. Fi rs t ly , a n d closely related to the idea of cr ime and disorder 
being the police's area of 'na tural expertise', is the not ion of cr ime and 
disorder being the police's 'core' business . Whi le s u c h ideas are 
supported by the police's professional identity, they are also strongly 
supported by the performance management regimes w h i c h new publ ic 
management has appl ied to the police service, par t icu lar ly since the 
1994 Police a n d Magistrates ' Cour t s Ac t . Ini t ia l ly there was a bias 
towards objectives and targets expressed i n terms of detections, w h i c h 
existed at the t ime C D R P s were first established. A l though it is 
acknowledged since 2000 the targets, as expressed through B V P I s , 
have taken on a stronger orientat ion to cr ime reduct ion. However, 
whether focused o n detections or cr ime reduct ion the key point is 
these are targets a n d performance indicators 'owned' by the police, and 
thus they need to be i n control of the means by w h i c h s u c h targets are 
to be achieved. 
Secondly, some part ic ipants i n the research just i f ied the police's 
p r imacy wi th in C D R P s through reference to pub l i c expectation. Th is 
worked i n two ways. Init ially, the pub l i c expected l i i e police to be 
responsible for loca l cr ime a n d disorder problems and , as some 
part ic ipants pointed out, the idea of C D R P s be ing responsible h a d yet 
to ca tch on i n the popular imaginat ion. Yet, i t was also argued that 
the pub l i c expected the police to take swift, authori tat ive action. T h u s 
pub l i c expectations were used as a sort of ' rhetorical device' to support 
the idea that the police shou ld be the lead agency and , i n their lead 
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role, shou ld take decisive l i e re a n d now' act ion, w h i c h d id not 
necessari ly fit wel l w i t h the more strategic a n d 'slower t ime ' orientation 
of C D R P bus iness . 
Interestingly a n d important ly , therefore, cr ime management and the 
rhetor ical appeal to publ ic expectations worked i n the same, 
paradoxica l way. They both gave the police the 'excuse' to 'own' C D R P 
bus iness , whi le s imul taneous ly leading that bus iness towards a dead 
end, because the strategic problem orientat ion of C D R P s either d id not 
fit the more immediate concems of the detectionist 'here a n d now', or 
because this strategic problem orientat ion was barely recognised due 
to the persistence of a more symbol ic view of C D R P s , as a n exercise i n 
flag-fl3dng a n d legi t imacy-bui lding. These tools a n d expectations gave 
the police considerable power over C D R P s , however, to a large degree i t 
was power deployed to achieve l imi ted results . 
The capacity of the police to thwart p rob lem oriented par tnership 
work ing was not confined to C D R P s . A l though , i t was not a strong 
focus of this research, a number of par t ic ipants h a d close experience 
of the Constabulary ' s engagement w i t h ne ighbourhood policing. 
A l though this engagement continues, par t icu lar ly through the 
deplojTxient of Police C o m m u n i t y Suppor t Officers, i t i s apparent there 
has been pressure to draw back from close engagement w i t h other 
agencies un less i t c a n be just i f ied i n performance terms, and 
specifically i n terms of detection a n d br ing ing offenders to just ice. 
Par tnership work ing ' is ' in tended to enhance s u c h performance by 
problem-solving, however, according to this way of t h i n k i n g s u c h an 
output seems to be s imply d ismissed , p resumably because 
performance pressure leaves little t ime for s u c h ' symbolic ' luxur ies , or 
perhaps p rob lem solving is insufficiently productive i n detectionist 
terms. A s one par t ic ipant effectively acknowledged, work ing wi th 
' c r imina l jus t ice ' partners is more acceptable, because of the 
detectionist resul ts i t is l ike ly to deliver, whi le w o r k i n g wi th 
' communi ty par tners ' is d i smissed as less productive. 
Nat iona l pol icy developments demonstrate there has been considerable 
central fms t ra t ion w i t h C D R P s for their l ack of progress a n d action, 
hence the reforms affected by the 2005 Police a n d Jus t i ce Act . Th is 
research suggests one reason for this l ack of progress i s the strength 
of a detectionist mental i ty permeating the police service at a cu l tu ra l 
level, w h i c h plays itself out th rough processes s u c h as crime 
management a n d rhetorical appeals to pub l i c expectations. Th is 
detectionist mental i ty bas ical ly affords little space for the k i n d of 
strategic problem-oriented t h i n k i n g w h i c h C D R P s were intended to 
embrace. Ironically, s u c h a mental i ty is ac tual ly encouraged by 
elements of government policy, s u c h as the A u d i t Commiss ion ' s 
promot ion of cr ime management a n d the more recent adoption of the 
N I M , thus wha t fmstrates govemment is also par t ly the product of its 
own actions. 
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However, i f i ts poor fit w i th a dominant detectionist cul ture i s one 
explanat ion for the general lack of progress of C D R P s , another 
explanat ion, imcovered by this research, relates to the l ack of t ra in ing 
a n d suppor t given to those ind iv idua ls who are pu t forward to 
represent the Cons tabu la ry on C D R P s . It was clear from part icipant 
responses they h a d received little or no t ra in ing w i t h regard to 
par tnership work ing a n d engaging w i t h other agencies, through the 
new C D R P s , was j u s t something that they were expected to get on 
wi th . 
There are a number of possible reasons for this l a ck of preparation. To 
some degree i t fits the Tiere and now', 'just get o n w i t h i t ' attitude 
prevalent w i t h i n the police organisat ional cul ture . Yet i t is also 
possible that t ra in ing i n par tnership w o r k i n g does not attract a h igh 
prior i ty because, as noted above, there was some inc l ina t ion to regard 
par tnership work ing as requir ing little more that a flag-fl5dng presence. 
Cer ta in ly some par t ic ipants suggested their supervisory officers often 
h a d little interest i n the par tnership work ing under taken by their staff. 
Also , some par t ic ipants suspected that the Constabulary ' s response to 
the 1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t was a caut ious one, reflecting a 
cyn ica l view of poli t ics a n d pol icy-making , wha t was here today may, 
o n a pol i t ica l w h i m , be gone tomorrow. Experience has taught the 
police to be caut ious due to the frequency of pol icy changes from the 
centre, something w h i c h has certainly accelerated unde r New Labour 's 
' init iativit is ' . 
The effect of a l l this for those given a responsibi l i ty or mandate for 
engaging w i t h other agencies through C D R P s is one of marginal isa t ion. 
National ly, cr ime prevention specialists have always been marginal ised 
from the police mains t ream, exist ing i n wha t Weatheri t t (1986) 
referred to as a 'security ghetto'. Th i s Cons tabu la ry took crime 
prevention specialists out of this securi ty ghetto by re -naming them 
Cr ime Reduc t ion Officers, giving them a n ins t rumenta l locat ion wi th in 
the cr ime management model , a n d requi r ing the cr ime reduct ion 
sergeants to play an ins t rumenta l role i n servicing the C D R P s , work ing 
i n t andem w i t h loca l govemment officers w i t h a designated 
responsibi l i ty for communi ty safely. However, whi le they may have 
been lifted out of the securi ty ghetto, they (specifically the crime 
reduct ion sergeants) ended u p being dropped, instead, into a 
'partnership ghetto', w h i c h was no less margina l i sed t h a n before. A n d , 
whi l s t th is l ies outside the focus of the research, i t i s also the case that 
crime reduct ion officers are not we l l integrated w i t h crime 
management, because of the dominance of detect ionism a n d the lowly 
place afforded to cr ime reduct ion w i t h i n that model . 
The 'dumping ' of CDRP-re la ted work into a 'partnership ghetto' may be 
a famil iar by-product or imin tended consequence of special isat ion. 
Some part ic ipants conveyed the s t rong impress ion that partnership 
work ing h a d not been wel l integrated into the organisat ional cu l tu ra l 
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repertoire as a generally accepted par t of operat ional pol ic ing, a n d 
thus i t tended to be regarded more as the preserve of 'specialists ' . The 
identification of par tnership work ing as a specia l i sm, however, then 
gives others w i t h i n the organisat ion a n excuse not to shoulder any 
responsibi l i ty themselves, i n m u c h the same way that Harvey et a l . 
(1989) suggest that the establ ishment of the cr ime prevention 
spec ia l i sm has abrogated responsibi l i ty for cr ime prevention from 
elsewhere w i t h i n the police service. 
Despite the ghettoisation of par tnership work ing , i t wou ld be very 
wrong to suggest that the police service has totally neglected it. Two 
par t icular reasons presented themselves from the research to suggest 
a l though par tnership work ing w o u l d r ema in largely on the outside of 
operational pol ic ing , i t nevertheless he ld some significance for the 
police service. Fo r one of the reasons, par tnership work ing presented 
the service w i t h a n opportuni ty while for the other, i t presented the 
service w i t h a threat. The opportuni ty side of par tnership work ing has 
ar isen, par t icu lar ly since 2001 , because C D R P s have provided the 
police service w i t h a gateway to funding sources. A s resources get 
tight, as they have i n recent years w i th the impos i t ion of and increased 
expectation a r o u n d efficiency gains, C D R P s have provided the police 
w i t h a n oppor tuni ty to access resources, w h i c h they m a y not otherwise 
have, to supplement exist ing resources, to replace lost resources or 
potential ly to replace resources who can then be deployed elsewhere. 
A n u m b e r of par t ic ipants i n this research revealed the emergence of a 
rather cyn ica l tactic of 'chasing the money', pu r sued both by the police 
a n d other agencies w i t h i n C D R P s . Th i s d id not always resul t i n the 
money being we l l spent, and sometimes i t appears that the funding 
was u s e d more to support infrastructure t h a n to enhance delivery, 
though this m a y depend u p o n the funding s t ream being accessed. 
Some suggested, indeed, that par tnership w o r k i n g was probably more 
effective when th is C5niical tactic of chas ing the money was taken out 
of the equation. The emergence of more sol id funding streams through 
the L A A s has not necessari ly e l iminated the tactic, however, i t may 
have displaced i t onto a different stage, w i t h some part icipants 
emphas is ing the importance of the police service, pu t t ing themselves 
i n a s t rong posi t ion to influence resource a l locat ion decisions w i th in 
the L S P s . 
If the addi t ional funding, w h i c h flowed as a resul t of par t ic ipat ion i n 
par tnership w o r k i n g presented the police service w i t h a n opportunity, 
then the presence of alternative l ines of accountabi l i ty , i n large part to 
account for the spending of this addi t ional funding, presented the 
service w i t h a threat. A somewhat unant ic ipa ted finding of this 
research was that the arr ival of C D R P s intensified a n in ternal poli t ics 
of pol ic ing, w h i c h was perhaps always beneath the surface a n d always 
l ikely to become a n issue given the pressure placed u p o n police 
services to decentralise provis ion, increasingly to the B C U level. 
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The Cons tabu la ry h a d prepared itself for the ar r iva l of C D R P s by-
reorganising into a district-level c o m m a n d s t ructure and , ini t ia l ly , i n 
the first r o u n d of audi ts a n d strategies th is -was not regarded as 
problematic, perhaps because of prevai l ing police attitudes about 
par tnership -working a n d a tendency to see them more i n sjnnbolic 
than ins t rumenta l terms. Ho-wever, this a l l changed once the Home 
Office's Cr ime Reduc t ion Strategy -was in t roduced i n 2000, because 
that strategy brought i n a performance management regime for C D R P s 
a n d also gave a key role i n s u c h performance management to the ne-w 
crime reduct ion teams -working out of the government offices. 
Once funding streams began to flo-w towards C D R P s , after 2001 , these 
government offices took on a new significance as a n alternative source 
of funding for B C U s a n d as a n alternative l ine of accountabi l i ty and 
source of influence, par t icu lar ly over operat ional priori t ies. The threat, 
therefore, was that B C U Commanders w o u l d be d r awn towards the 
govemment offices, away from Cons tabu la ry headquarters and the 
authori ty of the Ch ie f Constable. The threat was of B C U Commanders 
'going native ' i n their localities, a n d gain ing a n over-inflated sense of 
their own importance a n d autonomy, as far as headquarters was 
concerned. Once the perceived threat was recognised, steps were 
taken to rectify the s i tuat ion th rough a reorganisat ion, w h i c h placed 
the control of B C U s m u c h more w i t h i n the influence of police 
headquarters. 
Outside of Pljnnouth, where the area was also the dis t r ic t by virtue of 
its un i ta ry status, this left dis tr ic t Ch ie f Inspectors w i th a 
responsibi l i ty for work ing -with C D R P s , -without any of the power, as 
the centre was able to ho ld a tighter re in over wha t the distr icts d id . It 
is p lausible to suggest that th is reorganisat ion conveyed to other 
agencies a 'cooling' of the police service towards par tnership work ing 
i n these locations, a n d possibly made par t ic ipat ion i n the C D R P s less 
interest ing at the dis tr ic t level, thereby marg ina l i s ing i t further from 
the operat ional pol ic ing mains t ream. Arguably , however, this wou ld 
have occurred anyway, once the changes in t roduced by the 2006 
Police a n d Jus t i ce A c t took ho ld , thereby effectively shifting the 
strategic side of C D R P s u p to p r inc ipa l author i ty level i n these areas. 
A l though the Constabulary ' s reorganisat ion m a y have mitigated the 
immediate threat posed by distr icts 'going native', i t d i d not remove the 
threat altogether. Reflecting u p o n the wider significance of the 
emergence of L A A s , some par t ic ipants cou ld envisage a s i tuat ion 
where police B C U s become more firmly integrated into the wor ld of 
loca l government, emula t ing a s i tua t ion per ta in ing to other countries 
s u c h as the U S A . Thus , albeit th rough L A A s rather than through 
C D R P s , par tnership work ing s t i l l poses a threat to the authori ty and 
influence of police headquarters a n d the delivery of a s trong corporate 
control process. W i t h i n par tnership w o r k i n g i n L A A s , therefore, there 
exists a subtext, where the 's tmggle for the sou l ' of loca l pol ic ing is 
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being played out. It m a y mean the police service flexing its musc le over 
the contents of the 'safer a n d stronger' b lock of L A A s , or i t cou ld entai l 
the absorpt ion of the police into the more corporate voice of local 
govemment. One part icipant 's comments suggested that, whatever 
the fate of this 'higher pol i t ics ' of pol ic ing, the 'departmental ' cu l tu ra l 
identi ty of the police w o u l d r ema in entai l ing, presumably, the 
cont inuance of a detectionist mentali ty, and a preference for 'here and 
now' police-led pol ic ing. 
Reflecting upon the Relevance of the Research 
It i s impor tant to recognise the l imi ta t ions of the empir ica l research, 
w h i c h has informed this thesis. It has focused u p o n only a single 
police constabulary area, w h i c h is not necessari ly representative of a l l 
other constabular ies and, w i t h i n that constabulary, i t has inc luded 
par t ic ipants a n d respondents from headquarters, bu t also important ly 
from different B C U areas. A deliberate decis ion was t aken for reasons 
of confidentiali ty a n d anonymity not to focus u p o n a single B C U , a n d 
yet i t i s apparent that B C U experiences are different. Some of the 
locations having greatest crime occurrence levels, w h i c h happened 
also to inc lude the un i ta ry authorit ies, d id not experience a i l the 
par tnership w o r k i n g difficulties experienced by the more m r a l , lower 
cr ime a n d two tier areas. Consequent ly, cau t ion has to be exercised 
w h e n seeking to generalise the findings of th is research beyond the 
Cons tabu la ry area, as wel l as beyond the t ime per iod covered by the 
research, as i t was also clear m a n y of the major issues raised by the 
police's accommodat ion of par tnership work ing were closely related to 
specific pol icy developments a n d events, w h i c h w o u l d not necessari ly 
have occurred at other t imes. Tha t sa id , however^ m a n y of the issues 
ra ised are l ikely to have wider appl icabi l i ty . There i s no par t icular 
reason to th ink that the findings uncovered here c a n 'not' be projected 
on to a wider canvas. 
The li terature review set the background for this project. Tak ing the 
three literature review chapters together, the general picture painted 
was of the police service being subjected to a range of different reform 
measures and initiatives, of w h i c h the pressure to engage more i n 
problem-oriented crime prevention par tnerships is bu t one. The 
general case for reform has rested u p o n a n u m b e r of different concerns 
about the state of the police, a n d pr inc ipa l ly , involves concems 
regarding effectiveness (the police have not been as good at control l ing 
cr ime as they shou ld be), accountabi l i ty (govemments have found it 
harder than they shou ld to influence wha t the police do) a n d 
legit imacy (the pub l i c are less enamoured of the police than they 
shou ld be i n a stable democracy). These concerns often overlap i n 
ind iv idua l reform measures, w i t h par tnership w o r k i n g i n cr ime 
prevention being a case i n point. T h u s , a strategic problem-oriented 
focus is intended to make t i ie police more effective, address ing major 
a n d / o r recurrent problems i n a systematic way. Performance targets 
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a n d specific funding streams are intended to influence what the police 
do (and sometimes how they do it). Par tnership work ing , consul ta t ion, 
a n d par t icu la r ly more recent init iatives i n c o m m u n i t y engagement, 
meanwhile , are ways of enabl ing 'the communi ty ' to exercise greater 
say over, a n d have involvement wi th , wha t the police do, i n a n 
expectation that th is w i l l b r ing greater satisfaction a n d greater police 
legitimacy. 
One of the problems wi th reform init iat ives is whi le the rationale for 
change m a y be sound , there remains uncer ta in ty regarding how, 
precisely, to b r ing the change about a n d w i t h i n that uncer ta in ty there 
is space for disagreement a n d conflict. In other words, i t is difficult to 
argue vidth the case for greater effectiveness, accountabi l i ty or 
legitimacy, however, i t remains unc lear exactly how these worthy 
objectives might be realised. It is l ike knowing wha t is wanted but 
being unsu re of how to get it. Different groups of interests have 
different ideas of how to get it, govemment m a y have one view, the 
police service m a y have another. G o v e m m e n t a n d the police exist i n a 
relat ionship of power-dependence. B e i n g i n 'the front l ine ' the.police 
possess considerable experience a n d expertise, however, they cannot 
act wi thout author i ty a n d resources bo th of w h i c h are acquired, 
notwi ths tanding the t radi t ion of constabulary independence, from 
government. 
It is possible to read a l l of the var ious pol icy ini t iat ives d iscussed i n 
the li terature review as attempts to achieve 'worthy' objectives through 
means that are uncer ta in and contestable, a n d w h i c h are often 
contested. T h u s , for example, there are t imes w h e n reform initiatives 
have been resisted a n d there are t imes w h e n police bodies have sought 
to develop al temative reform agendas. The pressure to work i n crime 
prevention par tnerships c a n be seen i n s u c h terms. A s mentioned 
above, the reasons for par tnership work ing are generally va l id , i f often 
overlapping. In i ts identification of 'cr i t ical success factors' official 
guidance, of the sort highl ighted i n the l i terature review, has a n idea of 
wha t i t wants to see yet does not k n o w exactly how to b r ing a round 
these success factors. A s the li terature has demonstrated, attempts to 
engineer t hem have not generally succeeded, however, they have 
generated resistance a n d al temative agendas a n d th is i s wha t the 
more cr i t i ca l l i terature on par tnership work ing has often p icked up , i n 
the form of problems s u c h as inter-agency conflicts, or police 
'colonisat ion ' of par tnership bodies. 
The research o n w h i c h th is thesis is based follows a s imi la r l ine 
identifying, as w i t h previous research, the resistance a n d al temative 
agendas. The focus of the research has not been so m u c h on the 
inter-agency conflicts, i n par t because i t concentrated only on the 
police service, bu t i n part also because, as the research uncovered, 
police par t ic ipants generally felt that other agencies tended to leave 
crime a n d disorder reduct ion to the police anyway. They were not 
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par t icular ly interested i n getting more involved a n d the perennial 
p rob lem of getting others to take more of a responsibi l i ty for crime 
prevention evidently remains . Th is research has focused more 
specifically on the intra-agency d imens ion and , as such , i t has helped 
to add detail to our unders tanding of the alternative agendas and 
tactics of resistance, w h i c h other research has highl ighted. 
In the case of the police, we have learned par tnership work ing is 
something the police organisat ion is yet to take completely seriously as 
a route to greater effectiveness, ma in ly due to the cu l tu ra l dominance 
of detectionism a n d the *here a n d now' mental i ty of operational 
pol ic ing, w h i c h is rhetorical ly just i f ied as representing Svhat the publ ic 
wants ' . Par tnership is t aken more ser iously as a means of bu i ld ing 
legit imacy by increas ing what the dominant police cul ture wou ld 
d ismiss as V a r m a n d fluffy' contact w i t h the communi ty , w h i c h is 
symbol ical ly important . Th i s cu l tu ra l resistance to par tnership 
work ing is s imi la r to the cu l tu ra l resistance, w h i c h Reiner (2000) 
identifies as a major barr ier to attempts to enhance police 
accountabil i ty. A s w i t h those efforts, the police demonstrate 
compliance w i t h the requirement to form cr ime prevention 
partnerships, j u s t as they are compl iant w i t h the P A C E Code of 
Practice, however, th is is compliance more w i t h the letter t han the 
spir i t of the law. In the case of par tnership work ing , the compliance 
m a s k s a n in ternal police poli t ic i n w h i c h headquarters seeks to retain 
control of B C U s , rather t han having s u c h control wrest led from them 
by the pol i t ical centre, operating at a distance th rough the govemment 
offices. In s u c h poli t ics , police headquarters suppor ts the wor thy a i m 
of accountabil i ty, yet sees i t more appropriately directed in temal ly , u p 
the police hierarchy, rather t han externally to pol i t ica l 'masters' who, 
as this research demonstrates, the police regard w i t h some C3niical 
suspic ion , not least because of the volat i l i ty of, a n d frequent t idal 
changes i n , pol i t ica l decis ion-making. 
If the research has highl ighted the problems cr ime prevention 
par tnerships face from police resistance, they also demonstrate the 
problems they face from uncer ta in govemment policies. A s previously 
stated, governments m a y k n o w what they wan t bu t they do not 
necessari ly know how to get it, a n d their reform attempts do not 
always meet w i t h success. In par t icular , the cause of par tnership 
work ing was not helped by legislation, w h i c h in i t ia l ly identified the 
police as one of only two responsible authori t ies, w i t h the other i n 
m a n y areas being relatively disinterested, t hus m a k i n g police 
colonisat ion of par tnerships h ighly l ikely, even i f not intended, a 
na tu ra l causa l effect of the police being very aware of 'the b u c k 
s topping ' w i t h them. In addi t ion, the chances of br inging other 
agencies on board were always l imi ted by the l ack of 'joined-up 
government' at the centre, as agencies were pressured to focus on their 
own 'core business ' . Meanwhi le , attempts have been made to drive u p 
performance through the central impos i t ion of a performance 
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management regime a n d set w i t h i n a cr ime management model , w h i c h 
has since been replicated nat ional ly th rough the N I M , further 
emphas is ing the focus on detect ionism to meet targets, b y encouraging 
a short-termist, 'here a n d now' approach to performance wh ich , i n 
large part, mil i tates against strategic, jo ined-up, problem-oriented 
solut ions. A n d the government's sovereignty predicament (Garland, 
2001) ensured that despite the apparent suppor t for problem-oriented 
par tnership work ing , the performance pressure a n d expectation for 
local cr ime a n d disorder control w o u l d always fall u l t imately on the 
police. 
The in t roduct ion of a variety of funding streams since 2001 has done 
little to change this , as other agencies have used s u c h resources more 
to support infrastructures subsequently becoming ends i n themselves 
(auditing and m a p p i n g cr ime has become a n indus t ry , and perhaps 
also a n end, i n i ts own right), and the police have 'chased the money ' 
to make good the resource shortages found elsewhere. The research 
probably paints too pessimist ic a picture here because identifying 
' issues ' tends to equate w i t h identifying 'problems', w h i c h therefore 
overlooks more tangible achievements however even so these problems 
are impor tant to es tabl ish i n order to highl ight the deficiencies of 
government policy. Genu ine par tnership work ing does not necessari ly 
happen ju s t because money is th rown at it. 
Th i s research d i d not focus o n the everyday mechanics of par tnership 
work ing , because i t was more interested i n how s u c h par tnership 
work ing was 'scripted' from the police perspective. H a d it focused on 
these mechanics i t may wel l have found par tnerships appearing to 
work wel l : agencies meeting together on cord ia l terms, audi ts and 
strategies being produced a n d agreed u p o n where necessary, funding 
applicat ions being made a n d spends being properly accounted for. Yet 
a l l of this may have looked l ike good par tnership work ing , however, i t 
w o u l d have h a d a somewhat empty, r i tual is t ic qual i ty to it. Th i s i s not 
to say that this level of analysis is un impor tan t , rather, i t is 'very' 
impor tant that those work ing i n par tnership have the appropriate 
personal and interpersonal quali t ies a n d sk i l l s . However, this 
research has demonstrated that the stage for par tnership work ing is 
really set beyond the interpersonal level, at the organisat ional a n d 
govemmental level, where reform ideas are hatched, received, modified 
and opposed according to a poli t ics of power-dependence between the 
police a n d government. 
There is a theoretical li terature, w h i c h argues that we are entering a 
new era for goveming crime. The new era is character ised by some as 
the shift from 'government' to 'governance' (Pierre a n d Peters 2000), 
w h i c h i n the c r i m i n a l jus t ice context translates as the shift from 
'police' to 'policing' , or from pol ic ing to 'security governance' (Johnston 
a n d Shearing, 2003). Its dis tant cause is seen as being the decline of 
the na t ion state i n the context of economic global isat ion (Pierre a n d 
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Peters, 2000), a n d the emergence of a r i sk society, w h i c h both 
disperses the responsibi l i ty for managing r i sk s s u c h as crime 
(Garland, 2001), a n d encourages a proactive, preventive approach to 
s u c h r i sks . The ar r iva l of cr ime prevention par tnerships appears i n 
sympathy w i t h s u c h developments. It spreads the responsibi l i ty for 
'pol icing ' or 'security governance', bo th broadly conceived, beyond the 
police to other agencies, whether i n the pub l i c sector or further afield 
a n d i t encourages partner agencies to engage i n processes of r i sk 
assessment a n d r i s k management, as typified by cr ime audi t ing and 
problem oriented pol ic ing. It w o u l d be easy, then, to conclude that the 
1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder Ac t , th rough i ts es tabl ishment of C D R P s , 
provide f i rm evidence of this movement into a new era of goveming 
crime. 
However, the resul ts of the research, informing this thesis, casts doubt 
u p o n s u c h a s impl is t ic conc lus ion . The establ ishment of C D R P s is not 
convinc ing evidence of the end of the police service's pre-eminence i n 
loca l cr ime control . The police r emain pre-eminent, i n part because 
what government pol icy appears to take away w i t h one h a n d is 
restored w i t h the other, w i t h greater or lesser degrees of 
deliberateness, since some of this restorat ion is the un in tended 
consequence of practices s u c h as, i ronical ly , the l a ck of jo ined-up 
govemment. However, they remain pre-eminent also because, as other 
research has found, crime prevention par tnerships are vulnerable to 
police colonisat ion, w h i c h again is not always deliberate given the lack 
of interest sometimes shown by other agencies. A n d having colonised 
them, the police organisat ional cul ture then marginal ises them from 
the operational pol ic ing mains t ream, tapping them as a useful source 
of funding whi l s t also seeking to min imise the threat they pose to 
in ternal l ines of police accountabil i ty, a l though at present this is a 
threat that c a n only be contained, a n d not removed altogether. The 
net effect of th is paradoxica l police colonisat ion a n d marginal isa t ion is 
to ensure that, whi l s t C D R P s have altered the loca l cr ime control 
landscape, they have not altered i t fundamental ly, a n d thus ta lk of the 
shift from police to pol ic ing, or of the rise of securi ty govemance is 
premature. Rather t h a n C D R P s providing evidence of the emergence 
of a new era, they represent yet another init iat ive i n police reform, the 
fortunes of w h i c h hang, as do other s u c h init iat ives, on the outcome of 
a contest of wi l l s between police a n d govemment, exis t ing as they do 
i n relations of power-dependence. 
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Chapter 7 - Policy Implications 
The findings of th is thesis point to a n u m b e r of problems, w h i c h have 
ar isen as the police service has been placed unde r pressure to engage 
i n cr ime prevention par tnerships . It suggests, overall, the 
par tnerships covered by this research may not be l iv ing u p to their 
t rue potential . If we accept, nonetheless, 1±iat par tnership work ing i n 
cr ime prevention remains a good idea a n d the case for i t remains a 
compel l ing one, given that the drivers a n d levers for cr ime occurrence 
extend wel l beyond the reach of any single agency, or of the c r imina l 
jus t ice system, then we are left w i t h the challenge of how to take 
things forward i n terms of pol icy development. 
The review of par tnership provisions resul t ing from the 1998 Cr ime 
a n d Disorder A c t (Home Office, 2006) was par t ly premised on the 
Home Office's frustrat ion at performance problems and , i n addi t ion, 
the l ack of delivery a n d vis ib i l i ty of C D R P s . Th i s frustrat ion suggests 
the problems identified i n this research are experienced more widely, 
though the Home Office conceptualises them, as i t wou ld , i n more 
manager ia l is t terms. The Home Office's proposed solu t ion to these 
problems was set out i n the reforms made u n d e r the 2006 Police and 
Jus t i ce Ac t , rol led out from mid-2007 onwards. A m o n g other things, 
this involves the impos i t ion of a set of na t iona l s tandards, based u p o n 
not ional l i a l l m a r k s of effective practice', as ar t icula ted by the Home 
Office (2007) o n the basis of its unders tand ing of wha t the 'best 
performing' C D R P s are doing. 
Whi le i t is too early to tel l whether these reforms have resulted i n the 
requisite 'uplift ' i n C D R P performance, i t is arguable that the reforms 
a n d the na t iona l s tandards repeat m a n y of the errors of the 'what 
makes a good par tnership ' approach d i scussed above i n Chapter 3. 
T h u s , the ha l lmarks isolate factors s u c h as s t rong leadership, 
appropriate seniori ty for agency representatives, a n d the adoption of 
clear par tnership processes. It is difficult to argue vidth the meri ts of 
any of these, however, the point is that whi le these m a y indeed be 
features of the 'best performing' C D R P s , the road to emula t ion may be 
b locked by s t ruc tura l barriers, w h i c h no amount of guidance can shift. 
Th i s work has uncovered some of these barriers , demonstra t ing how 
the police service's attempt to get to grips w i t h par tnership work ing 
has been hampered to some extent by i ts own posi t ional dominance i n 
the loca l cr ime control field; the self-imposed subordina t ion of other 
agencies; its default cu l tu ra l predi lect ion for detectionism; its 
inc l ina t ion to treat par tnership work ing as a source of accountabi l i ty 
pressure requi r ing a degree of 'flag-flying'; the s t rong performance p u l l 
from central government; the central isat ion tendency of the 
constabulary, a n d so forth. The impl ica t ion of the research is that 
more effective par tnership work ing w i l l be difficult to achieve unless 
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tiiese barr iers are overcome, a n d thus the key policy-related question 
ar i s ing from th is research is how this might be done. 
Arguably , a p r inc ipa l source of the barriers uncovered i n this research 
is cu l tu ra l , however, the problems that accrue from this source are 
exacerbated by s t ruc tura l tensions i n police organisat ion. It might be 
naive to expect that s t ruc tura l changes can automat ical ly effect 
cu l tu ra l changes, yet i t is equally naive to conceive of police cidture as 
some immutab le force (Chan, 1997), unaffected by the s t ruc tura l 
organisat ion of the police service. In the case of th is research, the 
s t ruc tura l issue is t i ia t of the posi t ion of the police B C U . It w i l l be 
remembered from the research that, hav ing taken the enlightened step 
of decentral is ing B C U s down to being coterminous w i t h the district 
and un i t a ry local author i ty areas w i t h i n its boundaries , the 
Cons tabula ry then later reversed its decis ion a n d ins tead scaled up to 
four B C U areas, w h i c h have since been reduced to three. These B C U s 
are s t i l l coterminous i n the sense that none of their boundaries cut 
through local author i ty areas, however, two of the B C U s encompass a 
large n u m b e r of C D R P s w i t h i n their new boundar ies , w i t h one 
inc lud ing both un i t a ry a n d non-uni ta ry areas. 
Reasons for the in i t i a l decis ion to establ ish dis tr ic t based coterminous 
B C U s were never sought i n the research, however, logic suggests they 
were pu t i n place i n preparat ion for the ar r iva l of C D R P s i n 1998, 
thereby recognising the importance of par tnership work ing as a 
funct ion of B C U s - something that has also been recognised more 
recently by the Police Superintendents Assoc ia t ion (PSA) (2004). The 
reversal of this decis ion was clearly related to a headquarters c o n c e m 
that B C U commanders were i n danger of 'going native ' - operating wi th 
some autonomy from headquarters, a n d thus act ing as a latent threat 
to the Chie f Constable 's authori ty. However, beyond the potential 
threat to the Ch ie f Constable 's authority, i t i s impor tant to ask what is 
wrong w i t h the idea of B C U commanders 'going native'? Is this not the 
quintessent ial expression of local pol ic ing, a n d of looking to provide 
l o c a l solut ions to local problems' , as the rhetoric su r round ing the 
1998 Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t originally promised? 
It is impor tant to remember, as Loveday (2007: 325) does, that 
following heavy promotion, by amongst others the A u d i t Commiss ion , 
B C U s were devised i n the mid-1990s as "the future b u i l d i n g blocks of 
police forces", replacing the previous s tmc tu re of divis ions and sub­
divis ions w i t h decentralised management, flatter hierarchies and 
firmer terr i torial leadership. The capacity of the B C U to deliver 
decentralised management, however, depends u p o n i ts access to 
f inancia l resources, yet i t is a frequent concern that police 
headquarters have been reluctant to devolve funding to B C U s (HMIC, 
1998 a n d 2000; P S A , 2003). Loveday argues that i n the absence of 
s u c h devolution B C U commanders have t u m e d increas ingly to sources 
of direct funding, w h i c h flow from government offices to C D R P s . This 
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is precisely what was uncovered i n this research, w i t h the police 
viewing their own actions i n a cyn ica l l ight. S u c h cyn i c i sm may have 
been bo rn par t ly of the fact that whi le th is direct funding was used to 
address loca l priori t ies, the local priori t ies themselves h a d been 
manipu la ted by the police to ensure consistency w i t h their own force 
priorit ies, w h i c h i n t u r n fell out of Home Office-imposed priori t ies. 
However, th is i s not so m u c h the police colonis ing C D R P agendas i n 
some sinister, u n d e r h a n d way. Rather, i t is B C U Commanders- doing 
what they shou ld be doing i n pu r su i t of decentral ised management, 
bu t i n a context where decentralised management i s constantly 
undermined by the impos i t ion of priori t ies from 'on h i g h ' - from police 
headquarters, a n d th rough them the Home Office. Tha t is to say that 
there is a cer ta in rat ional i ty to police act ion here, j u s t as, before direct 
funding became available, C D R P s tended to be d i smissed i n the 
research areas as forums requir ing only symbol ic demonstrat ions of 
support a n d a b i t of flag-flying. W h e n the C D R P s were not gateways to 
direct funding, their role for the police was potential ly that of local 
white noise. The police h a d no obligations to respond to local 
communi ty concerns as expressed by C D R P s because they were tak ing 
their s trong cues from the central priori t ies, weighed heavi ly on local 
pol ic ing p lans i n the wake of the 1994 Police a n d Magistrates ' Cour ts 
Act . In a context of s u c h strong central isat ion, a failure to recognise 
the relevance of C D R P s to loca l operat ional pol ic ing is quite 
understandable . 
The way loca l pol ic ing is s t ruc tura l ly organised tends to mili tate 
against the operat ion of C D R P s as effective bodies for delivering local 
solutions to loca l problems, i f that is their purpose, as indeed it shou ld 
be. The establ ishment of B C U s has promised, yet failed, to deliver 
decentralised management, because the boundary-set t ing of B C U s 
remain at the discret ion of the Chief Constable , a n d far too t ied to 
central ly- imposed cr ime reduct ion agendas. T h u s this equates to one 
of the key partners i n C D R P s , the loca l police, being distracted from 
their local tasks . In Crawford's (1997) terms they are, 're-centred' at 
the same t ime as being 'de-centred' a n d by far the strongest influence 
lies w i t h the re-centring, due to the performance management role of 
the centre. 
Whi le there m a y be problems w i t h specific performance indicators , 
w h i c h help to perpetuate a detectionist mental i ty, there is some virtue 
i n New Labour ' s aspi ra t ion to b r ing performance da ta w i t h i n reach of 
local communi t ies , so local people can access informat ion about local 
cr ime problems a n d how they are being addressed. To this end, as set 
out i n their 1999 Cr ime Reduc t ion Strategy, from J a n u a r y 2000, New 
Labour facilitated for the first t ime the pub l ica t ion of cr ime statistics at 
B C U level. A t that t ime there were 318 police B C U s across E n g l a n d 
and Wales, conta in ing 376 C D R P s , a n d this evidently presented a 
slight problem, since performance da ta h a d to be produced for both . 
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creating a s i tua t ion w h i c h was, for loca l people, somewhat confusing. 
Th is p rob lem intensified as, i n a b id to make th is performance data 
more intell igible a n d useful , the Home Office decided to pu t C D R P s 
into Tamily groupings ' (Leigh et a l . , 2000) to a id benchmark ing and 
compar ison . The reason for the intensif icat ion of the problem is that 
the same grouping exercise needed to be under taken for police B C U s , 
a n d was rendered problematic by the fact that the const i tu t ion of 
B C U s , u n l i k e C D R P s , was not fixed. 
Ch ie f Constables are able to change B C U boundar ies as they see fit, 
because s u c h changes are regarded as operat ional matters - hence the 
changes wi tnessed th rough the dura t ion of this research. For those 
seeking to compare performance, this is a potent ial headache. Indeed, 
a research group set u p to es tabl ish the cr i ter ia for B C U family 
groupings encountered this problem. A t the t ime their report was 
pub l i shed i n J u l y 2002 i t h ighl ighted the n u m b e r of B C U s h a d fallen 
from 318 to 280 , 30 new (merged) B C U s hav ing been created i n the 
intervening per iod since J a n u a r y 2000 (Sheldon et a l . , 2002). The 
frequency of police force boundary changes also created problems for 
the Home Office's B C U F u n d , w h i c h was establ ished for the first time 
i n 2 0 0 3 / 2 0 0 4 to enable B C U s to contribute f inancial ly to the work of 
C D R P s . It also created problems for those assess ing the effectiveness 
of specific cr ime control-related interventions. Researchers report ing 
on cr ime level changes i n New Dea l for Communi t i e s (NDC) areas, for 
example, were unable to assess changes i n Leicestershire N D C areas 
because of changes to B C U boundaries , w h i c h rendered stat ist ical 
compar isons impossible (Adamson, 2004). 
The problems ra ised by B C U boundary changes clearly bothered the 
government to the extent that the Nat iona l C o m m u n i t y Safety P l a n 
2006-2009 ( H M Govemment , 2005) contained w i t h i n i t the expectation 
that there w o u l d i n future be coterminousi ty between B C U a n d C D R P 
boundaries , a n d the Home Office's review of the Cr ime a n d Disorder 
A c t (Home Office, 2006) also stressed the need for s u c h 
coterminousi ty. In early 2006 the Home Office consul ted regionally 
about th is matter. Hitherto, between one-quarter a n d one-fifth of 
B C U s h a d been non-coterminous. The upsho t of the consul ta t ion was 
the inser t ion of a clause into the 2006 Police a n d Jus t i ce B i l l that 
proposed pu t t ing B C U s on a statutory footing something that, together 
w i t h the expectation of coterminousity, w o u l d place t h e m on a more 
permanent basis , thereby address ing the performance management 
problem of seeking to tie down constant ly moving targets. 
Th i s proposal was strongly backed by the Loca l Govemment 
Assoc ia t ion (LGA, 2006), w h i c h made the poin t that "strengthening 
loca l police accountabi l i ty is par t icu lar ly impor tan t as the new larger 
strategic police forces [then under consideration] m a y be remote from 
the communi t i es they serve." It also moved Loveday (2007: 334) to 
write approvingly of a "move towards ending the arbi t rary redrawing of 
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B C U boundar ies by chief officers that h a d served to. undermine the 
development of loca l par tnership arrangements." 
However, the clause was as equally strongly opposed to by both A C P O 
and the Assoc ia t ion for Police Author i t ies (APA), who raised the 
predictable objection that s u c h a reform was i n danger of unde rmin ing 
the t radi t ion of constabulary independence. Th i s opposi t ion prompted 
the B i l l manager, a senior Home Office official, to write i n a letter to 
the A P A stat ing that "I c an assure y o u that there are no plans to 
directly fund B C U s " , however, u l t imately i t also prompted a backtrack, 
as the govemment moved a n amendment to the B i l l i n the House of 
Lords , as explained by L o r d Bas sam, whose words, for their 
significance, are wor th quot ing at length (Hansard, 2006 , 76): 
"My Lords, this amendment removes from the Bill the provision which 
would place basic command units on a statutory footing. In explaining 
why we are withdrawing this provision, it is perhaps worth reminding 
the House why we included it in the first instance. There is widespread 
agreement that agencies involved in tackling crime and disorder can 
work best together if their boundaries are aligned. This is particularly 
true in the case of basic command units and local authorities, which are 
the two key pillars of crime and disorder reduction partnerships and 
strategies. Most, if not all, chief constables recognise this, but it is open 
to any new chief constable to alter BCU boundaries. Paragraphs 1 and 
2 of Schedule 2, therefore, simply sought to enshrine in statute the 
requirement for BCU and local authority boundaries to be aligned and 
coterminous, and to place a duty on chief constables to consult key 
partners before altering BCU boundaries. It is undoubtedly the case 
that other motives have been read into this provision... I repeat that, in 
bringing forward this provision, we are concemed solely with ensuring 
that BCUs are coterminous with local authority boundaries to aid 
partnership working on community safety issues. Happily, the police 
service shares that objective. A number of chief constables have moved 
during the past year or so to review their BCU boundaries. I am now 
aware of only she BCUs out of some 225 which are not coterminous with 
local authorities, and in four of these cases the discrepancy is very 
minor. 
As the situation on the ground now largely reflects the outcome we were 
seeking, the govemment are ready to withdraw this provision from the 
Bill. My ministerial colleague, the Minister for Policing, Security and 
Community Safety has, however, written to the Association of Chief 
Police Officers to reinforce out expectation that the principle of 
coterminosity will be observed, save where there are compelling reasons 
for departing from this general rule. 
We have a happy situation here where a policy objective is shared; there 
is commitment to it; and, in large measure, it is in place without the 
more rigorous hand of statute imposing its print on the way in which 
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policing operates. That happy outcome enables me to move the 
amendment. I beg to move." 
This c l imb down is significant because, as indica ted above, the 
government appeared to be concemed enough to steer clear of s t i r r ing 
u p something of a hornets ' nest. L o r d B a s s a m c la ims , effectively, that 
coterminosi ty was sought because of its l ike ly con t r ibu t ion to effective 
communi ty safety, bu t that the means of achieving it, th rough statute, 
was somewhat heavy-handed, r i sk ing a degree of const i tut ional 
conflict, as i t impinged u p o n the pr inciple of constabulary 
independence. However, i s L o r d B a s s a m correct i n suggesting that the 
need for statutory intervention has disappeared because chief 
constables ' have 'seen the l ight ' anyway? In h i s own statement, he 
notes that the n u m b e r of B C U s now (in 2006) s tands at 223 - a 
significant reduct ion from the 280 B C U s exist ing i n 2002 , as noted 
above, a n d significantly fewer t han the 376 C D R P s w i t h w h i c h they are 
expected to engage i n par tnership work ing . 
The t rend has been for B C U s to become larger. Fo r example, since the 
al locat ion of the B C U F u n d i n 2 0 0 6 / 0 7 , Thames Val ley has seen a 
reduct ion i n B C U s from 10 to 5, a n d N o r t h u m b r i a has seen a 
reduct ion from 15 to 6. C B y m e (2001: 125) says i n relat ion to B C U 
size that "When the A u d i t C o m m i s s i o n in i t ia l ly proposed the concept 
[of B C U s ] the ideal number was reckoned to be between 150 and 200 
police officers. B y the late 1990s the idea l n u m b e r h a d become for 
most forces between 250 a n d 350 officers. Some forces how have 
B C U s of over 400 officers a n d at least one force has B C U s of 1000." 
A s Loveday (2006) observes, the numbers of s u c h very large B C U s 
have grown significantly since the time C B y m e made this observation, 
a n d s u c h calculat ions also fail to take account of the (growing) 
number s of police suppor t staff. The case for ever-larger B C U s , 
Loveday (2006) says, rests on the professional judgement of chief 
constables, yet, as he points out there has been very little analysis to 
suppor t s u c h a case. Elsewhere (2005: 277) he notes that, "there 
appears to be a shared perception within the police organisation that 
BCUs with relatively small manpower numbers are unviable although 
there appears to be no clear research evidence that this is the case 
either." 
Loveday a n d others do not share th is view. The danger wi th the 
growing size of B C U s is that they become more a n d more remote from 
the communi t ies that they are supposed to serve, therefore, open u p 
a n accountabi l i ty gap. As Loveday (2006) points out, this gap is 
par t icu lar ly noticeable i n two-tier areas where the large B C U s - s u c h 
as those now i n existence i n the site of this research - cover a number 
of different C D R P s . S u c h a model , of large B C U s embrac ing smaller 
C D R P s , fits w i t h the changes brought by the 2006 Police a n d Jus t ice 
Act , as the strategic role of lower tier C D R P s is supposed to be 
migrated upwards to the L A A s set by the p r inc ipa l county authorities, 
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a n d th is fit helps to expla in w h y the govemment was prepared to 
wi thdraw its controversial c lause fi-om the preceding B i l l , as noted 
above. However, whi le the govemment a n d A C P O m a y be seeing eye-
to-eye on this issue, th is does not necessari ly m e a n that they have got 
it r ight. Despite the provis ion to migrate the strategic role of lower tier 
C D R P s to the county L A A , there r emain serious misgivings about the 
l ikely tensions that this w i l l cause, as the lower tier C D R P s are 
pressured to concentrate u p o n delivery, thereby los ing some of their 
democratic voice a n d influence u p o n the shape of these strategies, 
notwi ths tanding the fact that the Home Office (2007) expects that 
lower tier communi ty safety portfolio holders w i l l have a direct i npu t to 
the county L A A s . 
M a k i n g provis ion for i npu t is a l l very wel l , however, this does not 
recognise the potent ia l conflicts that w i l l ensue, a n d there is no 
guarantee that they w i l l be resolved i n ways that ensure that local 
voices are heard - par t icu lar ly when , despite the rhetoric of loca l i sm 
that underp ins L A A s , i t s t i l l remains the case that they are subjected 
to the same k i n d of performari.ee management regime, albeit under the 
new name of the Assessment of Pol ic ing a n d C o m m u n i t y Safety 
(APACS) (see Home Office, 2007). 
The impor tant poin t is that there w i l l be pressure for s tandardisat ion. 
A quote from a recent report of the Police Au thor i ty of Wales (2007: 6) 
is very revealing i n this regard: 
"There is a rea l l ike l ihood that a l l , or most , of the seven 
par tnership areas i n Sou th Wales, reflecting the Loca l Author i ty 
a n d B C U boundaries , w i l l have progressed their L S P development 
work ahead of the release of the formal l e a m i n g from the W A G 
Development sites. Th i s i s not necessari ly a b a d th ing . However, 
wha t i t does mean for a n organisat ion s u c h as the S o u t h Wales 
Police i s that i t w i l l need to relate to seven different L S B s , a n d may 
wel l find itself hav ing to work to seven different approaches. It is 
impor tant for S o u t h Wales Police that i ts B C U Commander s have a 
clear sense of direct ion w h e n representing the chief constable i n 
local d iscuss ions , a n d that, as far as possible, i t is able to 
influence loca l development so that the disadvantages associated 
w i t h work ing to" 7 different s tmctures a n d approaches are l imited." 
In Wales , a l l loca l authori t ies are un i ta ry authori t ies , so there is one-
to-one coterminousi ty w i t h B C U s . The above quote suggests that the 
S o u t h Wales constabulary w i l l a i m to work, as the constabulary d id i n 
this research, to stop B C U commanders from 'going native' . In two tier 
areas i n Eng land , where large B C U s embrace a n u m b e r of C D R P s , this 
problem w i l l be worse: B C U s w i l l be under pressure to standardise 
w i th in their terr i torial boundaries , a n d constabular ies w i l l do the 
same, another step removed. In s u c h a scenario, the prospects for 
loca l i sm does not look good. 
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Another example of the potential p roblem to accrue from larger B C U s 
embrac ing smal ler C D R P s c a n be found i n a pub l i ca t ion intended for 
cr ime analysts (Chapman, 2006: 8), w h i c h points out that the 
accommodat ion of a n u m b e r of C D R P s w i t h i n larger B C U s i n Dorset 
"has helped to reduce bureaucracy a n d dupl ica t ion of par tnership 
forums, provide consis tency i n terms of performance agendas, 
encourage enhanced strategic t h i n k i n g a n d developed more consistent 
service delivery." The author of this article evidently finds s u c h things 
advantageous, a n d s u c h th ink ing was clearly also i n evidence when 
the Home Office was pondering, i n its review of the Cr ime a n d Disorder 
Act , the possible merger of C D R P s - a step i t eventually decided not to 
take, preferring to advocate ins tead the awkward s trategic/operat ional 
spl i t between counties and lower tier C D R P s . A g a i n , however, little 
account is t aken of the potential disadvantages i n terms of the loss of 
loca l i sm. 
Interestingly, i n a n argument that w o u l d not have looked out of place 
coming from one of the media-dubbed l o o n y left' loca l authorit ies of 
the 1980s, the shadow home secretary D a v i d Davis has pu t forward a 
s trong argument for loca l police accountabi l i ty , say ing of B C U s that 
"local people have no control over them whatsoever ... there mus t be a 
formal m e c h a n i s m to pu t loca l accountabi l i ty i n place." (cited i n 
Loveday, 2006). A s imi la r argument has been made by the Policy 
Exchange (see Loveday a n d Reid , 2003), a n d more recently by B r a n d 
(2007: 4) for the Nat iona l Loca l Government Network: 
"Local ly elected counci l s , a n d th rough them communi t ies , shou ld be 
pu t back at the heart of a n overly-centraHsed c r i m i n a l jus t ice system 
that i s s t ruggl ing to ma in t a in the pub l i c t rust . We argue that a more 
local ly tai lored a n d responsive c r i m i n a l jus t ice service wou ld 
strengthen c o m m u n i t y ties, restore faith i n the c r i m i n a l jus t ice system 
a n d reduce fear of cr ime. Strengthening the role of loca l authorit ies i n 
pol ic ing can deliver visible police accountabi l i ty , increase efficiency, 
improve service co-ordination, strengthen c o m m u n i t y engagement, 
target loca l cr ime more effectively a n d create a police force that is t ru ly 
embedded w i t h i n the local communi ty i t serves. C o u n c i l Leaders, as 
the figureheads for local democracy a n d direct ly accountable to the 
publ ic vote, s h o u l d lead and support s u c h a system." 
Interestingly, a n d important ly, this argument has also been made by 
the P S A , the staff associat ion, w h i c h represents B C U Commanders , 
who are often deeply frustrated by the l ack of delegated funding a n d 
dec is ion-making they have been given i n wha t are supposed to be 
s tructures for decentralised management. The P S A , as Loveday (2006) 
points out, i s prepared to countenance a m u c h greater role for local 
authorit ies i n the h i r ing a n d firing of B C U Commanders , a n d the 
determinat ion of local pol ic ing policy, thereby p lac ing loca l pol ic ing 
very m u c h w i t h i n the corporate management s t ructures of local 
govemment. 
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So, thus far, whi le central govemment has supported a n d promoted 
the idea of coterminousi ty between B C U s a n d C D R P s , i t has done so at 
a level of abst ract ion that goes wel l beyond the boundar ies of lower-
tier, bu t sometimes also un i ta ry C D R P s ; a n d i ts promot ion stops a 
long way short of j o in ing u p pol ic ing a n d loca l government at the local 
pol i t ica l level, i n order to enhance local accoimtabi l i ty . Th i s is not so 
m u c h because accountabi l i ty is un impor tan t to central government, 
rather because i t priori t ises calculative a n d cont rac tua l (Reiner and 
Spencer, 1993) manager ia l accountabi l i ty over loca l pol i t ica l 
accountabi l i ty , a n d remains wedded to the managerial is t idea that 
bigger B C U s (and CDRPs) w i l l deliver economies of scale. Hence, 
coterminousi ty is attractive because, for example, as we have seen i t 
makes performance measurement considerably easier, as we l l as jo in t 
inspect ion u n d e r the new A P A C S regime, a n d i t also makes i t easier to 
govem loca l pol ic ing a n d C D R P s directly bu t at a distance, through 
government offices, w h i c h cont inue to have s t rong influence over the 
contents of L A A s . 
The argument here, however, is that the case for smal ler B C U s 
operating under stronger regimes of loca l accountabi l i ty is a 
compel l ing one as i t offers the best prospect of overcoming the barriers 
that have been uncovered i n this research, w h i c h have prevented the 
loca l police from m a k i n g a more effective cont r ibu t ion to crime 
prevention par tnerships . Loca l pol i t ica l accountabi l i ty w o u l d give 
other partners a m u c h stronger stake i n loca l cr ime control , poss ibly 
succeeding where devices s u c h as Sect ion 17 of the Cr ime and 
Disorder A c t have ostensibly failed. It w o u l d make i t less l ikely that 
partners - par t icular ly loca l authori t ies - w o u l d s imply defer to police 
expertise, because, i n a m u c h more meaningful way cr ime control 
w o u l d also be their business. For their part, the police w o u l d be less 
l ike ly to treat par tnership work ing as a n opportuni ty for a bi t of flag-
flying a n d tokenist ic support , because they w o u l d be par t of a 
corporate s tmc tu re that was m u c h more focused u p o n delivering local 
communi ty safety, because i t was directly accountable to the local 
electorate for this , rather than , as now, because i t is obliged to comply 
w i t h centra l policy, w h i c h m a y encourage C D R P s to be viewed more as 
vehicles for pub l i c relations t han for loca l delivery. B y the same token, 
since loca l agencies w o u l d a l l be ' in i t together', the police inc l ina t ion 
to take the lead w o u l d be more muted, s imply because other agencies 
w o u l d be less l ikely to let them. Par t icular ly because the drivers for 
cr ime lie beyond the c r i m i n a l jus t ice system, loca l communi ty safety 
practice s h o u l d not necessari ly give pr ior i ty to police act ions against 
crime, a n d m a k i n g crime a t m l y corporate responsibi l i ty m a y be the 
best way of de-centring the police from local cr ime control , whi l s t s t i l l 
recognising their c m c i a l importance. 
Al so , while i t cannot be regarded as a panacea, stronger loca l pol i t ical 
accountabi l i ty might offer the best prospect for t ack l ing the 
detectionist mental i ty w h i c h prevails w i t h i n the police service and 
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w h i c h has been encouraged by the Home Office's cr ime reduct ion 
performance management regime, a n d the 'detectionist friendly' 
deplo5anent of the N I M . 
Presently, the police are primus inter pares i n the bus iness of local 
cr ime control , a n d the Cr ime a n d Disorder A c t has done little to 
challenge this s tatus - indeed, the reinvigorat ion of loca l pol ic ing 
u n d e r neighbourhood pol ic ing may have, i f anjdi i ing, exacerbated the 
problem. Embedd ing the police service more f i rmly w i t h i n structures 
of loca l govemment, a n d reducing some of the performance 
management influence from the centre, w o u l d challenge both their 
loca l independence a n d their autonomy, a n d i n so doing i t wou ld go 
some way to chal lenging a dominant cul ture that, as C h a n (1997) 
observes, is not immutable , let alone monol i th ic , as the part icipants 
from this research, w i t h a genuine en thus i a sm for partnership 
work ing , have clearly demonstrated. A n d finally, w i t h the police 
service being more seriously confronted w i t h a demand to change their 
way of working , a n d to engage more meaningful ly i n partnership 
work ing to tackle the 'wicked i ssue ' of cr ime, i t i s surely more l ikely 
that they w o u l d begin to address the t ra in ing need i n partnership 
work ing , w h i c h th is research revealed has been sadly l ack ing . 
A s noted above, loca l accountabi l i ty w o u l d be no sudden panacea, a n d 
the benefits identified here are necessari ly speculative at this stage. It 
s h o u l d be recognised that loca l i sm is not necessar i ly a n unmit igated 
benefit - there clearly are dangers of undue loca l pol i t ica l influence 
over a publ ic service as pol i t ical ly sensitive as pol ic ing. Yet at present 
the dangers of u n d u e central influence m a y be plajdng out i n the 
difficulties experienced by C D R P s i n m a k i n g a real i ty of partnership 
work ing when the police, i n par t icular , are exposed to this de-
centr ing/re-centr ing dialectic, w h i c h tends to ma in t a in their 
independence from other loca l agencies i n general, a n d the local 
author i ty i n par t icular . The conc lus ion of th is thesis is that i t is the 
problems a c c m i n g from this central influence, a n d the const i tut ional 
independence of the police from local pol i t ica l control , that creates the 
barriers to par tnership work ing uncovered by th is research. They 
cannot easily be wished away by clearer centra l guidance a n d 
direct ion, bu t they m a y j u s t be overcome by local pol i t ical 
accountabil i ty. There is a d i scemib le movement for loca l democratic 
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A Survey of Multi-Agency Partnership Working 
A Definition 
While agencies have always worked together i n terms, for example, of 
routine referral i.e. domestic violence, this is inter-agency, rather than 
mult i-agency, work. Mul t i -agency par tnerships typical ly require more 
frequent a n d more intense contact between agencies. In addi t ion, this 
is normal ly under taken vidth a long te rm a n d wider perspective. M u l t i -
agency par tnerships are now more common, a n d it is these 
par tnerships , w h i c h are the focus of th is research. 
Research A i m 
It i s hoped that by your co-operation i n th is work I m a y be able to 
provide a n ind ica t ion as to how the police service has evolved and 
embraced the phi losophy of mult i -agency work ing . 
The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire covers some general i ssues about mult i -agency 
par tnerships as wel l as details about y o u r own background . 
I appreciate that w i t h the mass of paperwork on y o u r desk this 
represents yet another task. However, I a m sure y o u w i l l acknowledge 
that wi thout assessing s u c h issues we as a service w i l l not be i n a 
pos i t ion to progress. 
W h e n completed please re tu rn i t to; 
A/Superintendent Stuart Lander 
Paignton Police Station 
South and West B C U 
T h a n k y o u i n ant ic ipat ion. 
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Experience of Partnership Working 
1. In your current role, or previously, do you work with other 
agencies/organisations to address crime and disorder issues; 
Yes 
No (If no go to Q6) 
2. Which of the following agencies or services do/have you 
worked with? (tick as many as required) 
Socia l service department 
E d u c a t i o n department 
Loca l author i ty other (please specify) 
Hea l th service (please specify part).... 
Probat ion service 
Pr i son Service 
Fire service 
Vo lun ta ry sector 
Other (please specify) 
Other (please specify) 
Other (please specify) 
3. How would you describe the nature of the most recent piece of 
work you have undertaken with other agencies.? 
Strategic (e.g. the p l ann ing of service delivery) 
Operat ional (e.g. the delivery of services) 
Mix tu re of both 
4. Approximately what proportion of a typical working week 
(expressed as a percentage) do you devote to partnership 
working in your present post (or a previous one if your current 
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role does not require partnership work)? 
"I spend approximately Q L J L J % of the work ing week on 
par tnership work ing" 
5. "I am allowed enough capacity within my workload to fully 
engage in partnership working." 
Strongly Agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly Disagree 
Please evidence your response to question 5. 
6. "The work that I put in to multi-agency partnerships is valued 
by my own organisation?" 
Strongly Agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly Disagree 
Please evidence your response to question 6. 
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7. Are you formally appraised at work by a supervisor or 
manager? 
Yes 
No • (If no go to Q9) 




9. Have you received any training or instruction regarding how 
to undertake multi-agency partnership working? 
Yes 
No (If no go to Q12) 
10. Please briefly describe the nature of this training. 
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11. Who provided this training? 
In-house \ ^ 
B y one of the mult i -agency partners C 
Independent t ra in ing agency C 
other (please specify) G 
12. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was intended to make 
several key agencies work together with the community to 
deliver to reduce crime and disorder. Are you aware of this 
legislation and its aim? 
Yes 
No 
13. How would you judge your current knowledge of the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998. 
Excel lent 5 4 3 2 1 No Unders tand ing 
14. "The Devon and Cornwall Constabulary has placed 
partnership working fully the core of its operating culture." 
To what extent do you agree with this statement. 
Strongly Agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly Disagree 
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What evidence can you provide to support your answer to 
question 14. 
15. Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the 
following statements; 
• D85CC has par tnership work ing as a core po l ic ing activity. 
Strongly agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree 
• The police s h o u l d have the lead responsibi l i ty for managing crime 
a n d disorder i n local communi t ies . 
Strongly agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree 
• M u l t i agency par tnerships work ing is really only a sideline to our 
core business! 
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strongly agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree 
Pol ic ing needs to get back to law enforcement a n d not become 
overly bothered by par tnership working! 
Strongly agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree 
Par tnersh ip w o r k i n g undermines our core bus iness of l aw 
enforcement. 
Strongly agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree 
Devon a n d C o r n w a l l Cons tabulary are fully commit ted to m u l t i 
agency work ing . 
Strongly agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree 
It i s essential that the police service pushes more of a responsibi l i ty 
for the management of crime a n d disorder onto the shoulders of 
other agencies l ike loca l authorit ies. 
Strongly agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree 
The police shou ld concentrate on serious cr ime a n d leave minor 
cr imes a n d disorder to our partner agencies. 
Strongly agree 5 4 3 2 1 Strongly disagree 
. If you could shape the future of partnership working in 
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary what would you do? What 
would your vision for such working look like? 
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17. Is there anything you wish to add in relation to the police 
service and its partnership involvement with other agencies 
and organisations. 
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3. Length of service with the police (years) 
4. Current rank/role 
Constable 
Sergeant 
Inspec tor /Chief Inspector . 
Super in tendent / Ch ie f Superintendent 
Ass i s tan t Ch ie f Constable a n d above 
Police Staff - Specify grade 
5. Current role 
Uni fo rm Response 
CID 
Neighbourhood Beat 
Special is t (specify) 
Managemen t /Supe rv i s ion (specify). 
Police staff (specify) 
6. How long have you worked in your present post? 
I have worked in this post for • • years and U U months 
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